THE  WORLD  PERIL 


AMERICA'S  INTEREST 
IN  THE  WAR 


BY 

MEMBERS  OF  THE  FACULTY  OF 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

PRINCETON 

LONDON :  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
OXFORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1917 


Copyright,  1917,  by 
Princeton  University  Press 

Published  October,  1917 
Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


T  "T-"  -J 


SRLF 
URL 
D 

CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction     1 

John  Grier  Hibben 

Chapter  I 

American  Rights  Imperilled 5 

Henry  van  Dyke 

Chapter  II 

Democracy  Imperilled 19 

Thomas  Jefferson  Wertenbaker 

Chapter  III 
International  Law  Imperilled 53 

Edward  S.  Corwin 

Chapter  IV 

The  World  Balance  of  Power  Imperilled      82 

Mason  W.  Tyler 

Chapter  V 

The  World  Peril  and  the  Two  Americas     106 

Clifton  R.  Hall 

Chapter  VI 
The  World  Peril  and  American  Interests 

in  the  Far  East 190 

Mason  W.  Tyler 

Chapter  VII 

The  World  Peril  and  World  Peace 213 

Philip  Marshall  Brown 


THE  WORLD  PERIL 

INTRODUCTION 

The  Department  of  History  and  Politics  of 
Princeton  University  offers  the  articles  of  this 
volume  as  an  especial  contribution  to  the  more 
accurate  understanding  of  the  reasons  for  the 
entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  European 
War,  and  to  the  more  vivid  appreciation  of  all 
that  is  involved  in  the  outcome  of  this  conflict. 
There  is  an  imperative  need  today  that  every 
American  citizen  should  clearly  discern  the  full 
significance  of  a  Teutonic  victory.  This  volume 
will  greatly  aid  in  illuminating  the  understand- 
ing of  any  who  may  still  be  unable  or  unwilling 
to  appreciate  the  bearing  of  the  issues  of  this 
war  upon  their  own  country  and  the  world.  It 
is  well  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  offers  to 
refresh  our  memory  and  fortify  our  resolution 
by  a  frank  rehearsal  from  a  new  point  of  view 
of  the  proved  facts  of  German  political  policy 
and  ambition. 

To  establish  a  Germanic  world  empire,  to 
realize  her  arrogant  pretensions  that  the  Ger- 
mans are  a  superior  race  and  destined  by  divine 
decree  to  subdue  all  peoples  to  an  unquestion- 
ing obedience  to  her  autocratic  sway,  with  an 
insolent  insistence  that  all  means  are  justified 

1 


2  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

by  the  sacred  end  of  the  German  will  to  rule — 
broken  treaties,  the  ingenuity  of  scientific  sav- 
agery, campaigns  of  frightfulness,  wanton 
cruelty,  mocking  the  restraints  of  moral  law, 
the  dictates  of  mercy,  the  demands  of  decency 
and  the  promptings  of  chivalry — this  is  the 
Teutonic  program.  Americans  should  not  allow 
themselves  to  forget  this  or  to  minimize  its 
import. 

A  nation  that  has  been  inhuman  in  war  will 
be  merciless  in  victory.  Within  the  last  few 
days  Count  Zu  Reventlow  has  been  quoted  in 
the  press  as  saying  that  the  moral  law  is  bind- 
ing as  between  Germans,  but  not  as  between 
Germans  and  other  nations.  If  this  is  an  ethical 
creed  obtaining  in  war,  it  will  not  be  set  aside 
by  a  nation  flushed  with  victory  and  glutted 
with  the  spoils  and  indemnities  of  war.  Our 
pacifist  friends  whose  well  meaning  utterances 
in  this  present  crisis  are  nothing  more  or  less 
than  treason  should  consider  the  inevitable  ten- 
dency of  their  peace  propaganda.  It  means 
either  a  direct  and  immediate  surrender  to  Ger- 
man demands  and  the  consummation  of  a  Ger- 
man victory,  or  an  inconclusive  outcome  of  the 
present  war,  affording  to  Germany  the  oppor- 
tunity and  the  means  to  reconstruct  her  war 
machine  and  precipitate  within  the  next  genera- 
tion another  world  conflict  and  agony. 

We  dare  not  pay  the  price  of  a  premature 
peace.  Rather  let  us  be  willing  to  undergo  any 
sacrifice,  to  suffer,  to  endure  to  the  end  all  the 
miserable  woe  and  sorrow  of  a  protracted  war. 


INTRODUCTION  3 

If  Germany  has  been  misrepresented  and  is 
fighting  a  fair  war  in  a  fair  way  with  the  legiti- 
mate purpose  solely  to  defend  her  own  land  and 
her  own  people,  then  this  war  should  end  at 
once  and  an  equitable  compromise  be  sought 
and  secured.  If,  however,  one  is  constrained  to 
believe  that  the  success  of  Germany  will  prove 
the  scourge  of  the  world,  then  there  is  no  escape 
from  the  grim  conclusion  that  this  war  must 
be  fought  to  a  finish,  whatever  may  be  the  ac- 
cumulated misery  for  us  and  our  children. 

John  Grier  Hebbeit. 
Princeton,  N.  J., 
August  27,  1917. 


CHAPTER  I 

AMERICAN  RIGHTS  IMPERILLED 

Conscientious    Objectors    of    the    Fourth    of 

July  Type1 

Hon.  Henry  van  Dyke,  D.C.L.  (Oxon.) 

The  Fourth  of  July  is  a  good  day  for  setting 
forth  the  case  and  maintaining  the  cause  of 
true  Conscientious  Objectors,  like  the  men  who 
signed  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in  1776. 
This  is  what  I  propose  to  do. 

The  name  "conscientious  objector"  has  suf- 
fered much  from  its  modern  appropriation  by 
people  whose  conscience  centres  in  the  idea  of 
non-resistance.  They  think  it  always  wrong  to 
fight,  even  for  the  protection  of  justice  and  hu- 
manity. They  object  to  the  use  of  force  even 
to  defend  the  right  against  the  force  which  is 
used  to  inflict  wrong.  Persons  who  have  had 
that  particular  kind  of  conscience  long  enough 
to  make  sure  that  it  is  not  a  cloak  for  cowardice 
or  sedition,  should  be  allowed  to  obey  it.  If  a 
man  cannot  fight  for  his  country,  let  him  work. 
If  he  will  not  work,  neither  let  him  eat. 

But  let  him  not  dare  to  claim  that  he  is  the 
real  or  the  only  "conscientious  objector."    He 

1  Address  at  Madison  Barracks,     July  4,  1917. 

5 


6  THE  WOELD  PEEIL 

belongs  to  a  small  and  narrow  class.  There  are 
millions  of  men  who  have  a  larger  and  more 
heroic  conscience.  They  object  to  the  tyranny 
of  unrighteousness  even  more  than  they  object 
to  fighting.  And  they  have  not  been  afraid  to 
risk  everything  in  the  defense  of  justice,  lib- 
erty, and  human  rights. 

The  English  men  who  met  at  Eunnymede  in 
1215  to  force  the  Magna  Carta  of  English  lib- 
erties from  their  base  King  John  were  con- 
scientious objectors  to  a  rotten  regal  autocracy. 

William  the  Silent,  who  raised  the  banner  of 
freedom  in  the  Netherlands  in  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury, was  a  conscientious  objector  to  the  brutal 
tyranny  of  Philip  II  of  Spain.  He  wrote  in 
1568:  "We  are  unable,  by  reason  of  our  loyal 
service  due  to  his  Majesty,  and  of  our  true  com- 
passion for  the  faithful  lieges,  to  look  with  tran- 
quillity any  longer  at  such  murders,  robberies, 
outrages  and  agony.  We  take  up  arms  there- 
fore to  oppose  the  violent  tyranny  of  the  Span- 
iards, by  the  help  of  the  merciful  God,  who  is 
the  enemy  of  all  bloodthirstiness. " 

Hampden,  Pym,  and  Cromwell  were  conscien- 
tious objectors  in  the  seventeenth  century  when 
they  resisted  the  claim  of  King  Charles  I  to  the 
divine  right  of  a  monarch  to  impose  a  people's 
wrong.    They  fought  him  and  they  beat  him. 

The  signers  of  the  American  Declaration  of 
Independence  were  conscientious  objectors  in 
1776,  when  they  drew  up  their  famous  protest 
against  the  attempt  of  the  German  King  of 
England  George  III,  and  his  fat-witted  minis- 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  7 

ter  Lord  North,  to  enslave  and  oppress  the 
American  colonists  by  military  force.  Read  the 
history  of  the  American  Revolution  carefully, 
and  you  will  see  that  it  was  not  a  Rebellion :  it 
was  a  Resistance  against  an  illegal  assertion  of 
power  by  an  autocrat.  It  was  a  repetition  of 
the  lessons  which  Great  Britain  herself  had 
taught  us  in  her  great  objection  to  the  Stuart 
tyranny.  It  was  a  prophecy  of  the  causes  which 
have  brought  us  to  her  side  today.  The  reasons 
which  forced  us  to  fight  against  George  III  in 
1776  are  precisely  the  same  as  those  which  bring 
us  to  take  part  with  Great  Britain,  and  with  our 
old  and  true  friend  France,  in  resistance  to  this 
last  unjust  and  violent  assertion  by  a  German 
monarchy,  that  it  has  a  right  to  rule  the  world 
by  military  might. 

Abraham  Lincoln  was  a  conscientious  ob- 
jector when  he  wrote  to  the  men  who  were  try- 
ing to  destroy  the  United  States  in  1861,  "In 
every  event,  to  the  extent  of  my  ability,  I  shall 
repel  force  by  force". 

Woodrow  Wilson  was  a  conscientious  objector 
when  he  sent  his  great  message  to  the  United 
States  Congress  on  April  2, 1917,  declaring  that 
the  present,  avowed,  ruthless  "German  sub- 
marine warfare  against  commerce  is  a  warfare 
against  mankind".  He  continued:  "I  advise 
that  the  Congress  declare  the  recent  course  of 
the  Imperial  German  Government  to  be  in  fact 
nothing  less  than  war  against  the  Government 
and  people  of  the  United  States,  that  it  formally 
accept  the  status  of  belligerent  which  has  thus 


8  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

been  thrust  upon  it ;  and  that  it  take  immediate 
steps  not  only  to  put  the  country  in  a  more 
thorough  state  of  defense,  but  also  to  exert  all 
its  power  and  employ  all  its  resources  to  bring 
the  German  Government  to  terms,  and  end  the 
war '  \ 

That  is  a  magnificent,  measured,  sane  state- 
ment of  the  position  of  true  conscientious  ob- 
jectors today.  It  sets  forth  the  aim  which  they 
have  at  heart:  "to  end  the  war".  It  states  the 
only  way  by  which  that  end  can  be  achieved, 
by  a  victory  which  shall  "bring  the  German 
Government  to  terms '  \  Let  me  sum  up  briefly 
the  nature  of  our  objections  to  Germany's  war. 


I.  We  object  to  the  existence  of  this  war.  It 
is  a  needless,  wasteful,  horrible  conflict  which 
should  never  have  been  begun.  The  offense  of 
choosing,  forcing  and  beginning  it  lies  on  Ger- 
many's head. 

By  the  head  of  Germany  I  mean  whatever 
power  has  actually  controlled  that  country  in 
her  recent  policy  and  action. 

Some  say  it  is  the  Kaiser,  and  many  of  his 
own  remarks  seem  to  indicate  that  he  himself 
is  under  that  impression. 

Others  say  that  he  is  little  more  than  an  im- 
posing figure-head,  and  that  the  real  power  lies 
with  a  group  of  men  who  surround  him,  his 
counsellors,  the  great  manufacturers,  shipping- 
merchants,  heads  of  corporations  and  Junker 
land-owners. 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  9 

Others  say  that  the  ruling  class  in  Germany 
is  the  military  and  naval  clique  which  had  built 
up  an  enormous  instrument  of  war,  fitted  with 
all  modern  devices  for  destroying  life  and  prop- 
erty, and  which  could  not  be  content  until  they 
had  a  chance  to  use  their  new  machine.  That 
sounds  childish,  but  it  is  none  the  less  likely 
to  be  true. 

However  that  may  be,  the  power,  or  the  com- 
bination of  powers  in  Germany  and  Austria, 
which  sent  the  armies  into  the  field  and  keeps 
them  there,  is  the  criminal  guilty  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  bloody  and  unnecessary  world  war 
of  the  twentieth  century. 

Understand  I  do  not  now  profess  to  speak 
of  the  causes,  of  the  conflicting  national  inter- 
ests, which  lie  behind  this  great  conflict.  They 
reach  back  to  the  capture  of  Constantinople  by 
the  Turks  in  1453,  and  perhaps  even  farther. 
It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  in  those  multi- 
tudinous international  disputes,  differences  and 
strifes,  the  right  was  all  on  the  side  of  one  na- 
tion, or  of  any  one  group  of  nations.  Indeed 
the  groups  have  formed  and  reformed  them- 
selves so  frequently,  and  with  so  many  changes, 
that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  trace  the  heredity 
of  great  alliances  today. 

But  our  point  is  this:  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  condition  of  the  international  questions 
of  Europe  and  of  the  so-called  balance  of  power 
in  1914,  there  was  absolutely  no  reason  and  no 
justification  for  choosing  and  forcing  war  as  a 
method  of  attempting  to  settle  those  difficulties. 


10  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

Take  the  Austro-Servian  quarrel,  which  was 
made  the  nominal  root  and  origin  of  all  the  evil 
that  has  been  brought  upon  us.  An  Austrian 
Archduke  and  his  wife  were  assassinated  on 
June  28,  1914,  on  a  visit  to  the  capital  of  the 
province  of  Bosnia.  The  assassins  were  Aus- 
trian subjects,  of  doubtful  character.  The 
Austrian  Government  despatched  an  ultimatum 
on  July  23  accusing  the  Servian  Government  of 
complicity  in  this  crime,  and  demanding  by  way 
of  punishment  conditions  which  would  practi- 
cally destroy  the  independence  of  Servia  as  a 
nation.  Forty-eight  hours  were  given  as  the 
period  in  which  this  ultimatum  must  be  abso- 
lutely accepted  in  all  its  terms.  The  Servian 
Government  replied  by  practically  accepting  all 
of  the  terms  but  one,  and  by  stating  that  it  did 
not  understand  that  term,  and  that  it  would  be 
willing  to  refer  the  matter  for  peaceable  solu- 
tion to  the  decision  of  the  International  Court 
at  The  Hague,  or  to  the  decision  of  the  Great 
Powers  who  signed  the  Declaration  of  1909. 
Now  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  either  that 
Germany  did  not  know  the  terms  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum  before  it  was  sent  to  Servia, 
or  that  she  was  ignorant  of  the  tenor  of  Servia 's 
submissive  and  peaceful  answer,  or  that  she  was 
unaware  of  the  grave  danger  which  would  arise 
on  the  side  of  Eussia  if  the  independence  of  the 
Servian  nation  should  be  overridden  by  Austria. 

During  this  time  the  British  Government 
made  earnest  efforts  to  avert  the  storm  of  war 
which  Germany  determined  to  let  loose.    It  was 


AMEEICAN  RIGHTS  11 

proposed  by  the  British  Foreign  Minister  that 
the  French,  Italian  and  German  Ambassadors 
should  meet  him  in  conference  immediately,  to 
discover  an  issue  which  would  preserve  peace. 
He  also  suggested  that  these  four  Powers, — two 
from  the  Triple  Alliance  and  two  from  the  En- 
tente, Germany  and  Italy,  and  Great  Britain 
and  France, — should  mediate  between  Austria, 
Servia  and  Russia  either  at  Vienna  or  at  St. 
Petersburg.  France  and  Italy  on  July  27  ac- 
cepted Great  Britain's  proposal  for  this  confer- 
ence. On  the  same  day  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  refused  it.  Direct  conversations  were 
begun  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg. 
That  afternoon  the  Kaiser,  who  had  been  yacht- 
ing at  Kiel,  returned  to  Potsdam! 

On  the  next  day,  July  28,  Austria  declared 
war  on  Servia,  and  on  the  following  day  Russia 
began  to  mobilize  her  armies  in  the  districts 
bordering  upon  Servia  and  Austria.  On  this 
same  day  the  late  Czar  of  Russia  telegraphed 
to  the  Emperor  William  as  follows:  "Thanks 
for  your  telegram,  which  is  conciliatory  and 
friendly,  whereas  the  official  message  presented 
today  by  your  Ambassador  to  my  Minister  was 
conveyed  in  a  very  different  tone.  I  beg  you 
to  explain  this  divergency.  It  would  be  right 
to  give  over  the  Austro-Servian  problem  to  The 
Hague  Tribunal.  I  trust  in  your  wisdom  and 
friendship".  On  July  30  the  Austrians  began 
to  bombard  Belgrade.  On  the  31st,  in  answer 
to  a  question  from  Great  Britain,  France  prom- 
ised to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium ; — Ger- 


12  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

many  refused  to  answer  the  question,  and  pre- 
sented an  ultimatum  to  Russia  and  to  France. 
On  August  1  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia. 
On  August  2  she  violated  the  neutrality  of  Lux- 
emburg, entered  the  territory  of  France,  and 
presented  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium  demanding 
that  she  should  betray  her  own  neutrality.  On 
August  3  Germany  declared  war  on  France.  On 
August  4  Germany  invaded  Belgium,  and  Great 
Britain  presented  an  ultimatum  to  Germany; 
on  the  5th  the  British  Ambassador  left  Berlin, 
and  on  the  6th  the  Prime  Minister  announced 
a  state  of  war. 

There  we  have  in  outline  the  whole  shameful 
story  of  Germany's  betrayal  of  the  peace  of 
Europe.  She  refused  every  proposition  of  ar- 
bitration. She  declined  to  have  anything  to  do 
with  a  conference  of  the  four  Powers,  in  which 
a  peaceful  solution  of  the  question  between  Aus- 
tria and  Servia  might  have  been  obtained.  She 
played  fast  and  loose  with  her  own  promises, 
and  made  disgraceful  propositions  to  Great 
Britain  to  betray  her  obligations  to  France,  and 
to  Belgium  to  allow  herself  to  be  shamefully 
used  in  an  attack  upon  the  flank  of  France.  She 
drew  the  bloody  sword  apparently  without  hesi- 
tation and  without  remorse.  She  professed  to 
be  forced  into  a  war  of  self-defence ;  but  she  has 
never  to  this  day  been  willing  to  state  what  it 
was  that  she  was  defending,  or  what  was  the 
cause  for  which  she  was  determined  to  fight, 
but  which  she  was  not  willing  to  submit  to  an 
impartial  court  of  arbitration,  or  even  to  a  con- 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  13 

ference  of  her  sister  nations.    She  wanted  war, 
and  she  got  it! 

Doubtless  she  had  no  dream  of  the  full  flood 
of  blood  and  horror  and  grief  which  she  was 
letting  loose  upon  Europe.  Doubtless  she 
thought  the  war  would  be  a  short  and  compara- 
tively easy  one.  But  even  if  in  her  pride  she 
thought  that,  it  was  no  excuse.  If  the  war  had 
only  lasted  three  months,  it  would  still  have 
been  a  terrible  crime.  Now  that  it  has  lasted 
nearly  three  years  it  has  become  a  gigantic  sin 
against  humanity,  of  which  Germany  must  bear 
the  guilt.  We  conscientious  objectors  make  our 
first  objection  to  the  very  existence  of  this  war, 
and  we  propose  to  help  our  allies  in  pursuing 
the  only  way  which  now  remains  to  end  it, 
namely,  to  bring  the  German  Government  "to 
terms". 


II.  We  object  also  in  the  name  of  conscience 
to  the  manner  in  which  Germany  has  conducted 
this  war.  It  has  been  an  astounding  exhibition 
not  only  of  disregard  for  solemn  treaties,  but 
also  of  contempt  for  the  accepted  rules  of  inter- 
national law  and  the  plain  instincts  of  human- 
ity. Begin  where  you  like  in  the  record.  You 
will  find  that  everywhere  Germany  has  led  the 
way.  I  do  not  say  that  she  has  been  altogether 
alone  in  practices  which  are  abhorrent,  and 
from  which  we  hoped  that  the  common  prin- 
ciples of  civilization  had  delivered  every  bel- 
ligerent nation.     But  I  do  say,  and  I  say  it 


14  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

without  hesitation,  after  careful  study,  that  in 
every  case  Germany  has  been  the  first  to  vio- 
late the  rule  of  law  and  the  instinct  of  human- 
ity. Take  the  unannounced  dropping  of  aerial 
bombs  on  the  sleeping  city  of  Antwerp  on 
August  24,  1914.  It  is  true  that  Antwerp  was 
a  fortified  city.  But  that  fact  did  not  cancel  the 
rule  of  international  law,  that  the  bombardment 
of  even  a  fortified  city  must  be  announced,  in 
order  that  the  lives  of  non-combatants  may  be 
spared.  This  shocking  Zeppelin  raid,  however, 
which,  from  the  course  taken  by  the  airship, 
was  evidently  carefully  designed  to  destroy  the 
palace  in  which  the  King  and  Queen  of  Belgium 
were  sleeping  with  their  children,  and  the  hotels 
in  which  the  members  of  the  Belgian  Cabinet 
were  lodged,  as  a  matter  of  fact  succeeded  only 
in  destroying  some  sixty  peaceful  houses  and 
injuring  hundreds  of  others,  and  in  killing  by 
way  of  playful  experiment  scores  of  helpless 
women  and  children.  It  was  the  keynote  of  the 
horrors  which  were  committed  by  the  Germans 
after  that  in  Belgium  and  elsewhere.  Louvain 
and  Dinant  were  burned,  and  hundreds  of  their 
people  were  massacred.  Scores  of  old  cities  in 
Flanders  and  northern  France  were  ruined 
without  any  military  excuse.  The  cathedral  of 
Rheims  has  been  slowly  and  systematically  re- 
duced to  a  ghastly  ruin,  for  no  reason  other 
than  the  pure  lust  of  destruction.  The  abomina- 
ble use  of  poison  gas  in  warfare,  with  all  the 
cruelty  that  it  involves,  was  begun  by  the  Ger- 
mans in  the  trenches  before  Ypres  on  April  22, 


AMERICAN  RIGHTS  15 

1915.  Summer  resorts,  peaceful  villages  and 
coast  towns  of  England,  whether  fortified  or  not, 
were  raided  from  the  air.  The  laboring  popula- 
tions of  invaded  Belgium  and  northern  France 
were  deported  with  circumstances  of  incredible 
brutality  and  taken  to  Germany,  where  they  were 
made  to  work  at  tasks  which  were  unquestion- 
ably hostile  to  their  own  countries.  And  the 
German  submarines  began  their  career  of  de- 
struction against  peaceful  ships  of  all  nations, 
including  the  nations  with  whom  they  were  in 
friendship,  as  well  as  those  with  whom  they 
were  at  war. 

Try  to  understand  the  submarine.  Germany 
claimed  that  it  was  such  a  wonderful,  delicate 
and  scientific  instrument  of  destruction,  that 
the  old-accepted  rule  of  international  law,  which 
obliged  a  naval  commander  before  sinking  a 
merchant  ship  to  give  warning  and  to  make 
provision  for  the  safety  of  the  passengers  and 
the  crew,  could  not  any  longer  be  regarded  as 
binding.  The  exquisite  and  triumphant  sub- 
marine, fragile  as  it  was,  could  not  afford  to 
take  any  such  humane  precautions.  It  must 
be  allowed  to  sink  any  vessel  that  it  chose  to 
sink,  and  leave  the  people  on  board  of  it,  men, 
women  and  children,  to  perish  in  the  waves. 
This  argument,  if  once  admitted,  would  justify 
any  assassin  in  killing  anybody,  provided  the 
instrument  with  which  he  committed  his  crime 
was  sufficiently  delicate  to  be  in  danger  of  being 
broken  in  case  of  a  conflict. 

The  German  idea  of  Kultur  in  war  has  culmi- 


16  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

nated  in  the  practice  of  torpedoing  hospital 
ships  with  wounded  men  and  Red  Cross  nurses 
on  board,  many  of  whom  are  necessarily  lost. 
This  is  certainly  the  extreme  limit  of  scientific 
barbarism.  Taken  in  connection  with  the  long 
list  of  preceding  cruelties  and  atrocities  it  fully 
justifies  the  conscientious  objectors  in  saying 
that  they  object  with  amazement  and  horror  to 
Germany's  conduct  of  this  war,  and  that  they 
propose,  with  the  help  of  God,  to  put  an  end  to 
it  by  whatever  means  are  needful  and  possible. 


III.  In  the  third  place  we  conscientious  ob- 
jectors in  America  object  to  the  way  in  which 
the  German  Government  has  forced  this  war 
upon  our  peace-loving  country.  The  record  is 
a  long  list  of  shameless  injuries  and  provoca- 
tions to  the  United  States,  borne  with  an  ex- 
treme patience  and  forbearance, — yea,  to  the 
utmost  limit  of  more  than  seventy  times  seven. 

While  we  were  still  at  peace  with  the  Ger- 
manic Powers  they  established  a  base  system 
of  espionage  and  an  impudent  propaganda  in 
our  country.  These  enjoyed  the  aid  and  com- 
fort of  diplomatic  representatives,  whose  very 
office  bound  them  to  honorable  conduct.  We 
sent  the  Austrian  Ambassador  home  for  pro- 
moting sedition  and  privy  conspiracy  here. 
The  German  Embassy  continued  his  shameless 
work.  Officials  of  that  Embassy  less  clever  than 
their  chief,  Count  Bernstorff,  were  caught  black- 
handed  and  sent  home.     Still  German  agents 


AMERICAN  EIGHTS  17 

conspired  against  our  neutrality  and  honor. 
They  used  our  land  to  plot  outrages  in  Canada. 
They  set  flame  to  our  factories  and  our  wharves. 
They  made  the  German  ships  to  which  we  had 
given  asylum  in  our  harbors  an  assassins '  cave, 
for  the  manufacture  of  bombs  to  be  hidden  in 
our  own  ships  and  in  those  of  friendly  nations. 
Filled  with  the  madness  of  destruction,  they 
cared  not  whom  they  maimed  or  slew.  At  last 
the  German  Government  sent  a  secret  message 
to  Mexico,  proposing  an  alliance  in  case  of  war, 
offering  to  give  her  two  or  three  of  our  states 
as  a  reward,  and  even  urging  her  to  persuade 
Japan  into  that  unholy  league.  Such  is  the  rec- 
ord of  the  German  Government  and  its  agents 
on  land, — a  record  of  contempt,  injustice  and 
treachery  toward  our  country. 

Now  turn  to  the  record  on  the  sea.  The  story 
of  the  attack  of  the  German  submarines  upon 
American  interests,  rights  and  lives,  is  one  of 
the  most  shocking  pages  of  human  history.  The 
Lusitania  was  torpedoed  without  warning  on 
May  7,  1915.  There  were  114  American  men, 
women  and  children  on  board  who  were  thus 
murdered, — drowned  without  an  effort  of  the 
submarine  to  help  them, — ' '  Butchered  to  make  a 
German  holiday '  \  The  holiday  was  celebrated ; 
and  I  have  one  of  the  infamous  medals  which 
were  struck  in  Germany  to  commemorate  it. 

Within  the  next  three  months  three  indignant 
notes  of  protest  and  warning  against  this  out- 
rage of  law  and  humanity  were  sent  to  Ger- 
many.   Her  answer  was  to  sink  the  Arabic,  on 


18  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

August  19,  and  murder  three  more  Americans. 
After  this  the  correspondence  dragged  along 
until  the  attack  on  the  Sussex,  March,  1916. 
Then  a  practical  ultimatum  was  sent  by  the 
President,  warning  Germany  that  diplomatic 
relations  would  be  broken  off,  unless  she  aban- 
doned her  illegal  and  inhuman  submarine  policy. 
She  promised  to  abandon  it.  On  January  31, 
1917,  she  withdrew  that  promise  and  announced 
that  she  would  carry  on  an  unrestricted  sub- 
marine war,  sinking  merchant  and  passenger 
ships  at  sight.  The  President  kept  his  word, 
and  broke  off  relations.  Promptly  thereafter 
the  Germans  torpedoed  eight  American  mer- 
chant vessels  in  succession,  and  murdered  forty 
more  Americans. 

The  die  was  cast.  Our  country  could  no 
longer  restrain  her  conscientious  objections  to 
the  existence,  the  conduct  and  the  animus  of 
this  war  against  freedom,  justice  and  democ- 
racy. Germany  compelled  us  either  to  take  up 
arms  to  end  it,  or  to  submit  to  its  threat  against 
the  world's  liberties  and  our  own  life. 

We  are  in  the  war  now, — in  it  with  our  con- 
science and  our  honor.  Let  us  make  ourselves 
count  in  it  for  all  we  are  worth, — heart  and  head 
and  hand,  purse  and  property  and  prowess.  We 
pledge  our  best  aid  to  our  brave  Allies  in  order 
to  get  the  war  over  as  soon  as  possible.  We  will 
unite  every  counsel,  every  will,  every  effort  to 
serve  the  good  cause.  We  are  resolved  not  to 
cease  until  the  menace  of  an  all-powerful,  ruth- 
less, military  autocracy  shall  perish  from  the 
face  of  the  earth. 


CHAPTER  II 

DEMOCRACY  IMPERILLED 

Thomas  Jefferson  Wertenbaker 

How  ignorant  of  history  is  the  world !  When, 
in  the  summer  of  1914,  the  German  Emperor 
violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  the  world 
was  surprised.  When  the  German  Chancellor 
defended  his  master  by  declaring  that  it  was 
unreasonable  to  expect  him  to  forgo  his  plans 
for  an  attack  upon  Prance  because  of  a  mere 
scrap  of  paper,  the  world  was  again  surprised. 
It  was  with  amazement  and  alarm  that  the  world 
awoke  to  the  dread  realization  that  the  Kaiser 
was  making  a  deliberate  assault  upon  the  lib- 
erties of  Europe,  and  that  he  had  organized  his 
empire  for  that  purpose  into  a  vast  military 
machine. 

There  was  no  reason  for  surprise  at  these 
things.  In  doing  them  William  II  was  only  be- 
ing true  to  the  traditions  of  his  house.  In  the 
breach  of  Belgian  neutrality  he  had  before  him 
the  example  of  ancestors  whom  he  had  always 
revered  and  imitated.  In  organizing  his  people 
into  a  great  army  for  aggression  upon  his  neigh- 
bors, he  could  find  his  precedent  in  almost  every 
Hohenzollern  from  the  Great  Elector  to  his  own 
grandfather,  the  Prince  Cartridge  of  the  Berlin 
Revolution  of  1848. 

19 


20  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

In  fact,  the  house  which  now  rules  in  Germany 
has  had  a  history  of  singular  uniformity,  of  un- 
flagging adherence  to  certain  fixed  principles. 
William  II  is  not  different  from  William  I,  Will- 
iam I  followed  the  policy  of  Frederick  the  Great, 
Frederick  the  Great  was  the  reflection  of  the 
Great  Elector.  There  are  five  cardinal  points 
in  the  Hohenzollern  policy:  the  raising  and 
equipping  of  the  largest  military  establishment 
that  their  subjects  can  possibly  support,  a  diplo- 
macy characterized  by  Machiavellian  duplicity 
and  faithlessness,  unswerving  opposition  to  lib- 
eral government  in  any  form,  an  appetite  for 
territorial  aggrandizement  that  can  never  be 
appeased,  machinelike  centralization  and  effi- 
ciency in  civil  affairs. 

If  we  may  single  out  from  these  policies  the 
one  which  has  been  the  most  consistently,  the 
most  religiously  adhered  to,  it  will  be,  perhaps, 
Hohenzollern  treachery.  Prince  after  prince, 
whether  of  his  own  initiative  or  from  the  advice 
of  his  ministers,  has  made  and  broken  treaties 
with  equal  facility,  has  deceived  friend  and  foe 
alike.  In  this  respect  there  has  been  no  truer 
representative  of  the  house  than  Frederick 
William  the  Great  Elector.  Wakeman,  in  his 
"Europe  1598-1715,"  written  many  years  be- 
fore the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  thus  de- 
scribes him:  "Not  one  spark  of  generosity  il- 
luminated his  policy,  not  one  grain  of  idealism 
colored  his  ambition,  no  sentiment  of  moral 
right  ever  interfered  with  his  judgment,  no  fear 
of  future  retribution  arrested  his  action.    Mean 


DEMOCRACY  21 

minded,  false  and  unscrupulous,  he  was  the  first 
sovereign  to  display  the  principles  of  seven- 
teenth century  Machiavellianism,  stripped  of 
their  cloak  of  Italian  refinement,  in  all  the  hid- 
eous brutality  of  German  coarseness." 

Of  a  similar  stripe  was  Frederick  the  Great. 
This  monarch's  wonderful  genius  and  his  plucky 
fight  against  tremendous  odds  have  blinded 
many  to  the  real  meaning  of  his  career.  He 
was,  as  Macaulay  has  said,  "a  tyrant  without 
fear,  faith  or  mercy. ' '  His  international  policy 
was  shaped  solely  by  what  he  thought  would 
benefit  Prussia.  He  never  hesitated  to  betray 
his  allies  in  their  hour  of  need  and  he  held  his 
own  word  as  a  matter  of  no  moment,  a  thing 
serviceable  only  to  deceive  his  friends  and  ene- 
mies alike,  a  thing  to  be  broken  without  hesita- 
tion or  compunction.  Weaker  nations,  he  de- 
clared, must  give  way  before  the  stronger.  They 
had  no  rights  which  need  be  respected  because 
they  had  not  the  power  to  defend  themselves. 

Frederick's  treatment  of  Saxony  in  the  Seven 
Years  War  affords  so  striking  a  parallel  to  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  in  1914  that  it 
will  be  well  to  give  a  brief  description  of  it.  At 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  1756,  Frederick  set 
his  armies  in  motion  ostensibly  for  the  invasion 
of  Bohemia.  Just  as  Belgium  was  the  easiest 
route  into  France  for  the  hosts  of  William  II, 
so  Saxony,  which  lay  directly  between  Branden- 
burg and  Bohemia,  afforded  Frederick  the  short- 
est path  to  Prague.  The  King  demanded  of  the 
Saxon  Elector,  Augustus  III,  permission  for  his 


22  THE  WOBLD  PERIL 

troops  to  pass  through  his  domains,  promising 
that  they  would  observe  exact  order  and  disci- 
pline upon  their  march.  Augustus,  who  was  not 
built  in  the  heroic  mould  of  King  Albert,  gave 
a  prompt  assent.  Whereupon  Frederick  moved 
into  Saxony  and  took  possession  of  it. 

The  terrified  Elector  now  learned  that  the 
Prussians  intended  not  to  pass  through  Saxony, 
but  to  seize  it  with  the  purpose  of  forcing  him 
to  become  their  ally  in  the  war  with  Austria. 
"Saxony  must  share  the  same  fortune  and  the 
same  dangers  as  my  own  states,"  declared  Fred- 
erick. "If  I  am  fortunate,  the  Elector  shall  be 
amply  compensated.  I  shall  take  charge  of  his 
interests  as  well  as  my  own.  As  for  what  people 
will  say,  ...  his  best  excuse  is  that  he  is  unable 
to  do  anything  else."  Augustus  was  told  that 
he  must  either  assist  Frederick  as  an  open  ally 
or  see  his  troops  incorporated  in  the  Prussian 
army,  his  revenues  appropriated  by  the  Prus- 
sian Government.  ' '  Good  God, ' '  cried  the  Saxon 
envoy,  "such  a  thing  is  without  example  in  an- 
cient or  modern  history. "  "Do  you  think  so ! " 
was  Frederick's  sneering  reply.  "It  seems  to 
me  there  is  a  precedent,  but  if  not,  perhaps  you 
know  I  flatter  myself  on  being  original." 

The  Saxon  army  retreated  to  a  strong  camp 
at  Pirna,  and  there  was  besieged  by  the  Prus- 
sians. Despite  the  heroic  efforts  of  the  Aus- 
trians  to  rescue  them,  they  were  captured,  and 
the  private  soldiers  were  compelled  to  enlist  in 
Frederick's  army.  Saxony  throughout  the  war 
was  treated  as  a  conquered  province,  and  a 


DEMOCRACY  23 

crushing  burden  of  taxation  placed  upon  her 
helpless  people.  Leipsig  alone  was  compelled 
to  pay  no  less  than  10,726,429  thalers. 

The  invasion  of  Belgium  shows  that  William 
II  is  no  better  and  no  worse  than  his  great  an- 
cestor, that  he  has  in  this  the  twentieth  century 
learned  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  Hohenzollern. 
Belgium  stood  in  the  way  of  his  ambitions  so 
he  trampled  her  under  his  feet  in  just  the  same 
way  that  Frederick  had  trampled  Saxony  a  cen- 
tury and  a  half  before.  And  had  Albert  sub- 
mitted to  the  violation  of  his  soil  as  Augustus 
had  submitted,  who  can  doubt  that  his  fate 
would  have  been  the  same  as  that  of  the  Elector! 

This  treacherous  foreign  policy  has  ever  been 
accompanied  by  blatant  militarism.  The  victims 
of  Hohenzollern  duplicity  have  only  too  often 
been  powerless  to  secure  redress  because  they 
could  not  match  the  overgrown  Prussian  army. 
The  sharp  command  of  the  drill  sergeant  and 
the  tramp  of  many  regiments  have  resounded 
throughout  Prussia  since  the  days  of  the  Great 
Elector.  William  II,  with  his  huge  fighting  ma- 
chine which  is  today  challenging  the  liberties  of 
the  world,  is  no  greater  advocate  of  militarism 
than  was  William  I,  or  Frederick  the  Great,  or 
Frederick  William  I.  In  fact  Frederick  William 
I,  known  in  history  as  the  Drill  Sergeant,  was 
the  greatest  military  enthusiast  of  all  time.  This 
man  had  the  same  love  for  his  regiments  that 
the  child  has  for  his  toy  soldiers.  He  loved  the 
fine  uniforms  of  his  grenadiers  and  their  glisten- 
ing muskets;  he  loved  to  watch  their  perfect 


24  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

discipline  as  they  wheeled  and  countermarched 
upon  the  parade  ground.  At  his  death  he  handed 
down  to  his  son  the  great  Frederick  an  army 
of  89,000  men,  the  most  perfect  in  Europe.  Can 
we  wonder  that  the  present  Emperor,  with  such 
traditions  in  his  family,  should  adhere  to  the 
military  fetish?  "I  thank  my  army  for  all  that 
it  has  accomplished  for  my  House,"  said  Will- 
iam II  in  an  address  to  the  soldiers,  "for  its 
devotion  and  spirit  of  self-sacrifice,  for  its 
bravery  and  loyalty.  .  .  .  The  new  century  sees 
our  army — in  other  words,  our  people  in  arms — 
gathered  around  their  standards,  kneeling  be- 
fore the  Lord  of  Hosts.  .  .  .  And  verily,  if  any- 
one has  especial  reason  for  bowing  down  before 
God,  it  is  our  army.  A  glance  at  our  standards 
suffices  for  an  explanation,  for  they  are  the  em- 
bodiment of  our  history."  "It  is  the  soldier 
and  the  army,"  said  he  upon  another  occasion, 
"not  Parliamentary  majorities  and  votes,  that 
have  welded  the  German  Empire  together.  My 
confidence  rests  upon  the  army." 

The  Crown  Prince,  even  more  than  his  father, 
glories  in  militarism.  "For  him  who  has  once 
ridden  in  a  charge  in  peace, ' '  he  writes,  ' ' there 
is  nothing  better  except  another  ride  ending  in 
a  clash  with  the  foe.  How  often  in  the  midst 
of  a  charge  have  I  caught  the  yearning  cry  of 
a  comrade,  'Donnerwetter,  if  it  were  only  in 
earnest. '  That  is  the  cavalry  spirit.  Every 
true  soldier  must  feel  and  know  it."  "We  live 
today  in  a  time  which  .  .  .  indulges  in  foolish 
dreams  of  the  possibility  of  a  perpetual  world 


DEMOCRACY  25 

peace,"  he  says  again.  "This  view  of  life  is 
Tin-German  and  does  not  become  us.  A  German 
who  loves  his  nation  .  .  .  must  not  close  his  eyes 
to  such  reveries.  .  .  .  Just  as  lightning  equalizes 
the  tension  in  two  differently  charged  strata  of 
the  air,  so  will  the  sword  always  be  and  remain 
till  the  end  of  the  world  the  finally  decisive 
factor." 

"It  behooves  us  to  have  a  sharp  eye  for,  and 
to  guard  against  half-heartedness  in  our  mili- 
tary effort,"  writes  Baron  von  der  Goltz, 
"against  any  adulteration  or  dilution  of  the 
warlike  spirit  and  warlike  passion,  against 
diplomatic  generals.  .  .  .  Let  us  be  spared  the 
false  humanitarianism  which  would  shrink  from 
a  desperate  fight.  .  .  .  The  warlike  spirit  must 
not  be  allowed  to  die  out  among  the  people, 
neither  must  the  love  of  peace  get  the  upper 
hand." 

But  what  makes  the  German  army  especially 
dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  the  world  is  that 
it  controls,  rather  than  is  controlled  by,  the  peo- 
ple. The  power  rests  in  the  hands  of  a  bureau- 
cracy of  officials,  who  are  not  responsible  to  the 
Reichstag,  but  to  the  Kaiser  alone.  This  bu- 
reaucracy is  filled  with  Prussian  nobles,  popu- 
larly known  as  Junkers,  who  are  passionately 
attached  to  the  stern  old  repressive  military 
spirit,  and  fanatically  loyal  to  their  monarch 
and  war  lord.  "Prussia  attained  her  great- 
ness," says  Prince  Biilow,  "as  a  country  of 
soldiers  and  officials,  and  as  such  she  was  able 
to  accomplish  the  work  of  German  union;  to 


26  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

this  day  she  is  still,  in  all  essentials,  a  state  of 
soldiers  and  officials."  "Any  one  who  has  any 
familiarity  at  all  with  our  officers  and  generals, ' ' 
says  another  German  writer,  "knows  that  it 
would  take  another  Sedan,  inflicted  on  us  in- 
stead of  by  us,  before  they  would  acquiesce  in 
the  control  of  the  army  by  the  German  Parlia- 
ment. ' ' 

The  Cologne  Gazette,  in  a  recent  issue,  en- 
tered a  vigorous  protest  against  a  proposal 
made  by  the  Constitutional  Committee  of  the 
Reichstag,  that  the  unlimited  control  of  the 
Kaiser  over  the  army  and  navy  be  in  some  way 
curbed.  After  publishing  a  defence  of  Prussian 
military  traditions  together  with  the  history  of 
the  relations  between  the  Crown  and  the  army, 
it  says:  "What  is  positively  perilous  is  the 
effort  ...  to  interfere  with  the  position  of  the 
Supreme  War  Lord  toward  army  and  navy. 
The  proposal  to  make  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
or  the  Minister  of  War  responsible  for  the  nomi- 
nation of  officers  is  an  invasion  of  the  rights  of 
the  Crown  which  we  must  characterize  at  once 
as  unfounded,  inappropriate  and  harmful,  and 
which  must  be  repudiated  with  the  greatest  de- 
termination in  the  interest  of  the  corps  of  offi- 
cers, which  is  the  backbone  of  our  defence  on 
sea  and  land.  .  .  .  Are  we  now,  as  if  we  had 
Jena  and  Auerstadt  immediately  behind  us,  sud- 
denly to  cut  the  ties  which  unite  the  King  of 
Prussia  and  German  Kaiser  with  the  corps  of 
officers?  Why  should  we  do  so?  Only  because 
doctrinaire  theorists  wish  so." 


DEMOCRACY  27 

Hand  and  hand  with  militarism  has  gone  des- 
potism. The  Hohenzollern  house  has  always 
had  an  invincible  antipathy  to  any  form  of  pop- 
ular government.  They  have  been  patriotic  in 
the  sense  that  they  have  governed  always  effi- 
ciently, but  they  have  fought  fiercely  against 
the  growth  of  parliamentary  power.  From  the 
days  of  the  Great  Elector,  when  the  liberties  of 
Brandenburg  and  East  Prussia  were  ruthlessly 
crushed,  to  those  of  the  present  Kaiser,  Prussia 
has  been  essentially  a  despotism.  In  1813  and 
1814,  when  the  Prussian  people  rose  against  the 
hosts  of  Napoleon  and  threw  them  across  the 
Rhine,  there  was  momentary  hope  that  the  old 
system  would  be  overthrown.  Frederick  Will- 
iam III,  in  his  hour  of  need,  promised  a  consti- 
tution to  his  country.  But  when  fear  of  Napoleon 
had  passed,  yielding  to  the  pleading  of  the  nobles 
and  of  the  reactionary  Metternich,  he  broke  his 
word,  and  refused  to  make  any  concessions 
whatever. 

It  is  true  that  later,  in  1850,  Frederick  William 
IV  consented  to  the  mockery  of  a  constitution, 
but  it  in  no  way  changed  the  character  of  the 
state.  Prussia  remains  today  what  it  has  al- 
ways been — aristocratic  and  despotic.  Although 
there  is  a  parliament,  the  electoral  system  is  so 
arranged  that  there  is  no  chance  for  the  poor 
to  exert  their  proportionate  influence,  even  in 
the  lower  or  popular  house.  In  1900  the  Social 
Democrats,  although  they  poUed  a  majority  of 
the  votes,  secured  only  seven  seats  out  of  four 
hundred.    The  House  of  Lords  is  made  up  of 


28  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

hereditary  members  who  represent  rights  of 
blood,  life  members  who  represent  landed  prop- 
erties and  great  institutions,  and  officials  who 
represent  the  bureaucracy.  This  body,  the  very 
centre  of  reaction,  is  the  King 's  creature,  for  he 
may  appoint  new  members  without  limit. 

The  German  Empire,  while  it  enjoys  a  more 
liberal  constitution  than  Prussia,  is  also  essen- 
tially autocratic.  The  Kaiser  declares  war  with 
the  consent  of  the  Bundesrath,  or  Upper  House 
of  Parliament;  he  is  the  head  of  the  army  and 
navy;  he  appoints  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to 
whom  the  heads  of  the  executive  departments 
are  responsible;  he  names  the  Prussian  dele- 
gates to  the  Bundesrath.  The  Lower  House  or 
Reichstag  plays  but  a  subordinate  part  in  the 
government.  It  neither  makes  nor  unmakes 
ministries,  it  does  not  control  the  army,  and 
while,  in  conjunction  with  the  Upper  House,  it 
votes  the  appropriations,  many  of  these  are 
granted  for  long  periods  of  years.  The  Bundes- 
rath is  an  assemblage  of  princes,  for  it  repre- 
sents not  the  people  of  Germany,  but  the  rulers 
of  the  states  of  which  the  Empire  is  composed. 

To  Americans  it  seems  incredible  that  a  vast 
empire,  an  empire  noted  for  its  leadership  in 
many  intellectual  fields,  should  at  the  beginning 
of  the  twentieth  century  cling  to  this  illiberal 
system.  When  Germans  display  reverence  and 
awe  for  their  Kaiser,  when  they  unsheathe  their 
swords  and  vow  to  defend  his  throne  and  to  ex- 
tend his  power,  there  comes  to  us  the  picture  of 
a  Louis  XIV  or  a  Henry  VIII,  and  we  wonder 


DEMOCRACY  29 

why  the  Teutonic  mind  is  still  enslaved  to  prin- 
ciples long  since  cast  off  by  other  modern  na- 
tions. We  are  apt  to  view  the  German  with 
something  like  contempt  and  speak  lightly  of 
the  time  when  he  shall  enjoy  the  freedom  which 
is  ours,  when  he  shall  cast  aside  the  imperial 
trumpery  and  like  a  man  take  the  government 
of  his  country  into  his  own  hands. 

Unfortunately  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  effect 
reforms  in  Germany.  Any  change  in  the  consti- 
tution of  the  Empire  can  be  blocked  by  fourteen 
votes  in  the  Bundesrath,  or,  as  the  Kaiser  ap- 
points the  seventeen  Prussian  delegates  to  that 
body,  by  what  amounts  to  an  imperial  veto. 
That  William  II  will  never  willingly  permit  the 
liberalization  of  the  Empire  his  whole  career 
bears  witness.  If  the  German  liberals  are  to 
secure  the  boon  of  liberty,  it  must  be  done  by 
revolution  or  by  the  aid  of  foreign  arms.  And 
revolution  is  most  difficult  because  sentiment 
is  by  no  means  universally  in  favor  of  radical 
changes.  There  are  millions  of  Germans  who 
are  convinced  that  their  government  is  the  best 
in  the  world,  who  would  give  their  lives  to  de- 
fend the  powers  and  privileges  of  their  Kaiser. 
So  far  are  they  from  repudiating  the  German 
system  that  they  long  to  spread  it  to  other  lands. 
It  is  best  that  we  should  conquer,  they  say,  that 
we  may  give  to  less  fortunate  neighbors  the 
benefit  of  Kultur. 

"Germany,  thanks  to  its  genius  for  organiza- 
tion, has  reached  a  stage  of  civilization  higher 
than  that  of  other  peoples,"   says  Professor 


30  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Ostwald,  a  German  of  great  prominence.  *  'War 
will  make  them  share  our  higher  civilization 
some  day,  under  the  form  of  this  organization. 
Of  our  enemies  .  .  .  the  French  and  the  English 
have  attained  the  degree  of  cultural  develop- 
ment that  we  passed  more  than  fifty  years  ago. 
This  is  the  stage  of  individualism.  But  above 
this  stage  is  the  stage  of  organization.  It  is 
this  stage  that  Germany  has  reached." 

"A  man  who  is  not  a  German  can  know  noth- 
ing of  Germany,"  said  Professor  Lasson,  in  a 
letter  published  in  the  Amsterdammer  of  Octo- 
ber 11,  1914.  "We  are  morally  and  intellectu- 
ally superior  to  all;  beyond  comparison.  The 
same  is  true  of  our  organization  and  our  insti- 
tutions. ' ' 

"Germany  ought  and  desires  to  remain  iso- 
lated," wrote  Professor  von  Leyden  in  the 
Frankfurter  Zeitung.  "The  Germans  are  the 
most  elevated  people  on  earth.  They  will  ac- 
complish their  destiny  which  is  to  govern  the 
world  and  to  control  other  nations  for  the  wel- 
fare of  humanity." 

These  are  not  the  words  of  isolated  fanatics, 
but  of  leaders  of  German  thought,  and  they 
represent  the  opinions  of  millions  of  the  sober 
temperate  people  of  Germany.  To  Englishmen 
and  to  Americans  it  seems  incredible  that  any 
save  a  madman  could  hold  such  monstrous 
views,  and  they  wonder  how  it  was  possible 
for  them  to  become  current  among  an  intelligent 
people.  The  explanation  is  found  in  the  control 
exerted  over  the  educational  system  by  the  Gov- 


DEMOCRACY  31 

eminent.  For  decades  the  Prussian  bureaucracy 
has  made  use  of  the  institutions  of  learning  for 
the  unceasing  preaching  of  despotism,  militar- 
ism and  aggressive  nationalism.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  a  large  number  of  the  uni- 
versities have  become  instruments  for  propa* 
gating  ideals  of  government  which  accord  with 
the  wishes  of  the  official  caste.  The  nomination 
of  professors  for  the  universities  lies  practically 
in  the  hands  of  the  Minister  of  Education,  and 
this  minister  can  and  does  exert  pressure  upon 
them  to  compel  orthodoxy.  With  typical  Ger- 
man docility  a  large  part  of  the  people  have 
accepted  their  teaching,  have  learned  to  glory 
in  despotism,  have  learned  to  regard  all  save 
Germans  with  contempt. 

In  the  task  of  retaining  its  hold  upon  the  peo- 
ple the  Government  has  one  argument  which  has 
been  hard  for  the  liberals  to  answer — success. 
It  constantly  harps  upon  the  benefits  that  have 
come  to  Prussia  and  to  Germany  from  the 
Hohenzollern  House ;  military  glory,  prosperity, 
national  unity.  Against  the  pleas  of  the  Social 
Democrats  the  Kaiser  can  point  to  the  fruits 
of  despotism.  William  II  would  have  the  Ger- 
man people  revere  William  I  as  a  demi-god. 
His  references  to  the  founder  of  the  present 
Empire  in  an  address  in  1896  are  so  instructive 
that  we  quote  at  some  length:  "Had  this  ex- 
alted sovereign  lived  in  the  Middle  Ages  he 
would  have  been  canonized  and  pilgrimages 
from  all  lands  would  have  come  to  offer  up 
prayers  at  his  relics.     God  be  thanked,  it  is 


32  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

even  so  today.  The  door  of  his  mausoleum 
stands  open;  daily  his  faithful  subjects  fare 
thither,  taking  their  children  with  them,  and 
strangers  come  to  rejoice  at  the  sight  of  this 
glorious  old  hero  and  of  his  statues. 

1  'But  we  may  be  especially  proud  of  this 
mighty  man,  since  he  was  a  son  of  the  Mark. 
.  .  .  The  House  of  Hohenzollern  and  the  Mark 
of  Brandenburg  are  connected  as  though  they 
were  one.  ...  So  long  as  the  farmer  of  the 
Mark  stands  by  us,  so  long  as  we  can  count  upon 
the  support  and  help  of  the  Mark  in  our  work, 
no  Hohenzollern  will  despair  of  his  task.  .  .  . 
To  this  task  the  memory  of  Emperor  William 
the  Great  calls  me,  and  in  fulfilling  it  we  will 
rally  around  him,  around  his  memory,  as  the 
Spaniards  of  old  rallied  around  the  Cid.  This 
task,  which  is  laid  on  the  shoulders  of  all  of  us, 
and  which  by  our  fealty  to  Emperor  William  I 
we  are  bound  to  undertake,  is  the  battle  against 
revolution — a  combat  to  be  waged  with  every 
means  at  our  command.  That  party  which  ven- 
tures to  attack  the  foundations  of  the  State, 
which  revolts  against  religion,  which  does  not 
even  stop  at  the  person  of  the  most  exalted  sov- 
ereign of  whom  I  have  spoken — that  party  must 
be  vanquished.  I  shall  rejoice  to  know  that  the 
hand  of  any  man  is  clasped  in  mine — be  he 
workman,  sovereign  or  gentleman — if  only  he 
helps  me  to  this  combat." 

Nor  is  this  plea  entirely  unreasonable.  Al- 
though the  Hohenzollerns  have  given  Germany 
little  real  liberty,  they  have  given  it  a  marvel- 


DEMOCEACY  33 

lous  organization.  They  have  always  coupled 
their  despotism  with  centralized  efficiency  which 
has  been  largely  responsible  for  the  rapid  de- 
velopment and  growth  of  their  country.  They 
have  ruled  always  despotically,  but  well. 

Germany  today  resembles  a  well  oiled  piece 
of  machinery,  perfectly  adjusted  in  all  its  parts. 
In  the  government  there  is  little  corruption, 
little  misdirected  energy,  little  bungling.  There 
is  no  Pork  Barrel,  no  waste  of  money,  no  muni- 
cipal scandals.  As  the  Kaiser  is  the  head  of 
the  administration  there  is  the  lack  of  the  peri- 
odic change  of  national  policy  which  is  an  in- 
herent weakness  in  more  democratic  countries. 
The  Government  guides  and  controls  the  na- 
tional energies,  turns  them  from  unproductive 
channels,  points  out  the  way  to  prosperity. 

It  is  this  marvellous  efficiency  which  has  made 
possible  Germany's  rapid  growth  in  population 
and  in  wealth  since  the  foundation  of  the  Empire 
in  1871.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  her 
people  were  numbered  at  66,715,000 ;  her  imports 
valued  at  $2,500,000,000;  her  exports  $2,131,- 
000,000;  her  wealth  $80,000,000,000.  German 
manufactured  goods  were  competing  vigorously 
and  successfully  for  the  world's  markets.  It 
was  but  a  few  days  ago  that  the  British  Empire 
Productions  Association,  at  a  luncheon  in  Lon- 
don, discovered  that  they  were  eating  from  Ger- 
man made  plates,  and  vented  their  vexation  by 
hurling  them  to  the  floor. 

And  it  is  this  very  efficiency  which  makes 
Germany  so  great  a  menace  to  the  world.    This 


34  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

machine,  this  mechanism  of  industry  and  wealth 
and  men,  wonderfully  organized  and  centrally 
controlled,  constitutes  the  most  powerful  crea- 
tion of  all  time.  The  successes  of  the  Germans 
in  the  present  war,  their  march  through  Serbia, 
their  conquest  of  Poland,  the  superiority  they 
have  shown  over  more  numerous  enemies  are 
due  not  entirely,  in  fact  not  chiefly,  to  the  per- 
fection of  their  armies,  but  to  the  organization 
of  the  nation  behind  them.  The  army  is  but 
the  weapon  with  which  blows  are  struck,  the 
nation  is  the  man  who  wields  the  weapon.  In 
other  words,  we  have  the  alarming  spectacle  of 
a  vast  empire  organized  in  its  every  detail  for 
aggression  upon  its  neighbors. 

The  power  which  has  come  to  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns  through  the  perfection  of  their  armies  and 
the  organization  of  their  resources  has  been 
used  ruthlessly  for  territorial  aggrandizement. 
When  Bismarck  was  trying  to  persuade  William 
I  to  annex  to  Prussia  the  duchies  of  Schleswig 
and  Holstein,  he  succeeded  by  reminding  him 
"that  each  of  his  immediate  predecessors  had 
won  an  addition  to  the  Monarchy." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century 
the  Hohenzollerns  were  petty  princes,  ruling 
over  Brandenburg  in  the  north  of  Germany; 
today  they  are  the  Kings  of  Prussia,  which  has 
engulfed  more  than  half  the  Teutonic  territory 
and  extends  in  one  vast  sweep  from  the  Memel 
to  the  Rhine;  they  are  German  Emperors,  and 
as  such  rule  from  Denmark  to  the  Alps ;  by  con- 
quest in  the  present  war  they  control  territory 
from  Lille  to  Kovel. 


DEMOCRACY  35 

The  growth  of  Hohenzollern  territory  has 
been  steady  and  rapid.  In  1600  the  House  ruled 
over  dominions  aggregating  about  40,000  square 
kilometres.  Before  the  middle  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  this  had  been  nearly  tripled,  and 
amounted,  at  the  death  of  the  Great  Elector,  to 
110,840  kilometres.  Frederick  the  Great  re- 
ceived from  his  father  118,000  kilometres  and 
handed  down  to  his  successors  195,000  kilo- 
metres. Frederick  William  II,  thanks  to  his 
participation  in  the  partition  of  Poland,  in- 
creased the  Prussian  territory  to  300,000  kilo- 
metres. There  was  some  loss  of  territory  under 
the  adjustments  of  the  Napoleonic  period  and 
the  Congress  of  Vienna,  but  they  were  more 
than  compensated  for  by  the  acquisitions  of 
1866,  when  Prussia  expanded  until  it  embraced 
an  area  of  348,000  square  kilometres.  The  North 
German  Confederation  which  was  formed  in  the 
same  year  and  placed  under  the  Prussian  Kings 
brought  the  total  Hohenzollern  territory  to  415,- 
000  kilometres.  Finally,  in  1871,  the  formation 
of  the  German  Empire  and  the  seizure  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  made  the  Kaiser  the  ruler  over  no  less 
than  540,496  square  kilometres.  In  three  hun- 
dred years  the  Hohenzollern  domains  have  in- 
creased more  than  thirteen  fold. 

As  we  reflect  upon  this  story  of  constant  ex- 
pansion at  the  expense  of  weaker  neighbors,  we 
ask  ourselves  in  alarm  where  the  thing  is  to  end. 
What  is  the  ambition  of  the  present  Hohenzol- 
lerns  and  the  men  who  surround  them?  Until 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  this  expansion 


36  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

had  been  carried  on  chiefly  at  the  expense  of 
other  German  states.  It  has  hitherto  been  ex- 
cused by  the  plea  that  it  was  necessary  in  order 
to  cement  German  union.  But  now  that  the 
Empire  is  a  fait  accompli,  can  it  be  that  the 
Hohenzollerns  desire  territorial  growth  at  the 
expense  of  non-Teutonic  peoples  f  Is  it  possible 
that  they  wish  to  restore  the  Holy  Roman  Em- 
pire and  plant  their  heels  upon  the  neck  of  van- 
quished nations? 

Germany's  hostile  intention  against  the  world 
can  no  longer  be  doubted,  for  it  is  evidenced 
by  the  writings  of  a  host  of  her  most  prominent 
citizens;  officials,  professors,  generals,  and  so 
forth.  "We  must  not  forget  the  civilizing  duty 
which  devolves  upon  us  by  the  decrees  of  provi- 
dence," writes  General  von  Clausewitz.  "As 
Prussia  has  been  made  by  fate  the  nucleus  of 
Germany,  so  Germany  will  be  the  regenerating 
nucleus  of  the  future  empire  of  the  West.  .  .  . 
And  in  order  that  no  one  shall  be  ignorant  of  it, 
we  proclaim  now,  that  our  continental  nation 
has  a  right  to  the  sea,  not  only  the  North  Sea, 
but  also  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Atlantic. 
We  will  absorb  then,  one  after  another,  all  the 
provinces  which  border  upon  Prussia;  we  will 
annex  successively  Denmark,  Holland,  Belgium, 
Franche-Comte,  North  Switzerland,  Livonia, 
then  Trieste  and  Venice;  finally  the  northern 
region  of  France,  from  the  Somme  to  the 
Loire. ' ' 

Referring  to  this  scheme  of  aggrandizement 
as  outlined  by  General  von  Clausewitz,  General 


DEMOCRACY  37 

von  Schellendorf ,  a  former  Prussian  Minister  of 
War,  says :  ' '  This  program  which  we  now  give 
out  without  fear  is  the  work  of  no  fool;  this 
empire  which  we  wish  to  establish  will  be  no 
dream;  we  have  now  in  our  hands  the  means 
for  its  realization." 

In  June,  1917,  the  principal  speaker  at  a 
reactionary  meeting  in  Germany  advocated  the 
seizure  of  all  the  vast  region  of  Lithuania  and 
Courland,  the  expulsion  of  many  of  the  inhab- 
itants and  its  settlement  by  2,000,000  German 
speaking  Russians  from  the  interior  of  the 
Slavic  dominions.  This  he  felt  would  weaken 
Russia  permanently,  would  establish  a  complete 
bulwark  of  dependent  states  east  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  and  would  widen  German 
influence  and  civilization. 

At  the  moment  of  writing  comes  the  report 
that  the  reactionists  are  circulating  among  the 
troops  a  pamphlet  entitled ' '  Germany 's  Position 
under  Good  and  Bad  Peace. ' '  Among  other  fea- 
tures of  this  publication  are  maps  showing  Ger- 
many covering  or  controlling  nearly  three- 
fourths  of  all  Europe.  It  is  actually  suggested 
that  France  be  annexed  to  the  German  Empire 
as  a  dependent  state.  An  alternative  proposi- 
tion is  the  acquisition  of  a  strip  of  territory  to 
connect  Germany  with  the  Mediterranean.  The 
pamphlet  also  pleads  for  the  formation  of  a 
German  customs  union  to  include  the  Scandi- 
navian countries,  for  the  expulsion  of  Great 
Britain  from  the  Mediterranean,  the  acquisition 
by  Germany  of  Cape  Verde,  the  Azores  and 


38  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

other  islands,  the  reduction  of  Poland,  Cour- 
land,  Finland,  the  Baltic  provinces  and  large 
stretches  of  Russia  proper  to  the  status  of  sub- 
ject states. 

"You  ask  what  Germany  desires?"  says  Pro- 
fessor Ostwald.  "Well,  Germany  wishes  to  or- 
ganize Europe,  for  Europe  so  far  is  unorgan- 
ized. Germany  wishes  to  enter  upon  a  new  path 
in  order  to  realize  the  idea  of  collective  work. 
How  does  Germany  propose  to  realize  her  pro- 
ject of  organizing  the  West?  She  will  demand 
that  both  Germans  and  French  be  made  wel- 
come into  each  of  those  countries,  that  they  be 
permitted  to  work  and  to  acquire  property  upon 
the  same  conditions  as  the  citizens  of  each  coun- 
try; in  the  East  Germany  will  create  a  confed- 
eration of  states,  a  kind  of  Baltic  League,  which 
will  embrace  the  Scandinavian  countries,  Fin- 
land and  the  Baltic  provinces.  Finally,  Poland 
is  to  be  torn  from  Russia  and  be  made  into  an 
independent  state.  I  believe  the  moment  has 
come  for  the  revising  of  the  map  of  Europe. ' ' 

General  von  Bernhardi,  in  his  famous  book, 
"Germany  and  the  Next  War,"  says,  "We  must 
arouse  in  our  people  the  unanimous  wish  for 
power  together  with  the  determination  to  sacri- 
fice on  the  altar  of  patriotism,  not  only  life  and 
property,  but  also  private  views  and  preferences 
in  the  interest  of  the  common  welfare.  Then 
alone  shall  we  discharge  our  great  duties  of  the 
future,  grow  into  a  world  Power,  and  stamp  a 
great  part  of  humanity  with  the  impress  of  the 
German  spirit.  ...  In  one  way  or  another  we 


DEMOCRACY  39 

must  square  our  account  with  France,  if  we  wish 
for  a  free  hand  in  our  international  policy.  .  .  . 
France  must  be  so  completely  crushed  that  she 
can  never  again  come  across  our  path. ' ' 

To  what  extent  the  German  nation  has  sub- 
scribed to  these  extreme  schemes  of  conquest  it 
is  not  possible  to  say.  It  is  improbable  that 
either  the  average  citizen  or  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment entered  the  present  war  with  the  defi- 
nite program  of  a  confederated  Europe  under 
German  leadership.  That  many  hundred  thou- 
sands believe  that  this  is  the  eventual  "manifest 
destiny"  of  the  Teuton  race,  none  can  gainsay. 

It  every  day  becomes  more  evident,  however, 
that  the  Kaiser  and  his  advisers  did  have  as 
their  chief  purpose  in  precipitating  war  the 
establishment  of  the  long  dreamed  of  Mittel- 
europa.  More  than  two  decades  ago  there  was 
established  a  society  known  as  the  Pan-Germanic 
Union,  whose  avowed  purpose  it  was  to  bring 
into  the  Empire  all  German  speaking  peoples. 
1 '  The  German  Empire  is  incomplete, ' '  they  said ; 
"beyond  the  imperial  frontiers  are  twenty-one 
million  Teutons,  two  million  in  Switzerland,  ten 
million  in  Austria-Hungary,  one  million  in  Rus- 
sia, and  eight  million  Netherlanders  in  Belgium 
and  Holland.  The  problem  consists  in  establish- 
ing complete  identity  between  the  linguistic  ter- 
ritory and  the  political  territory ;  then  only  will 
Germany  attain  her  natural  frontiers." 

This  society,  which  numbers  among  its  mem- 
bers many  of  the  most  prominent  men  of  the 
Empire,  has  been  laboring  unceasingly  to  con- 


40  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

vert  the  people  of  Germany  to  their  views. 
Agents  have  been  scattered  far  and  near  to 
preach  the  doctrine  of  Pan-Germanism,  money 
has  been  spent  freely,  professors  have  taught 
it  in  the  universities,  newspapers  have  conse- 
crated themselves  to  it.  That  this  propaganda, 
if  accepted  as  their  own  by  the  German  nation, 
would  lead  inevitably  to  a  great  European  up- 
heaval did  not  deter  them.  "It  is  then  necessary 
before  all  to  convince  ourselves, ' '  declared  Gen- 
eral von  der  Goltz, ' '  and  to  convince  the  genera- 
tion whose  education  we  must  shape,  that  the 
moment  for  repose  has  not  come,  that  the  pre- 
diction of  a  supreme  struggle,  having  as  its  stake 
the  existence  and  grandeur  of  Germany,  is  by  no 
means  a  vain  dream,  the  creation  of  the  imagina- 
tion of  a  few  ambitious  fools,  that  this  supreme 
struggle  will  break  forth  some  day  inevitable, 
terrible. ' ' 

With  time  the  Pan-Germanist  program  grew. 
Out  of  the  movement  for  a  union  of  German 
speaking  peoples  developed  a  vast  scheme  of 
unprecedented  expansion.  It  was  proposed  that 
Germany  should  annex  or  control  all  of  central 
Europe,  including  Belgium,  Holland,  northern 
France,  Poland  and  the  Baltic  provinces;  the 
whole  of  the  Turkish  Empire ;  and  a  connecting 
strip  of  territory  through  the  Balkans.  The 
new  Germany  was  to  stretch  in  one  mighty 
sweep  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf. 
Europe  was  to  be  split  with  an  iron  wedge,  and 
a  direct  path  opened  for  German  organization 
and  for  German  armies  into  the  heart  of  Asia. 


DEMOCRACY  41 

The  entire  plan  was  set  forth  in  1911  by  Otto 
Richard  Tannenberg  in  his  work,  "Gross- 
deutschland,  die  Arbeit  des  20ten  Jahrhund- 
erts." 

Although  the  Kaiser  and  the  group  of  men 
who  surround  him  have  not  accepted  openly 
this  scheme  of  aggression,  William  has  en- 
couraged the  Pan-Germanist  movement  in 
every  way,  allowing  their  agents  to  work 
freely  among  the  people,  receiving  their  lead- 
ers into  royal  favor.  More  significant  is  the 
fact,  now  for  the  first  time  dawning  upon  the 
consciousness  of  the  world,  that  the  imperial 
policies  have  for  years  shaped  themselves  in 
conformity  with  the  greater  part  of  the  Pan- 
Germanist  scheme.  What  other  interpretation 
could  be  placed  upon  the  Kaiser's  activities  in 
the  Orient,  his  visit  to  the  Sultan,  the  Bagdad 
Railway  concession,  the  Germanizing  of  the 
Turkish  army?  The  Kaiser's  famous  utterance 
at  Damascus  in  1898,  when  he  assured  "the 
Sultan  as  well  as  the  three  hundred  millions  of 
Musselmans  who  venerate  him  as  their  Khalifa" 
that  the  German  Emperor  was  their  friend  for- 
ever, takes  on  a  new  meaning  in  the  light  of 
recent  events.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  that 
the  immediate  occasion  of  the  present  great  war 
was  the  blocking  of  the  way  to  the  East  by  the 
Treaty  of  Bucharest  which  followed  the  Balkan 
wars.  With  this  treaty  the  crushing  of  Serbia 
became  a  necessity  to  Germany,  because  Serbia 
was  a  link  in  the  great  chain  which  was  being 
forged  to  connect  Hamburg  and  Koweit. 


42  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

More  convincing  still  is  the  fact  that  the  war 
has  made  the  Pan-Germanist  scheme  a  fait  ac- 
compli. The  thing  is  done.  ''Let  us  make  no 
mistake,"  says  M.  Cheradame,  "Austria-Hun- 
gary is  actually  as  much  under  the  domination 
of  William  II  as  is  Belgium.  The  European 
conflict  has  enabled  Germany  artfully  to  occupy 
the  Empire  of  the  Hapsburgs  under  the  pre- 
tence of  defending  it.  Since  the  beginning  of 
1915  all  the  troops  of  Francis  Joseph  have  been 
entirely  under  the  orders  of  the  Berlin  General 
Staff.  Even  if  Austria-Hungary  wished  to  make 
a  separate  peace  she  could  not  do  so,  for  all  her 
motive  power,  diplomatic  and  military,  is  ex- 
clusively controlled  by  the  Kaiser's  agents." 

The  conquest  of  Serbia,  Montenegro  and  parts 
of  Albania,  and  Rumania,  together  with  the 
domination  of  Bulgaria  have  made  real  the  sec- 
ond step  of  the  vast  scheme;  the  Germanizing 
of  Turkey  has  accomplished  the  third.  Ger- 
many's control  over  the  Sultan's  domains  is 
almost  as  great  as  over  Austria-Hungary.  Not 
only  has  the  economic  life  of  Turkey  fallen 
under  the  influence  of  German  industrial  organ- 
izers and  its  army  under  the  control  of  German 
officers,  but  a  large  delegation  of  German  pro- 
fessors has  been  sent  to  Constantinople  as 
apostles  of  German  Kultur. 

The  American  citizen  with  his  love  of  peace 
is  inclined  to  ask  why  the  Germans  wished  to 
enter  upon  this  vast  scheme  of  aggression  and 
conquest;  why  they  were  not  content  to  enjoy 
in  quiet  the  prosperity  which  their  industry  had 


DEMOCRACY  43 

won,  how  they  could  justify  themselves  in  plung- 
ing the  world  into  the  most  frightful  struggle 
of  all  time.  General  von  Bernhardi  gives  a 
partial  explanation.  ' '  Germany  supports  today 
65,000,000  inhabitants  on  an  area  about  equal 
the  size  of  France,"  he  writes,  " while  only  40,- 
000,000  live  in  France.  Germany's  enormous 
population  increases  annually  by  about  1,000,- 
000.  There  is  no  question,  agriculture  and  in- 
dustry of  the  home  country  cannot  give  perma- 
nently sufficient  employment  to  such  a  steadily 
increasing  mass  of  human  beings.  .  .  .  Parti- 
tioned as  the  surface  of  the  globe  is  among 
nations  at  the  present  time,  territorial  acquisi- 
tions we  can  only  realize  at  the  cost  of  other 
states  .  .  .  and  such  results  are  possible  only 
if  we  succeed  in  securing  our  power  in  the  centre 
of  Europe  better  than  hitherto. ' '  Again  he  says, 
4 'It  is  impossible  to  change  the  partition  of  the 
earth  as  it  now  exists  in  our  favor  by  diplomatic 
artifices.  If  we  wish  to  gain  the  position  in  the 
world  that  is  due  to  us,  we  must  rely  on  our 
sword,  renounce  all  weakly  visions  of  fear,  and 
eye  the  dangers  surrounding  us  with  resolute 
and  unflinching  courage." 

This  gospel  is  a  simple  one.  Since  Germany 
has  not  all  that  she  desires  or  that  she  considers 
necessary  for  her  development,  and  since  she 
can  get  it  only  by  robbing  her  neighbors,  she  is 
quite  justified  in  launching  an  attack  upon  them. 
That  other  nations  have  need  for  their  own  ter- 
ritory does  not  matter.  "I  am  hungry,"  she 
says,  "surely  you  cannot  blame  me  if  I  knock 


44  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

you  over  the  head  and  eat  you."  Her  crude 
appeal  to  force  she  justifies  by  the  law  of  the 
survival  of  the  fittest.  She  laughs  at  interna- 
tional law,  and  brushes  it  aside  as  the  foible 
of  petty  minds.  ' '  A  state  cannot  commit  crime, ' ' 
says  Professor  Lasson;  "to  observe  treaties  is 
not  a  question  of  law,  it  is  a  question  of  interest. 
.  .  .  He  who  has  power  can  create  new  condi- 
tions which  will  be  as  much  law  as  those  which 
precede  it.  In  spite  of  all  treaties  the  feeble 
are  the  prey  of  the  stronger.  .  .  .  Between 
neighboring  states  .  .  .  the  case  can  be  settled 
only  by  material  force.  .  .  .  The  feeble  flatter 
themselves  that  the  treaties  which  assure  their 
miserable  existence  are  inviolable.  But  war 
shows  them  that  a  treaty  can  be  untrustworthy, 
that  conditions  have  changed.  There  is  only 
one  guarantee:  a  sufficient  military  force." 
"Only  cranks  trust  in  international  conven- 
tions," said  Professor  Busch  at  a  recent  Pan- 
German  meeting,  "and,  as  for  disarmament 
treaties,  they  are  not  worth  the  paper  they  are 
written  on." 

What  shall  the  answer  be?  The  Kaiser  and 
his  people  have  presented  their  case  to  the  world 
in  an  unmistakable  manner — with  the  points  of 
millions  of  bayonets,  with  the  roar  of  thousands 
of  guns.  If  the  world  reproaches  them  for  their 
ruthless  aggression,  they  reply  with  steel;  if 
Belgium  bemoans  her  hard  fate,  their  reply  is 
steel;  if  France  points  to  her  bleeding  breast, 
their  reply  is  steel;  if  America  holds  them  re- 
sponsible for  her  murdered  women  and  children. 


DEMOCRACY  45 

they  reply  still  with  steel.  It  is  a  difficult  argu- 
ment to  answer;  in  fact  it  can  be  answered  in 
but  one  way — with  steel. 

The  world  is  slow  to  awaken  to  its  peril.  It 
was  so  content  to  go  peaceably  on  its  way,  de- 
voting its  energies  to  things  that  make  for  hap- 
piness and  plenty.  It  looked  back  with  pity 
upon  the  struggles  of  other  ages  and  congratu- 
lated itself  that  the  enlightenment  of  the  twen- 
tieth century  would  protect  it  from  the  horrors 
of  war.  It  cannot  even  today  realize  that  it  is 
terribly  necessary  to  bestir  itself,  to  throw  aside 
all  hesitancy,  to  arm  to  the  teeth  in  order  to 
preserve  all  that  it  holds  dearest,  that  it  is  neces- 
sary for  her  to  use  the  argument  of  steel. 

But  there  are  millions  of  Americans  who  are 
wondering  how  all  this  concerns  us.  They  can- 
not understand  why  we  should  be  dragged  into 
what  they  term  a  European  squabble.  Why 
should  we  care  if  the  Kaiser  does  secure  his 
Mitteleuropa  and  extend  his  power  to  the  Per- 
sian Gulf?  Why  should  we  send  our  youth  to 
slaughter  in  order  to  help  the  English  and 
French  conquer  their  enemies  I  They  think  that 
the  submarine  warfare  alone  has  forced  us  into 
war  and  wonder  whether  the  President  might 
not  have  found  some  way  to  preserve  longer  our 
strained  neutrality. 

In  fact  our  stake  in  the  war  is  the  same  as 
that  of  our  European  allies;  the  preservation 
of  our  democracy,  the  defence  of  our  liberties 
and  our  homes.  Should  the  Germans  be  suc- 
cessful in  this  war  the  balance  of  power  in 


46  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Europe  will  be  overthrown.  There  would  be 
no  nation,  no  group  of  nations  that  could  with- 
stand the  terrible  might  of  the  Kaiser.  It  would 
be  a  new  European  Empire,  it  would  be  Charle- 
magne returned  to  earth. 

It  requires  no  great  insight  to  perceive  that 
the  safety  of  the  American  continents  depends 
upon  a  division  of  power  in  Europe.  Were  all 
the  millions  of  men,  all  the  vast  wealth,  all  the 
resources  of  Europe  controlled  by  one  govern- 
ment, we  would  be  almost  helpless  before  it. 
The  day  would  not  long  be  delayed  when  it  would 
stretch  forth  its  mighty  hand  across  the  Atlantic 
for  a  share  in  the  riches  of  the  West.  Already 
the  Kaiser  has  cast  longing  eyes  at  the  Amer- 
icas, and  has  sent  to  them  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  Teutonic  settlers,  as  the  vanguard  of 
what  may  some  day  be  a  conquering  host. 

It  is  well  for  us  to  recall  the  dangers  which 
threatened  our  country  from  the  overgrown 
power  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte.  When  Napoleon 
became  First  Consul  of  France  the  vast  Louis- 
iana territory  bordered  upon  our  western  fron- 
tier, with  the  Mississippi  the  dividing  line. 
When  our  independence  was  acknowledged  this 
territorv  was  in  the  hands  of  the  decadent  and 
unprogressive  monarchy  of  Spain,  from  whom 
we  had  nothing  to  fear.  Except  for  the  extreme 
southern  section.  Louisiana  was  unsettled  and 
it  was  unlikely  that  it  would  be  settled  for  many 
decades.  The  possibility  of  the  building  up  of 
a  strong  rival  nation  and  the  blocking  forever  of 
our  westward  expansion  seemed  remote. 


DEMOCRACY  47 

But  when  Napoleon,  in  1799,  took  Louisiana 
from  the  helpless  Spaniards  with  the  design  of 
founding  a  new  French  empire  in  America,  we 
were  filled  with  the  greatest  alarm.  "The  day 
that  France  takes  possession  of  New  Orleans," 
declared  President  Jefferson,  ".  .  .  seals  the 
union  of  two  nations  who  in  conjunction  can 
maintain  exclusive  possession  of  the  ocean. 
From  that  moment  we  must  marry  ourselves 
to  the  British  fleet  and  nation."  The  renewal 
of  the  European  war  forced  Napoleon  to  sell 
Louisiana  to  the  United  States,  but  there  can 
be  little  doubt  that  he  would  have  turned  his 
attention  once  more  to  America  after  his  con- 
quest of  western  Europe,  had  not  the  way  been 
barred  to  him  by  the  ever  victorious  British 
fleet. 

It  cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  the 
people  of  the  United  States  that  their  safety 
would  be  seriously  jeopardized  were  Germany 
to  emerge  from  the  war  undefeated.  Were  hos- 
tilities to  end  today  upon  the  status  quo,  or  even 
upon  the  basis  of  no  indemnities  and  no  an- 
nexations, the  Kaiser's  domination  of  Europe 
would  be  almost  undisputed.  If  France,  Eng- 
land, Russia,  Italy  have  been  incapable  of  curb- 
ing the  military  might  of  Germany  in  the 
present  war,  what  conceivable  combination  of 
Powers  can  accomplish  the  task  in  the  next? 
A  truce  of  a  few  years  is  all  that  Germany 
would  require  to  organize  herself  and  her  allies 
into  an  invincible  fighting  machine.  General 
von  Bernhardi  was  quite  correct  when  he  wrote, 


48  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

"Our  opponents  can  only  attain  their  political 
aims  by  almost  annihilating  us  by  land  and  by 
sea.  If  the  victory  is  only  half  won,  they  would 
have  to  expect  continuous  renewals  of  the  con- 
test, which  would  be  contrary  to  their  interests. ' ' 
The  United  States  has  as  much  at  stake  in 
maintaining  a  divided  Europe  as  France  for- 
merly had  in  preventing  the  uniting  of  Ger- 
many. For  centuries  the  French  rulers  had 
little  to  fear  from  their  neighbors  across  the 
Rhine,  because  they  were  disunited,  weak  and 
bitterly  hostile  to  each  other.  In  1866,  Napoleon 
III  held  his  armies  inert  while  Bismarck  de- 
feated the  Austro-Hungarians  and  their  allies, 
and  brought  about  the  union  of  all  north  Ger- 
many. His  folly  resulted  not  only  in  the  crush- 
ing of  France  four  years  later  by  the  German 
military  machine  and  the  collapse  of  his  own 
imperial  government,  but  in  creating  such  a 
permanent  menace  to  the  very  existence  of 
France  that  she  has  lived  ever  since  in  the 
shadow  of  impending  disaster.  France  today 
is  paying  for  the  folly  of  her  Emperor  with  the 
lives  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  her  sons,  with 
billions  of  francs,  with  untold  bitterness  and 
suffering.  The  people  of  the  United  States 
would  be  equally  foolish  were  they  not  to  strike 
with  all  their  might  at  the  Teutonic  military 
power  which  threatens  now  to  overwhelm 
Europe.  If  we  fail  in  the  present  war,  if  Ger- 
many emerges  with  her  military  machine  in 
working  order,  our  sons  will  pay  dearly  for 
our  failure. 


DEMOCRACY  49 

But,  many  are  asking,  is  not  the  danger  as 
great  from  England  as  from  Germany?  Will 
we  not,  by  striking  down  the  Teutonic  peril, 
help  create  an  irresistible  Britain?  Is  the  men- 
ace of  the  Kaiser's  army  greater  than  that  of 
England's  navy?  Such  fears  are  without  foun- 
dation. There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
Great  Britain  will  emerge  from  this  struggle 
stronger  than  when  she  entered  it.  It  is  possi- 
ble that  she  may  retain  some  of  the  conquered 
German  colonies,  but  these  can  add  little  to  her 
power.  Upon  the  continent  of  Europe  she  will 
secure  not  one  foot  of  territory,  and  her  might 
will  still  be  balanced  by  that  of  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  Italy. 

Moreover,  Great  Britain,  like  ourselves,  is  a 
democratic  nation,  a  nation  whose  rulers  are  the 
representatives  and  servants  of  the  people.  She 
is  the  very  antithesis  of  the  military  despotism 
of  Germany.  There  is  no  fear  that  the  British 
people  will  ever  arm  themselves  to  the  teeth  as 
the  rulers  of  Germany  have  armed  the  German 
people,  for  an  assault  upon  the  liberties  of  the 
world.  Can  there  be  dread  of  a  country  the 
peace  strength  of  whose  army  is  only  138,497 
men,  and  who  was  forced  to  create  its  effective 
fighting  force  of  the  present  war  after  hostil- 
ities had  begun?  It  is  true  that  Great  Britain 
has  for  centuries  maintained  the  greatest  navy 
of  the  world,  but  this  has  been  necessary  in 
order  to  assure  the  integrity  of  her  empire  and 
her  own  existence.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
a  navy  is  primarily  a  defensive  weapon  in  that 


50  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

it  cannot  be  used  for  purposes  of  extensive  con- 
quest unless  accompanied  by  an  effective  army. 
The  British  navy  has  been  for  us  far  more  of 
a  protection  than  a  menace.  It  was  the  control 
of  the  seas  by  the  British  that  made  possible 
the  independence  of  the  Latin  American  states, 
for  our  Monroe  Doctrine  would  have  been  of 
little  avail  against  the  reactionary  continental 
powers  which  wished  to  aid  Spain  in  subduing 
her  rebellious  colonies,  had  not  Canning  refused 
them  passage  for  their  armies.  Nor  would  we 
have  been  allowed  to  acquire  Porto  Rico,  Guam 
and  the  Philippines  in  1898,  had  not  the  British 
navy  been  ready  to  oppose  any  hostile  league 
of  European  Powers. 

No,  the  menace  is  from  Germany,  not  from 
Great  Britain.  It  is  Germany  that  "  stands  in 
shining  armor  in  the  midst  of  Europe"  and 
defies  the  power  and  derides  the  laws  of  the 
world.  It  is  against  Germany  that  the  outraged 
peoples  have  been  compelled  to  arm  to  protect 
all  that  they  hold  best  and  dearest.  The  strug- 
gle has  become  a  world  crusade,  a  crusade 
against  a  nation  infidel  to  justice,  to  interna- 
tional law,  to  treaties,  to  all  save  its  own  selfish 
ends. 

There  can  be  but  one  of  two  outcomes  to  the 
world's  quarrel  with  Germany:  either  the  world 
must  crush  the  German  system,  or  succumb  be- 
fore it.  Just  as  it  was  impossible  for  the  United 
States  before  our  Civil  War  to  remain  perma- 
nently divided  against  itself,  as  it  inevitably  had 
to  become  all  slave  or  all  free,  so  the  world  to- 


DEMOCRACY  51 

day  cannot  remain  divided  against  itself,  it  mnst 
become  all  Prussian  or  all  democratic.  There 
can  be  no  compromise  in  the  present  struggle, 
no  half  victory.  If  we  do  not  crush  to  the 
ground  the  hosts  of  despotism  they  will  eventu- 
ally overwhelm  us.  We  will  not,  we  cannot  re- 
linquish the  struggle  until  the  goal  has  been 
reached,  until  militarism  has  been  rebuked,  until 
international  law  has  been  vindicated. 

When  once  this  end  has  been  accomplished, 
when  the  sword  has  been  struck  from  the 
Kaiser 's  hand,  steps  must  be  taken  to  make  im- 
possible the  recurrence  of  the  present  frightful 
calamity.  "The  world  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy. ' '  But  how,  it  may  be  asked,  is  this 
to  be  accomplished?  Is  Germany  to  be  disinte- 
grated? Is  Prussia  to  be  reduced  to  her  ancient 
bounds?  Are  the  south  German  states  to  be 
made  independent  ?  Is  France  to  secure  all  ter- 
ritory as  far  as  the  Rhine?  Such  radical  steps 
would  be  unwise  and  unnecessary.  Our  Presi- 
dent has  declared  that  we  have  no  quarrel  with 
the  German  people;  we  would  not  be  justified 
in  destroying  the  German  nation.  Our  foe,  the 
foe  of  the  world,  is  Prussian  military  autocracy, 
and  this  alone  must  be  destroyed.  But  this  must 
be  destroyed  utterly,  for  if  it  be  merely  curbed, 
it  will  arise  again  and  again  to  menace  the  lib- 
erty of  the  world.  The  world  must  be  made 
safe  for  democracy  by  democracy. 

At  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  when  the  vic- 
torious allies  were  quarrelling  over  the  spoils 
of  Europe,  which  they  had  just  torn  from  Napo- 


52  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

leon  Bonaparte,  the  delegates  of  the  little  Re- 
public of  Genoa  came  to  plead  for  recognition 
for  their  state.  "  Republics  are  no  longer  fash- 
ionable," they  were  told  by  the  Czar,  and  their 
territory  was  handed  over  to  the  King  of  Sar- 
dinia. Things  have  changed  since  that  day.  A 
glance  at  the  map  of  the  world  of  1815  shows 
that  there  was  then  but  one  real  republic  in 
existence — the  United  States.  Now  all  save  one- 
thirtieth  of  the  territory  of  the  world  is  occupied 
by  democratic  nations  or  their  dependencies. 
Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  some  of 
the  Balkan  states  are  almost  the  sole  survivors 
of  the  autocratic  spirit  of  past  ages.  Since  the 
Revolution  in  Russia  and  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war,  the  struggle  has 
assumed  openly  a  character  which  it  bore  in 
spirit  from  the  first,  a  battle  of  democracy  with 
despotism.  And  when  the  war  is  over,  when 
the  conference  is  held  for  the  reconstruction  of 
the  world,  Alexander's  words  will  be  turned 
against  the  Kaiser  and  he  will  be  told  that  it  is 
despotism  which  is  now  not  fashionable. 


CHAPTER  III 
INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IMPERILLED 

By  Edward  S.  Corwin 

The  greatest  of  German  jurists  defines  rights 
as  interests  which  society  undertakes  to  protect, 
not  merely  for  the  benefit  of  the  bearers  of  such 
rights,  but — and  primarily — for  its  own  benefit. 
It  follows  that  the  individual  who  asserts  his 
rights  to  the  extent  of  his  ability  performs 
thereby  a  social  service;  and  so  in  fact  Von 
Ihering  argues.  "Every  man,"  he  declares, 
"is  the  champion  of  the  law  in  the  interest  of 
society. ' ' 

What  then  is  the  duty  of  a  state  whose  rights 
under  international  law  have  been  trampled 
upon  by  another  state !  Clearly,  to  seek  repara- 
tion from  the  transgressor.  For  as  it  is  the 
object  of  municipal  law  to  "secure  the  condi- 
tions requisite  for  social  life,"  so  it  is  the  object 
of  international  law  to  secure  the  conditions 
which  are  requisite  for  the  life  of  the  civilized 
states  of  the  world  in  community  with  one  an- 
other. Where  therefore  international  law  as- 
sures certain  rights  to  the  individual  members 
of  the  family  of  nations,  its  doing  so  may  be 
taken  as  representing  the  verdict  of  mankind 
that  the  rights  in  question  comprise  essential 

53 


54  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

conditions  of  the  life  of  nations  in  association 
with  one  another,  and  that  the  relation  of  the 
individual  members  of  the  family  of  nations  to 
such  rights  is  to  be  regarded  as  one  of  obliga- 
tion as  well  as  of  privilege.  Furthermore,  the 
majority  of  men  will  hardly  deny  that  the  meet- 
ing of  this  obligation  must  in  certain  circum- 
stances involve  a  resort  to  force.  Accustomed 
to  evaluate  force  as  legitimate  or  illegitimate 
according  to  its  employment,  they  will  scarcely 
challenge  the  self-evident  fact  that  a  society  in 
which  force  was  always  more  readily  enlisted 
against  the  law  than  in  its  behalf  must  eventu- 
ally disintegrate. 

There  is  just  one  circumstance  which  may 
validly  operate  toward  relieving  a  state  from 
the  duty  otherwise  incumbent  upon  it  to  vindi- 
cate its  affronted  rights  under  international 
law,  and  that  is  the  likelihood  of  incurring  over- 
whelming calamity  if  it  undertook  the  discharge 
of  this  duty.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  in  the 
present  war  those  who  are  banded  together  in 
the  effort  to  bring  Germany  to  bar  have  over- 
looked the  laches  of  the  small  states  neighboring 
on  Germany  whose  rights  the  latter  has  so  sys- 
tematically violated,  since  it  is  appreciated  that 
for  Switzerland,  Holland  or  the  Scandinavian 
states  to  assert  themselves  against  Germany  in 
defence  of  their  rights  would  be  to  invite  the 
fate  that  has  already  overwhelmed  Belgium, 
Serbia  and  Rumania.  But  to  risk  ruin  is  one 
thing,  to  incur  grave  inconvenience  quite  an- 
other;  and  the   state   which  would   forgo   its 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  55 

rights  merely  in  order  to  avoid  the  immediate 
annoyance  and  expense  of  asserting  them  would 
only  expose  itself  to  fresh  aggressions  which 
must  in  the  end  become  unbearable. 

The  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the 
war  against  Germany  was  a  duty  which  it  owed 
itself  both  in  its  character  of  custodian  of  the 
rights  of  its  people  and  in  that  of  a  member 
of  the  family  of  nations.  Under  the  rules  of 
international  law  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  so  long  as  they  remained  neutral,  had 
the  right  to  venture  their  lives  and  their  goods 
upon  the  high  seas  subject  to  certain  risks.  By 
her  methods  of  submarine  warfare  Germany  has 
enhanced  these  risks  intolerably,  and  with  re- 
sultant loss  of  American  lives.  In  the  first 
place,  for  the  belligerent  right  of  capture  at 
sea  she  has  invariably  substituted  the  practice 
of  outright  destruction.  In  the  second  place, 
from  the  procedure  of  capture  she  has  elimi- 
nated the  essential  steps  of  visit  and  search, 
with  the  result  that  destruction  is  carried  out 
with  little  or  no  warning  to  the  victims.  In  the 
third  place,  for  the  duty  of  the  captor  to  put 
those  on  board  the  captured  vessel  into  a  safe 
place  before  destroying  it,  she  has  substituted 
"the  poor  measure  of  safety"  of  entrusting 
them  to  the  mercy  of  wind  and  wave  in  small 
boats  many  miles  from  land — when,  indeed,  her 
commanders  have  not  murderously  assailed 
them  with  shot  and  shell.  Then  to  these  gross 
infractions  of  the  law  of  nations  Germany  has 
added,  in  the  case  of  the  United  States,   an 


56  THE  WOELD  PEEIL 

equally  gross  violation  of  a  specific  pledge.  At 
the  time  of  the  controversy  over  the  sinking  of 
the  Sussex,  the  German  Government,  after  hav- 
ing forwarded  our  Government  an  explanation 
of  this  occurrence  which  for  sheer  hardihood  of 
prevarication  is  unsurpassed  in  the  annals  of 
diplomacy,  gave  its  word  that  thenceforth  mer- 
chantmen carrying  American  citizens  would 
be  sunk  by  its  vessels  only  after  warning.  This 
undertaking,  which  indeed  contained  an  intima- 
tion of  its  temporary  character,  was  probably 
instigated  by  the  fact  that  up  to  this  time  sub- 
marine warfare  had  not  proved  a  success  and 
that  most  of  the  submarines  of  the  original  pat- 
tern had  been  destroyed  by  the  British  navy. 
By  the  beginning  of  the  current  year,  however, 
Germany  had  a  new  stock  of  subsea  vessels  on 
hand  of  a  much  larger  type.  So,  confident  of 
being  able  to  end  the  war  by  the  use  of  the  im- 
proved weapon  before  the  United  States  could 
become  an  effective  enemy,  the  German  Imperial 
Government,  on  January  31,  1917,  bluntly  in- 
formed our  Government  that  it  proposed  to 
renew  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  on  the 
following  day.  This  time  at  any  rate  it  was  as 
good  as  its  word,  and  on  February  1  began  the 
course  of  events  which  compelled  our  Govern- 
ment to  determine  definitely  whether  to  submit 
to  injury  capped  by  insult  or  to  join  the  league 
against  the  Ishmael  among  nations. 

At  this  point  it  will  be  advantageous  to  antici- 
pate an  objection,  the  consideration  of  which 
will  bring  us  to  the  threshold  of  the  principal 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  57 

topic  of  this  chapter.  I  refer  to  the  argument 
which  has  appeared  in  certain  quarters  that, 
while  Germany  undoubtedly  infringed  upon  our 
rights  as  neutrals,  Great  Britain  by  her  em- 
bargo upon  neutral  trade  with  Germany  did  the 
same  thing,  and  that,  accordingly,  it  was  not 
the  vindication  of  our  rights  at  international 
law  which  really  determined  our  entrance  into 
the  war.  The  argument  conveniently  ignores 
a  material  fact,  namely,  that  Germany's  viola- 
tions of  our  rights  were  of  a  vastly  more  serious 
nature  than  Great  Britain's  and  so  required 
from  our  Government  a  corresponding  urgency 
in  meeting  them.  This  may  be  ascertained  by 
putting  the  following  question:  What  was  the 
menace  held  out  respectively  by  the  British  em- 
bargo and  by  German  submarine  warfare  to 
American  rights  in  case  they  were  asserted  in 
defiance  of  these  measures?  The  answer  is  ob- 
vious. The  menace  held  out  by  the  British  em- 
bargo was,  at  worst,  the  seizure  of  American 
property  on  the  high  seas  and  its  indefinite  de- 
tention in  British  waters — therefore,  property 
loss.  The  menace  held  out  by  German  sub- 
marine warfare,  especially  after  it  entered  upon 
its  final  stage  on  February  1,  1917,  was  the  out- 
right destruction,  without  an  instant's  warning, 
of  American  lives  as  well  as  of  American  prop- 
erty on  the  high  seas.  But  it  may  be  argued, 
along  the  line  taken  by  the  recent  Austrian  note 
to  our  Government,  that  the  destruction  wrought 
by  German  submarines  is  not  an  unwarned  de- 
struction,  that   indeed   the   warning   is   given 


58  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

even  before  American  property  or  American 
lives  leave  their  home  ports.  In  other  words, 
we  are  warned  not  to  try  to  exercise  our  rights 
on  the  high  seas  thenceforth.  Naturally,  our 
Government  has  not  given  any  heed  to  such 
warnings.  It  has  proceeded  on  the  assumption 
that  American  citizens  would  continue  to  assert 
their  rights  on  the  seas,  the  common  highway 
of  mankind. 

So  the  question  turns  upon  the  difference  be- 
tween the  right  to  life  itself,  when  one  is  where 
he  is  entitled  to  be,  and  the  right  to  property, 
which  is  but  a  means  to  life;  on  the  difference 
between  a  right  which  may  be  assessed  in  terms 
of  dollars  and  cents  and  paid  for,  and  a  right 
which  cannot  be  assessed  and  paid  for.  It  is  a 
difference  which  the  law  has  recognized  from 
antiquity.  Sir  Edward  Coke  stated  it  in  Mouse 's 
Case,1  where  he  held  blameless  a  ferryman  for 
jettisoning  his  cargo  in  an  effort  to  preserve 
those  on  board.  On  the  same  basis  rests  the 
right  of  municipal  authorities  to  destroy  prop- 
erty in  order  to  prevent  the  spread  of  a  con- 
flagration. Indeed,  even  that  otherwise  so  little 
sapient  organization  calling  itself  "The  Emer- 
gency Peace  Commission"  recognized  that  we 
could  not  arbitrate  matters  with  Germany  unless 
the  latter  first  discontinued  ruthless  submarine 
warfare. 

There  is,  moreover,  a  larger  aspect  of  the 
subject.  The  duty  of  our  Government  to  come 
to  the  protection  of  the  lives  of  our  citizens  in 

1 12  Coke  63. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  59 

the  exercise  of  their  rights  of  trade  and  travel 
was  a  very  immediate  one,  but  it  was  overshad- 
owed in  this  instance  by  an  even  more  impera- 
tive duty,  and  that  was  to  the  future  security 
of  our  communications  with  western  Europe. 
Germany  has  made  a  shambles  of  the  Atlantic 
highway,  she  has  dyed  with  the  blood  of  our 
citizens  those  very  waters  which  make  the  road- 
way of  the  vast  part  of  both  our  commercial 
and  intellectual  exchanges.  Is  she  to  be  per- 
mitted to  succeed  in  her  purposes  by  such 
methods?  And  if  she,  why  not  others'?  Are  the 
transcendently  important  part  of  our  foreign 
trade  and  the  vital  thread  of  intercourse  with 
the  sources  of  our  civilization  to  be  held  hence- 
forth in  fee  to  any  international  marauder  which 
may  consider  itself  entitled  to  a  bigger  "place 
in  the  sun"?  The  submarine  is  a  new  instru- 
ment of  warfare,  and  whether  it  is  to  prove  a 
blessing  or  a  curse  to  mankind  is  now  to  be 
determined  once  for  all.  Used  within  the  limits 
set  by  the  rules  of  international  law,  it  may  well 
prove  a  valuable  addition  to  the  arsenal  of  de- 
fensive warfare,  and  so  a  force  making  for 
international  peace.  Used  in  the  way  that  Ger- 
many is  using  it,  it  must  remain  a  terror  to 
civilization  unless  inventive  genius  contrives 
some  way  of  cancelling  it.  And  there  is  no  na- 
tion whose  concern  at  the  outcome  can  surpass 
that  of  our  own  country. 

When,  therefore,  the  German  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment issued  its  challenge  on  January  31, 
1917,  our  Government  was  bound  to  take  it  up 


60  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

or  else  to  abdicate  its  trusteeship  of  essential 
rights  and  interests  of  the  American  people. 
For  in  the  face  of  the  downright  declaration 
that  every  vessel  encountered  thenceforward  by 
German  submarines  in  the  waters  which  wash 
the  shores  of  Great  Britain,  France  and  Italy 
" would  be  sunk,"  that  is,  would  be  sunk  without 
warning  and  regardless  of  nationality,  no  single 
loophole  was  left  for  ever  so  dexterous  a  diplo- 
macy. Yet  it  is  not  this  fact,  nor  even  German 
brutality  of  word  and  threatened  act — to  which 
indeed  something  of  gratitude  was  due  for  clear- 
ing the  issue  of  much  obscuration — it  is  not 
these  which  offer  the  most  conclusive  demon- 
stration of  what  the  cause  of  international  law 
and  order  demands  of  us  now  that  we  are  in 
the  war.  Germany  has  violated  our  rights,  and 
so  has  given  us  a  casus  belli.  But  the  vastly 
more  important  circumstance  is  that,  pursuant 
of  the  principles  avowed  by  her  statesmen,  her 
jurists  and  men  of  learning,  it  was  inevitable 
that  sooner  or  later  she  should  do  just  this  thing. 
To  put  the  matter  somewhat  differently :  While 
it  is  Germany's  violations  of  international  law 
that  have  brought  us  into  the  war,  it  is  what 
these  violations  imply  that  must  keep  us  there 
until  Germany  is  defeated,  since  they  spring 
from  ideas  which  make  any  rational  hope  of 
good  order  in  the  world  of  nations  a  perma- 
nent impossibility. 

Suppose  we  extend  our  comparison  of  the 
derelictions  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  to 
the  apologetic  efforts  of  their  statesmen.    The 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  61 

British  Government  originally  sought  to  justify 
its  embargo  upon  neutral  trade  with  Germany 
as  a  measure  of  retaliation  for  Germany's  in- 
fractions of  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare.  But 
however  available  against  the  other  belligerent, 
the  argument  in  question  was  no  sufficient 
answer  to  neutral  protests,  since,  as  our  State 
Department  put  it  in  answer  to  the  German 
Government  when  the  latter  offered  the  same 
argument  in  extenuation  of  the  Lusitania  crime, 
acts  of  retaliation  "are  manifestly  indefensible 
when  they  deprive  neutrals  of  their  acknowl- 
edged rights."  And  so  the  British  Government 
has,  in  effect  at  least,  subsequently  admitted. 
Thus  in  his  elaborate  notes  to  our  Government 
of  July,  1915,  and  April,  1916,  Viscount  Grey 
endeavored  to  present  the  British  embargo  as 
an  allowable  application,  in  view  of  the  condi- 
tions of  modern  warfare,  of  the  belligerent  right 
of  blockade.  His  argument,  though  exceedingly 
adroit,  is  unconvincing,  since  the  effect  of  it  is 
to  wipe  out  the  distinction  between  contraband 
goods  and  innocent  goods  and  to  deny  the  United 
States  the  benefits  of  the  Declaration  of  Paris. 
Nevertheless,  it  has  in  candor  to  be  admitted 
that  the  concept  upon  which  the  British  Govern- 
ment today  rests  its  case  for  the  embargo,  the 
doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  also  underwent 
a  very  radical  extension  at  the  hands  of  our 
own  Government  during  the  Civil  War,  when 
Great  Britain  was  the  disadvantaged  neutral. 
Moreover,  the  question  of  the  convincingness  of 
the  British  argument  is  a  matter  somewhat  be- 


62  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

side  the  point.  For  whether  it  is  a  sound  argu- 
ment or  a  fallacious  one,  it  is  at  any  rate  an 
appeal  to  law  and  constitutes  therefore  an  ad- 
mission that  the  issue  which  the  embargo  has 
raised  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  is  one  to  be  determined  under  the  law, 
whose  ultimate  vindication  is  thus  assured.  Nor 
is  this  all :  from  the  outset  the  British  Govern- 
ment has  stated  its  willingness,  in  harmony  with 
the  existing  treaty  between  the  two  countries, 
to  refer  the  dispute  at  the  close  of  hostilities  to 
an  international  tribunal. 

With  this  attitude  of  humane  reasonableness, 
addressing  itself  to  like  reasonableness  with  like 
rights  and  avowing  its  readiness  to  abide  the 
verdict  of  the  tribunal  of  the  civilized  world, 
compare  the  outgivings  of  the  German  Imperial 
Government  when  it  revoked  the  pledge  it  had 
given  after  the  sinking  of  the  Sussex.  In  the 
note  which  accompanied  its  brusque  announce- 
ment the  German  Imperial  Government  used 
these  words: 

"Every  day  by  which  the  terrible  struggle  is 
prolonged  brings  new  devastations,  new  dis- 
tress, new  death.  Every  day  by  which  the  war 
is  shortened  preserves  on  both  sides  the  lives 
of  thousands  of  brave  fighters,  and  is  a  blessing 
to  tortured  mankind.  The  Imperial  Govern- 
ment would  not  be  able  to  answer  before  its 
own  conscience,  before  the  German  people  and 
before  history,  if  it  left  any  means  whatever 
untried  to  hasten  the  end  of  the  war.  .  .  .  The 
Imperial  Government,  if  it  desires  in  a  higher 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  63 

sense  to  serve  humanity  and  not  to  do  a  wrong 
against  its  own  countrymen,  must  continue  the 
battle  forced  on  it  anew  for  existence  with  all 
its  weapons." 

' '  Conscience, "  i '  history, "  ' '  service  to  human- 
ity," " battle  for  existence" — by  such  phrases 
does  the  German  Imperial  Government  seek  to 
appease  the  moral  sensibilities  of  those  whose 
intelligence  it  affronts.  In  the  presence  of  its 
own  people  it  is  not  so  hampered.  On  the  same 
day  that  the  document  just  quoted  from  was 
handed  to  Mr.  Gerard,  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
addressed  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  of 
the  Reichstag  on  the  renewal  of  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare  as  follows: 

"We  have  been  challenged  to  fight  to  the  end. 
We  accept  the  challenge,  we  stake  everything, 
and  we  shall  be  victorious.  ...  I  have  always 
proceeded  from  the  standpoint  of  whether 
U-boat  war  would  bring  us  nearer  victorious 
peace  or  not.  Every  means,  I  said  in  March, 
that  was  calculated  to  shorten  the  war  consti- 
tute [sic]  the  most  humane  policy  to  follow.2 
When  the  most  ruthless  methods  are  considered 
best  calculated  to  lead  us  to  victory,  and  swift 
victory,  I  said,  they  must  be  employed. 

1 *  This  moment  has  now  arrived.  Last  autumn 
the  time  was  not  yet  ripe,  but  today  the  moment 
has  come  when  with  the  greatest  prospect  of 
success  we  can  undertake  the  enterprise.  We 
must  not  therefore  wait  any  longer.  ...  As  re- 
gards all  that  human  strength  can  do  to  enforce 

2  The  Sussex  pledge  was  given  two  months  later ! 


64  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

success  for  the  Fatherland,  be  assured,  gentle- 
men, that  nothing  has  been  neglected.  Every- 
thing in  this  respect  will  be  done. ' ' 

Henry  James  in  one  of  his  critical  essays 
classifies  the  pleasures  of  literature  into  the 
pleasures  of  surprise  and  of  recognition.  The 
pleasure  to  be  got  from  reading  the  foregoing 
passage  must  today  unquestionably  be  set  down 
as  of  the  latter  order,  though  three  years  ago 
its  classification  would  have  been  a  matter  of 
more  difficulty.  For  who  can  read  the  words 
just  quoted  and  fail  to  recall  the  same  speaker's 
apology  for  the  invasion  of  Belgium1? 

"Gentlemen,  we  are  at  present  in  a  state  of 
necessity,  and  necessity  knows  no  law!  Our 
troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg :  perhaps  they 
have  already  entered  Belgian  territory.  Gentle- 
men, this  is  contrary  to  the  rules  of  interna- 
tional law.  It  is  true  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment has  declared  at  Brussels  that  it  would 
respect  Belgium's  neutrality  as  long  as  the  ad- 
versary would  respect  it.  However,  we  know 
that  France  was  ready  for  an  invasion.3  France 
could  afford  to  wait,  but  we  could  not !  A  French 
invasion  on  our  flank  on  the  lower  Rhine  might 
have  been  fatal  to  us.  Thus  we  were  forced  to 
disregard  the  justified  protests  of  Luxemburg 
and  Belgium.  The  wrong — I  speak  openly — the 
wrong  which  we  thereby  commit  we  shall  try 

s  Even  German  apologists  seem  today  disposed  to  abandon 
this  pitiable  fiction.  See  excerpts  from  an  article  by  Lieut. 
Gen.  Baron  von  Freytag-Loringhoven,  Chief  of  the  Supple- 
mentary General  Staff,  quoted  in  The  New  York  Times  of 
August  12,  1917. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  65 

to  make  good  as  soon  as  our  military  aim  is 
attained.  Whoever  is  threatened  as  we  are  is 
not  allowed  to  have  any  other  consideration  be- 
yond how  he  will  hack  his  way  through." 

Read  in  the  light  of  later  events,  how  terrible 
appears  the  relentless  candor  of  these  words! 
Yet  here  are  words  of  compunction,  a  confession 
of  wrong,  a  pledge  of  reparation,  none  of  which 
mitigates  the  speech  of  last  January.  Prussian 
ruthlessness  did  not  spring  into  existence  full 
grown ! 

We  come  therefore  to  the  third  dimension  of 
our  subject,  so  to  speak.  I  have  advanced  the 
thesis  that  Germany's  attitude  toward  the  law 
of  nations  and  international  obligations  consti- 
tutes a  perpetual  menace  to  international  good 
order  and  neighborliness,  makes  them,  in  truth, 
an  impossibility  so  long  as  it  shall  continue. 
Official  Germany's  attitude  in  this  respect  we 
have  just  passed  in  survey,  and  at  any  rate  the 
war  must  have  made  it  evident  to  the  dullest 
apprehension.  What  I  aim  now  to  show  is  that 
the  views  of  which  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  is 
mouthpiece  in  the  passages  given  above  are  by 
no  means  a  product  of  the  war  alone,  but  also 
of  a  way  of  thinking  which,  as  it  preceded  the 
war,  will  be  likely  to  survive  it,  certainly  if  Ger- 
many is  victorious.  Such  views  may  at  present 
wear  the  mask  of  exigency,  but  in  reality  they 
are  compound  of  the  sinews  and  substance  of 
a  considered  philosophy.  Their  menace  for  the 
peace  of  the  world  is  therefore  no  merely  tran- 
sient one. 


66  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

The  founder  of  Prussian  political  thought  was 
Hegel,  who  presents  the  State  as  the  complete 
development  of  morality  on  earth  and  as  en- 
trusted with  the  mission  of  spreading  its  own 
peculiar  culture  (Kultur) ;  and  especially  was 
this  so  of  the  Prussian  state,  the  last  word  of 
Deity  in  the  field  of  statecraft.  By  what  meth- 
ods, however,  is  the  Kultur-Staat — Prussia  in 
particular — to  fulfill  its  missionary  role  ?  Hegel 
does  not  say;  but  his  influential  disciple,  Pro- 
fessor Adolf  Lasson,  is  more  explicit,  as  the 
following  extracts  from  his  essay  "Das  Kultur- 
Ideal  und  der  Krieg"  will  show:4 

"  Between  states  war  alone  can  hold  the 
sceptre.  Conflict  is  the  essence  and  rule  of 
international  relations;  friendship  the  accident 
and  exception.  .  .  . 

"A  small  state  has  a  right  to  existence  only 
in  proportion  to  its  power  of  resistance. — 
Between  states  there  is  only  one  right  in  force 
and  that  is  the  right  of  the  strongest.  .  .  . 

"A  state  is  incapable  of  committing  crime. 
.  .  .  Whether  a  treaty  should  be  observed  or  not 
is  a  question  not  of  right  but  of  interest.  .  .  . 
Not  all  the  treaties  in  the  world  can  alter  the 
fact  that  the  weak  is  always  the  prey  of  the 
strong  so  soon  as  the  latter  finds  it  worth  while 
to  act  on  this  principle.  .  .  . 

' '  The  state  which  is  organized  only  for  peace 
is  not  a  true  state.  .  .  .  War  is  the  fundamental 
phenomenon  in  the  life  of  the  state  and  the 

4  See  also  his  Princip  und  Zunkunft  des  VolTcerrechts  (Berlin, 
1871). 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  67 

preparation  for  it  occupies  the  place  of  pre- 
ponderant importance  in  the  national  life.  .  .  . 

"It  is  not  only  the  state's  own  possessions 
which  are  at  stake  in  war,  but  also  those  which 
it  has  not  acquired  and  must  conquer.  It  is 
absurd  to  pretend  indignation  at  the  idea  of 
conquest.  The  only  essential  point  is  the  pur- 
pose of  conquest.  .  .  . 

"Civilization  is  the  general  improvement  of 
civilization  upon  barbarism.  Culture  [Kultur] 
is  the  distinctive  form  which  civilization  takes 
with  this  or  that  people.  The  diverse  forms  of 
Culture  are  mutually  opposed  to  one  another. 
Each  menaces  the  other,  for  each  believes  itself 
the  true  and  perfect  form  of  civilization,  and 
so  desires  to  extend  its  influence.  .  .  .  Every 
rational  war  is  a  war  between  competing  cul- 
tures. .  .  . 

"The  National  State,  representing  the  high- 
est expression  of  the  Culture  of  its  race,  can 
come  into  being  only  through  the  destruction  of 
other  states,  and  this  destruction  can  be  effected 
only  by  means  of  violence.  ...  To  demand  a 
peaceable  development  of  the  different  forms 
of  Culture  is  to  demand  the  impossible,  it  is  to 
reverse  the  order  of  nature,  it  is  to  set  up  a  false 
image  in  the  place  of  the  true  morality. ' ' 

When  in  1868  Lasson  first  published  the 
brochure  from  which  the  above  passages  are 
borrowed,  his  views  stirred  liberal  Germany  to 
vehement  protest,  but  the  brilliant  successes  of 
Bismarck's  policy  of  "blood  and  iron,"  inter- 
preted by  the  eloquence  of  Von  Treitschke  in 


68  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

terms  of  Prussian  history,  have  long  since  done 
their  work,  as  the  pages  of  Bernhardt  and  the 
pamphlets  of  the  Pan-Germanists  attest.  The 
key  to  Lasson  's  position,  which  is  today  the  posi- 
tion of  a  most  influential  section  of  German  so- 
ciety, is  furnished  by  his  exaltation  of  the  claims 
of  culture.5  Americans  and  Englishmen,  un- 
blessed by  an  overweening  consciousness  of  su- 
periority or  divinely  appointed  mission  to  the 
rest  of  Christendom,  are  apt  to  regard  culture, 
in  the  sense  in  which  Germans  use  the  term,  as 
considerably  less  important  than  civilization,  and 
this  they  look  upon  as  primarily  the  work  of 
gifted  individuals  and  as  only  indirectly  served 
by  the  state  through  its  service  of  the  individual. 
Furthermore,  they  hold  that  there  is  normally 
no  greater  service  which  the  state  can  render 
its  citizens  than  to  maintain  friendly  contacts 
with  other  states  as  the  essential  condition  of 
cooperation  in  the  common  tasks  of  civilization. 
The  Prussian  point  of  view  impinges  upon 
international  law  in  two  ways.  Lasson 's  idea 
that  the  State  can  do  no  wrong  of  course  makes 
international  law  impossible  from  the  outset. 
The  more  representative  German  view,  how- 
ever, though  it  ultimately  arrives  at  the  same 

5  On  the  general  subject  of  Pan-Germanism  see  the  familiar 
volumes  of  Usher  and  Cheradame;  also  Nippold's  Der  deutsclie 
Chauvinismus,  The  Berliner  Tageblatt  of  April  21,  1913, 
makes  this  interesting  statement:  "It  has  lately  been  clearly 
demonstrated  that  numerous  threads  connect  the  clamorous 
leaders  of  Pan-Germanism  with  the  official  world."  Cer- 
tainly one  finds  it  impossible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  if 
Germany  were  to  win  the  war,  the  Pan-German  influence 
would  determine  the  use  she  would  make  of  her  victory. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  69 

result,  does  so  by  a  more  roundabout  method.  In 
the  phraseology  of  an  exponent,  it  plants  in  the 
timbers  of  the  legal  edifice  ''the  secret  worm" 
which  ultimately  consumes  the  whole  fabric. 
What  this  "secret  worm"  is  we  shall  now  see. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  products  of  a 
German  pen  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  is  a 
brochure  by  Josef  Kohler,  written  to  defend  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  and  bearing  the  caption 
"Not  Kennt  Kein  Gebot."*  Kohler,  who  is 
professor  of  jurisprudence  at  the  University  of 
Berlin  and  a  Prussian  Privy  Councillor,  is  the 
most  eminent  of  living  German  jurists  and  the 
most  prolific  of  all  jurists,  "a  veritable  twen- 
tieth century  Leibnitz,"  with  over  five  hundred 
titles  of  books  and  articles  to  his  credit.  Though, 
like  Lasson,  a  disciple  of  Hegel,  he  was  until  re- 
cent days  a  preacher  of  international  peace  and 
cooperation.  Thus  in  his  "Lehrbuch  der  Rechts- 
philo sophie,"  which  appeared  in  1907,  he  had 
written :  ' '  Passionate  devotion  to  one  national- 
ity ..  .  will  long  struggle  against  the  idea  of 
bowing  to  a  supernational  law.  Nevertheless, 
the  idea  must  gradually  penetrate,  and  when  it 
has  become  fully  developed  the  chief  step  toward 
the  peace  of  the  nations  will  have  been  taken. ' ' 
And  to  Lasson 's  notion  of  the  inevitable  antag- 
onism of  national  cultures  he  had  opposed  the 
ideal  of  their  mutual  tolerance,  thus :  ' '  The  indi- 
vidual state  should  not  be  the  only  centre  of  cul- 
ture, but  the  attitude  of  all  states  to  one  another 

6  The  full  title  ia  Not  Kennt  Kein  Gebot,  die  Theorie  dea 
Notrechtes  und  die  Ereignisse  unserer  Zeit  (Berlin,  1915). 


70  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

should  so  conform  to  the  cultural  order  that  one 
does  not  clash  with  or  operate  against  the  cul- 
tural development  of  another."  But  the  iron 
of  the  war  has  entered  into  Kohler's  soul,  and 
his  recent  writings  prove  only  too  conclusively 
that  he  has  joined  forces  with  that  section  of 
German  jurists  one  of  whom  has  recently  pro- 
posed that  the  German  Branch  of  the  Interna- 
tional Law  Association  had  better  cut  loose  from 
its  foreign  affiliations,  the  reason  given  being 
that ' '  Germany  has  such  different  interests  from 
those  of  other  countries  that  its  tendencies  in 
this  field  are  not  those  of  other  nations."7 

With  characteristic  candor  Kohler  distin- 
guishes at  the  outset  of  his  essay  the  two  en- 
tirely different  but  frequently  confounded 
notions  of  self-preservation  and  self-defence. 
He  then  proceeds  to  rake  over  the  whole  field 
of  casuistry  for  the  stock  situations  in  which 
the  individual  is  confronted  with  the  choice  of 
violating  the  rights  of  others  or  himself  coming 
to  grief.  The  crux  of  his  position  is  disclosed 
in  his  treatment  of  that  situation  which  is  la- 
belled the  "Aut  Ego  aut  Tu."    In  this  case  two 

7  The  author  of  these  words  was  Prof.  Th.  Niemeyer  of  the 
University  of  Kiel,  also  a  Prussian  Privy  Councillor,  and  him- 
self the  President  of  the  German  Branch.  For  further  evidence 
of  the  disturbance  which  Kohler's  thinking  has  undergone  in 
consequence  of  the  war,  see  an  article  of  his  on  "The  New 
Law  of  Nations,"  translated  for  the  June,  1917,  number  of 
the  Michigan  Law  Beview  by  Prof.  Jesse  S.  Beeves.  For  proof, 
however,  that  not  all  German  publicists  have  gone  off  their 
heads  since  August,  1914,  see  a  letter  by  Dr.  Hans  Wehberg 
of  Diisseldorf  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  of  September  24, 
1915.  Prof.  Beeves  refers  to  this  letter  and  a  translation  of 
it  appears  in  the  American  Journal  of  International  Law  for 
October,  1915,  pp.  925-7. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  71 

men  who  have  been  shipwrecked  find  themselves 
grasping  a  plank  which  is  insufficient  to  bear 
them  both ;  the  stronger  man  pushes  the  weaker 
away  and  is  eventually  saved,  while  the  other 
is  drowned.  Commenting  on  this  class  of  cases, 
Kohler  writes:  "When  two  persons  act  in  a 
condition  of  necessity  [Notrecht]  and  the  legal 
order  can  discover  no  ground  for  giving  the 
preference  to  either,  then  must  the  legal  order 
give  way  to  the  natural  order  and  crown  the 
victor.    Das  ist  die  Realdialektik  der  Welt." 

But  if  the  justification  of  self-preservation 
may  be  claimed  by  the  individual,  Kohler  con- 
tinues, how  much  more  may  it  be  by  the  State, 
"a  human  institution  of  the  highest  rank  and 
of  deep  spiritual  significance,  as  well  as  the  eco- 
nomic foundation  of  our  being."  Hence,  "the 
relations  of  one  state  to  another  are  governed 
in  the  highest  degree  by  the  law  of  necessity 
[Notstandsrecht].  The  state  which  is  forced  to 
fight  for  its  existence  acts  rightly  if  in  the  course 
of  its  struggle  it  encroaches  upon  the  rights  of 
other  states,  even  upon  the  rights  of  neutrals, 
for  its  existence  comes  first ;  to  this  may  every- 
thing or  anything  be  sacrificed. ' '  And  so  it  was 
with  Germany's  invasion  of  Belgium:  "Even 
if  we  entirely  ignore  the  justification  of  self- 
defence  and  Belgium's  earlier  forfeiture  of  her 
right  of  neutrality,  still  Germany  was  entirely 
within  her  rights ;  what  she  did  was  not  an  ex- 
cusable wrong,  but  she  acted  in  exercise  of  the 
law  of  necessity,  and  at  one  and  the  same  time 
fulfilled  a  holy  duty  to  herself  and  to  the  world 


72  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  culture  [Kultur].  She  preserved  her  exist- 
ence; and  Belgium  thereby  incurred  a  heavy 
fate,  for  which  she  has  but  herself  to  thank. ' ' — 
Thus  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  despite  his  seem- 
ing candor,  spoke  falsely  after  all!  Germany 
did  no  wrong  in  entering  Belgium.  True,  she  vio- 
lated both  her  own  promises  and  international 
law,  but  she  fulfilled  a  Higher  Law,  the  law  of 
her  necessity — as  judged  by  herself ;  and  Real- 
dialektik  (which  apparently  is  Hegelian  for 
"Unser  alte  Gott"  of  the  Kaiser's  incantations) 
had  its  way  once  more.  The  thought  occurs, 
Why,  if  Realdialektik  is  such  a  beneficent 
agency,  should  its  interventions  be  confined  to 
cases  of  necessity? 

But  the  subject  has  also  its  technical  side, 
and  so  I  wish  once  more  to  confront  the  German 
point  of  view  with  the  English-American,  or 
such  evidences  of  the  latter  as  seem  best  au- 
thenticated; and  to  begin  at  the  beginning,  I 
will  match  Professor  Kohler  's  hypothetical  case 
of  "Aut  Ego  aut  Tn"  with  one  which  actually 
got  into  court.  I  refer  to  the  case  of  Regina  v. 
Dudley  and  Stephens,  the  facts  in  which  were 
found  by  the  jury  as  follows:  ''That  on  July 
5,  1884,  the  prisoners,  with  one  Brooks,  all  able 
bodied  English  seamen,  and  the  deceased  [Par- 
ker], an  English  boy  between  seventeen  and 
eighteen,  the  crew  of  an  English  yacht  [the 
Mignonette],  were  cast  away  in  a  storm  on  the 
high  seas,  sixteen  hundred  miles  from  the  Cape 
of  Good  Hope,  and  were  compelled  to  put  into 
an  open  boat ;  .   .  .  that  on  the  eighteenth  day, 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  73 

when  they  had  been  seven  days  without  food 
and  five  without  water,  the  prisoners  spoke  to 
Brooks  as  to  what  should  be  done  if  no  succor 
came,  and  suggested  some  one  should  be  sacri- 
ficed to  save  the  rest,  but  Brooks  dissented,  and 
the  boy,  to  whom  they  were  understood  to  refer, 
was  not  consulted;  that  on  the  day  before  the 
act  in  question  .  .  .  the  prisoners  spoke  of  their 
having  families,  and  suggested  that  it  would  be 
better  to  kill  the  boy  that  their  lives  be  saved 
.  .  . ;  that  next  day,  no  vessel  appearing,  Dud- 
ley .  .  .  made  signs  to  Stephens  and  Brooks 
that  the  boy  had  better  be  killed;  .  .  .  that 
Stephens  agreed  to  the  act,  but  Brooks  dissented 
from  it  .  .  .  ;  that  Dudley  with  the  assent  of 
Stephens  went  to  the  boy  and  telling  him  his 
time  had  come,  put  a  knife  to  his  throat  and 
killed  him ;  that  the  three  men  fed  upon  the  boy 
for  four  days ;  that  on  the  fourth  day  after  the 
act  the  boat  was  picked  up  by  a  passing  vessel, 
and  the  prisoners  were  rescued.  ..." 

The  jury  put  the  question  to  the  court  whether 
the  accused  were  guilty  of  murder.  The  court 
answered  "Yes,"  and  proceeded  to  reduce  de- 
fence's argument  to  an  absurdity :  "It  was  not 
contended,"  said  they,  "that  the  person  killed 
under  circumstances  of  so-called  necessity  would 
not  be  justified  in  resisting.  Now,  if  resistance 
is  justifiable  at  all  it  is  justifiable  even  to  the 
infliction  of  death  when  one's  own  life  is  at 
stake.  Therefore,  we  should  have  a  state  of 
things  in  which  A  is  not  punishable  for  killing 
B,  nor  yet  B  for  killing  A  if  he  cannot  prevent 


74  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

A  from  killing  him.  But  to  say  that  A  may 
kill  B  if  he  can,  and  also  that  B  may  kill  A  if 
he  can,  is  to  deny  the  existence  of  any  law  at 
all."  In  other  words,  Professor  Kohler's  re- 
gion of  the  Higher  Law  of  Necessity  in  which 
Realdialektik  holds  sway  is  dismissed  as  a  re- 
gion devoid  of  law!  Justice  Grove  also  added 
this  interesting  note :  "  If  the  two  accused  men 
were  justified  in  killing  Parker,  then,  if  not 
rescued  in  time,  two  of  the  three  survivors  would 
be  justified  in  killing  the  third,  and  of  the  two 
who  remained  the  stronger  would  be  justified 
in  killing  the  weaker,  so  that  three  men  might 
be  justifiably  killed  to  give  the  fourth  a  chance 
of  surviving."8  Again,  a  shocking  lack  of  con- 
fidence in  Realdialektik! 

All  the  objections  which  exist  to  admitting 
the  justification  of  supposed  necessity  for 
breaches  of  the  ordinary  law  are  reenforced 
when  it  comes  to  breaches  of  international  law. 
For  one  thing,  when  it  is  brought  into  the  ordi- 
nary courts  the  plea  signifies  the  grim  issue  of 
life  and  death,  while  as  between  states  the  so- 
called  "right  of  self-preservation"  is,  in  ninety- 
nine  cases  out  of  a  hundred,  the  merest  figure 
of  speech.  Again,  there  is  no  tribunal  above 
states  which  is  capable  of  passing  upon  such  a 
plea  with  impartiality  and  precision  as  there  is 
over  individuals,  so  that  each  state  is  left  ordi- 
narily to  assess  the  sufficiency  of  the  plea  ad- 
vanced by  itself.     Finally,  while  international 

s  L.  E.,  14  Q.  B.  D.  273 ;  Law  Quarterly  Review,  I,  282.    See 
also  ib.  51. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  75 

law  does  not — and  perhaps  never  can — form  a 
closed  circle,  and  each  state  is  consequently  left 
free  to  make  war  for  reasons  which  seem  good 
to  it,  yet  the  advantage  which  accrues  to  a  state 
from  having  the  sanction  of  law  on  its  side  is 
an  important  one  and  should  not  be  available 
on  a  plea  which  frankly  overrides  international 
law. 

Though  English  and  American  writers  on  in- 
ternational law,  in  a  misplaced  zeal  to  become 
apologists  for  certain  pet  derelictions  of  their 
own  governments,  have  seemed  at  times  to  give 
the  so-called  ''right  of  self-preservation"  an 
undue  extension,  yet  the  better  considered  utter- 
ances of  such  writers  will  generally  be  found  to 
confine  the  idea  to  its  proper  field.9  A  typical 
case,  which  is  discussed  by  all  the  authorities,  is 
furnished  by  the  action  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  connection  with  the  Caroline  affair  of 
1837.  This  vessel,  which  was  controlled  by  Can- 
adian rebels,  was  attacked  by  a  British  expedi- 
tion while  lying  in  American  waters.  The  British 
Government  defended  the  act  as  a  necessary 
act  of  self-protection  against  an  impending  in- 
jury for  which,  if  it  had  occurred,  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  would  have  been 
responsible.  Eventually,  our  Government  ac- 
cepted this  explanation  of  the  affair  as  satis- 

9  See  the  discussion  by  Prof.  C.  de  Visscher  of  the  University 
of  Ghent  in  his  article  entitled  "  Les  Lois  de  Guerre  et  la 
Theorie  de  la  Necessite"  in  the  Bevue  Generate  de  Droit 
Internationale  Public  for  January-February,  1917;  also  Prof. 
John  Westlake's  International  Law:  Part  I,  "Peace,"  Ch. 
XIII. 


76  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

factory.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Webster,  it  was 
admitted  that,  assuming  there  was  "a  necessity 
of  self-defence,  instant  and  overwhelming,  leav- 
ing no  choice  of  means,  and  no  moment  for 
deliberation,"  and  assuming  the  action  of  the 
British  Government  to  have  been  "  limited  by 
that  necessity  and  kept  clearly  within  it,"  such 
action  was  proper.  In  other  words,  the  British 
Government  exercised  its  right  of  self-help 
against  an  impending  wrong.  It  may  be  added 
that  our  controversy  with  Spain  over  the  Vir- 
ginius  affair  in  1873  was  adjusted  along  sim- 
ilar lines. 

But  the  capital  product  of  German  thought 
of  recent  years,  touching  the  relation  of  the 
state  to  international  law,  has  still  to  be  con- 
sidered. I  refer  of  course  to  the  doctrine  of 
Kriegs-raison.10  The  source  of  this  doctrine  is 
to  be  found  in  certain  passages  of  the  Prussian 
Von  Clausewitz's  work  "Vom  Kriege,"  of  which 
the  following  are  representative:  "War  is  an 
act  of  violence  designed  to  force  the  adversary 
to  perform  our  will.  ...  In  the  employment 
of  such  violence  there  are  no  limits.  .  .  .  War 
knows  only  one  method :  force,  .  .  .  and  this  em- 
ployment of  brute  force  is  the  absolute  rule." 
Certain  German  publicists  however  have  sought 
a  more  reputable  parentage  for  their  darling 

10  On  this  subject,  see  the  article  cited  in  note  9,  supra, 
with  the  writers  there  given;  Westlake's  Chapters  on  the  Prin- 
ciples of  International  Law,  238  ff.;  Prof.  Amos  S.  Hershey's 
The  Essentials  of  International  Public  Law,  pp.  353  and  389, 
with  accompanying  notes;  also  articles  by  Profs.  Reeves  and 
Niemeyer  in  the  Michigan  Law  Review,  XIII,  175  ff. 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  77 

theory  in  a  phrase  from  Grotius'  great  work: 
"Omnia  licere  quae  necesaria  sunt  ad  finem 
belli,"  which  may  be  rendered  in  the  words  of 
the  Great  General  Staff  as  follows:  "What  is 
permissible  includes  every  means  of  war  with- 
out which  the  object  of  the  war  cannot  be  ob- 
tained." Thus  the  founder  of  international 
law,  who  tells  us  that  he  wrote  principally  to 
protest  against  the  barbarities  of  warfare,  is 
made  sponsor  for  Prussian  f rightfulness ! 

The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  Grotius'  words 
may  be  interpreted  in  either  of  two  ways :  they 
may  mean  that  all  methods  of  warfare  are  legiti- 
mate which  are  thought  to  be  necessary;  or  they 
may  imply  that  necessary  methods  of  warfare 
must  first  be  legitimate ;  that  is,  within  the  law. 
The  English-American  view  of  military  neces- 
sity accords  with  the  latter  of  these  interpreta- 
tions. By  it  a  military  commander,  even  when 
acting  within  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare,  is 
entitled  to  use  no  more  violence  at  a  given  time 
than  is  necessary  under  the  circumstances.  The 
doctrine  of  Kriegs-raison,  on  the  other  hand, 
subjects  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  at  all 
times  to  what  a  commander — and  a  fortiori,  a 
government — may  deem  essential  to  achieve 
success.  The  doctrine  of  "Necessity"  is  thus 
divested  of  all  disguises  and  pretences:  that 
which  is  necessary  and  which  therefore  must 
be  obtained  at  all  hazards  is  German  victory! 
The  practical  conclusions  which  the  German  of- 
ficial mind  has  drawn  from  these  premises  have 
been  made  known  to  a  still  amazed  world  in 


78  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

terms  of  blood,  ruin  and  defilement:  the  in- 
vasion of  Belgium,  the  atrocities  of  Louvain, 
Dinant  and  a  score  of  other  towns,  the  execu- 
tion of  innocent  hostages,  the  shelling  of  Rheims 
Cathedral,  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania,  the  use 
of  poisonous  gases,  the  bombardment  of  unde- 
fended towns,  the  indiscriminate  slaughter  of 
women  and  children  by  explosives  hurled  from 
aircraft,  the  enslavement  of  Belgian  workmen, 
the  deportation  of  the  young  women  of  Lille, 
the  devastation  of  northern  France,  ruthless 
submarine  warfare,  the  sinking  of  hospital  ships, 
and  so  on  and  so  on.  To  be  sure,  the  German 
Imperial  Government  has  sometimes  sought  to 
alleviate  the  odium  of  universal  indignation  by 
special  explanations  of  some  of  these  acts,  but 
even  where  such  explanations  have  not  dealt  in 
downright  falsehoods,  their  unallowable  as- 
sumptions have  always  revealed  the  lineaments 
of  the  real  explanation. 

There  are  those  who  contend,  however,  that 
it  is  futile  to  attempt  to  govern  war  by  law, 
who  seem  indeed  rather  disposed  to  applaud 
Germany  for  making  war  as  hideous  as  possible, 
saying  that  the  thing  to  do  is  to  abolish  war! 
Is  Kriegs-raison  entitled  even  to  this  somewhat 
ambiguous  approval!  No;  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  law  of  war  so  long  as  we  have  wars  and 
the  abolition  of  war  as  soon  as  possible  are 
causes  which,  far  from  being  opposed  to  one 
another,  have  everything  in  common.  For  one 
thing,  the  restraints  which  international  law 
seeks  to  impose  upon  the  business  of  war,  and 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  79 

which  Germany  has  so  ruthlessly  and  system- 
atically swept  aside,  rest  upon  the  belief  that 
there  are  certain  funded  values  of  Christian 
civilization  which  no  necessity,  even  of  a  state, 
is  warranted  in  offending,  and  the  abolition  of 
war  must  appeal  to  the  same  belief.  Again, 
those  who  advance  this  view  seem  not  to  per- 
ceive that  the  German  doctrine  which  they  so 
heedlessly  ratify  constitutes  a  part  of  Ger- 
many's preparation  for  war,  and  to  that  extent 
an  incitation  to  war.  For  not  being  hampered 
by  the  scruples  which  trouble  other  govern- 
ments, the  German  Imperial  Government  has 
just  that  additional  reason  to  hope  for  the  suc- 
cess of  its  aggressions.  Finally,  the  view  in 
question  ignores  the  fact  that  the  difference  be- 
tween Anglo-American  and  German  methods  of 
warfare  connotes  a  difference  between  two 
theories  of  the  purpose  of  war  which  is  of  im- 
mense significance  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  movement  for  a  permanent  peace. 

The  German  theory  of  the  purpose  of  war  is 
stated  by  Bernhardi  as  follows:  "War  is  an 
instrument  of  progress,  a  regulator  in  the  life 
of  humanity,  an  indispensable  factor  of  civiliza- 
tion, a  creative  power."  This  is  but  Lasson's 
idea  over  again,  that  "War  is  the  fundamental 
phenomenon  in  the  life  of  states";  or,  as  Von 
Treitschke  has  put  it,  "War  is  the  forceful  ex- 
tension of  policy."  The  English- American 
theory  is  very  different  and  points  to  very  dif- 
ferent results.  It  is  that  war  is  primarily  rem- 
edial, a  redress  of  grievances,  a  method  of  self- 


80  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

help.  And  being  procedural,  with  the  vindica- 
tion of  the  law  its  object,  the  rules  governing  it 
must  be  followed  as  a  matter  of  course.  More 
than  that,  however,  since  war  takes  place  chiefly 
for  the  lack  of  a  better  method  of  obtaining 
one's  rights,  the  essential  step  in  its  abolition 
must  be  to  supply  the  procedural  deficiencies 
of  international  law.  In  short,  where  the  Prus- 
sian idea  of  war  presents  it  as  a  positive  good, 
the  Anglo-American  idea  presents  it  as  a  neces- 
sary evil,  and  offers  the  hope  that  it  will  not 
always  be  even  necessary. 

The  quarrel  between  our  country  and  Ger- 
many comes,  therefore,  ultimately  to  be  a  very 
deep  seated  one.  Back  of  the  conflicting  theories 
of  legal  obligation  which  it  involves  stand  con- 
flicting theories  of  the  purpose  of  war  and  of 
the  nature  of  civilization  itself.  Nor  is  this 
remarkable  when  one  considers  the  contrasted 
histories  of  the  two  nations.  The  history  of 
Germany  is  simply  the  history  of  Prussia 's  con- 
quest of  the  rest  of  Germany,  of  the  triumph 
of  the  Prussian  military  autocracy  over  the 
rights  of  weaker  populations  and  communities. 
More  unfortunately  still,  the  pietistic  German 
mind  has  brought  to  the  interpretation  of  this 
history  the  dangerous  notions  of  religious  and 
philosophic  obscurantism,  tricked  out  for  mod- 
ern use  with  the  terminology  of  biological  sci- 
ence. Since  the  history  of  German  unification 
has  been  a  history  of  violence,  this  interpreta- 
tion runs  in  effect,  then  violence  must  be  the 
way  of  God.    The  Anglo-American  mind  is  at 


INTERNATIONAL  LAW  81 

once  more  mundane  and  more  reverent.  Mis- 
trustful of  "Dark  Forces,"  it  finds  it  especially 
hard  to  believe  that  Providence  is  wont  to  em- 
ploy the  devices  of  Satan.  Its  political  achieve- 
ment, wrought  out  mainly  by  methods  of 
compromise,  is  constitutional  democracy  and 
imperial  federation;  its  political  ideal  a  recon- 
ciliation of  the  equality  of  men  with  the  rule  of 
law.  It  regards  law  as  normally  the  triumph  of 
opinion  and  so  of  reason,  as  so  much  snatched 
from  primitive  chaos,  the  way  which  civilization 
must  in  the  long  run  always  take  against  bar- 
barism. True,  in  an  imperfect  world  the  law 
must  frequently  rely  on  the  support  of  force, 
but  it  is  the  law  which  validates  force  and  not 
force  which  validates  the  law. 

Hence,  though  we  entered  the  war  in  behalf 
of  our  own  offended  rights,  we  fight  in  it  in  be- 
half of  the  law  and  the  order  of  the  world.  A 
nation  which  applauds  such  crimes  as  the  sink- 
ing of  the  Lusitania  has  lost  all  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility as  a  member  of  the  family  of  na- 
tions; a  nation  which  thinks  and  acts  by  the 
madcap  logic  of  "world  dominion  or  downfall" 
is  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 
Such  logic  can  be  refuted  in  only  one  way;  for 
if  nothing  succeeds  like  success,  nothing  fails 
like  failure.  Germany  will  see  eye  to  eye  with 
her  neighbors  when  she  has  been  chastened  by 
the  bitter  disappointment  of  defeat.  For  her 
past  merits  the  world  owes  her  this  boon. 


•  CHAPTER  IV 

THE  WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWER 
IMPERILLED 

Mason  W.  Tyler 

When  the  United  States  went  to  war  with 
Germany  last  April  the  causes  of  this  action 
seemed  clear  to  most  of  us:  it  was  Germany's 
continual  violation  of  international  law  and  of 
the  dictates  of  humanity  in  her  use  of  the  sub- 
marine and  her  breach  of  her  promises  to  us  to 
refrain  from  such  illegality  and  inhumanity  in 
the  future.  To  almost  all  of  us  these  were  the 
sole  causes  for  our  action  and  probably  still 
remain  its  chief  justification.  But  there  is 
coming  to  us,  exactly  as  there  came  to  Great 
Britain  after  she  had  gone  to  war  to  avenge  the 
violation  of  treaty  right  in  Belgium,  the  realiza- 
tion that  together  with  this  cause  for  action 
there  was  another — less  ostensibly  international 
and  humanitarian,  but  none  the  less  vital — the 
danger  from  the  enormous  power  of  Germany; 
the  need  of  the  restoration  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe.  At  first  this  phase  of  the 
problem  was  little  discussed  in  England,  but 
more  and  more  it  came  to  the  front.  Finally 
in  an  editorial  published  March  8,  1915,  the 

82 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  83 

London  Times  came  out  with  the  frank  state- 
ment that  England  had  not  gone  to  war  for  Bel- 
gian neutrality  but  to  restore  the  balance  of 
power  threatened  by  Germany.  That  this  is  an 
overemphasis  is  very  probable,  but  it  does  show 
that,  in  the  minds  of  at  least  some  of  the  leaders 
of  English  political  thought,  this  cause  for  action 
had  assumed  first  place.  Nor  has  this  feeling 
lessened  as  time  goes  on  until  now  probably  the 
main  motive  in  the  fighting  is  the  desire,  on  the 
part  of  the  Allies,  to  put  an  end  to  the  over- 
weening pretensions  of  Germany  to  world  domi- 
nation and  to  restore  the  balance  of  power. 
Have  we,  in  America,  any  interest  in  this  mo- 
tive? Would  we  be  willing  to  accept  a  settle- 
ment which,  while  restoring  Belgium  and  Serbia 
with  suitable  indemnities,  would  still  leave  Ger- 
many and  her  allies — to  use  a  euphemistic  term 
— the  masters  of  Europe?  Or  do  we  feel  that 
such  a  settlement  would  be  dangerous  for  us 
and  ought  not  to  be  allowed"?  And  if  so  how  is 
such  an  ending  of  the  war  to  be  prevented? 
These  are  questions  it  seems  to  me  America 
ought  to  face  as  soon  as  possible,  for  her  answer 
to  them  will  modify  to  no  small  extent  our  pol- 
icy both  during  the  war  and  in  the  settlement 
which  follows  it. 

Have  we  a  vital  interest  in  the  maintenance 
of  a  world  balance  of  power?1    It  would  seem 

i  The  phrase  "balance  of  power"  used  here  and  elsewhere 
in  this  chapter  refers  to  the  world  balance  of  power  and  not  to 
the  European  balance,  unless  the  latter  is  specifically  stated. 
Its  use  gives  rise  to  some  confusion  because  there  are  several 
local  ' '  balances  of  power ' '  as  well  as  the  world  balance.     In- 


84  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

that  those  who  would  answer  this  question  in 
the  negative  would  bring  forward  one  or  both 
of  two  lines  of  argument  to  support  themselves. 
The  first  is  that  the  balance  of  power  solution 
is  intrinsically  bad,  that  it  has  always  made  for 
strife  and  always  will  and  that  the  United  States 
should  stand  for  an  international  policy  which 
would  unite  all  nations  regardless  of  their  power 
or  influence.  The  second  is  that  our  best  policy 
is  found  in  abstention  from  European  affairs 
and  an  interest  only  in  the  two  Americas.  On 
this  policy,  they  say,  we  have  thriven  and  there 
is  no  advantage  in  giving  it  up  at  this  time. 
Let  Europe  settle  its  own  affairs,  we  will  settle 
those  of  the  American  continents.  These  two 
arguments  I  will  treat  in  turn. 

deed  whenever  any  issue  arises  the  Powers  most  interested — 
and  they  are  not  necessarily  those  of  the  first  magnitude — are 
apt  to  group  (around)  two  parties  to  preserve  the  balance  of 
power  in  the  locality  affected  by  the  issue.  Thus  Venizelos, 
in  forming  the  Serbo-Greek  Alliance  of  1913,  stated  that  its 
object  was  "to  preserve  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans" 
— that  is  in  the  regions  directly  affected  by  the  Balkan  wars. 
The  most  important  of  these  local  balances  of  power  is  the 
European  balance,  which,  from  the  magnitude  of  the  interests 
involved,  has  often  been  spoken  of  as  the  balance  of  power. 
But  with  the  advent  of  world  policy  there  has  arisen  a  world 
balance  of  power,  which  may  be  termed  a  synthesis  of  all  the 
local  balances  of  power,  but  which,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
greatest  amount  of  material  force  at  present  existing  in .  the 
world  lies  in  Europe,  rests  more  or  less  on  the  European  local 
balance  for  a  foundation  and  is  merely  modified  in  its  super- 
structure by  non-European  nations.  This  world  balance  is  by 
no  means  a  result  of  our  entry  into  the  war,  although  this 
event  has  made  more  clear  a  situation  which  has  existed  for 
some  years.  The  United  States  would  seem,  ever  since  the  war 
with  Spain,  to  have  been  considered  by  European  statesmen 
as  a  possible  make-weight  for  or  against  their  designs  and  to 
have  been  courted  accordingly.  Our  entry  into  the  war  appears 
to  signify  our  conscious  acceptance  of  the  situation  and  its 
attendant  responsibilities. 


BALANCE  OP  POWER  85 

We  ought  to  work  for  internationalism  and 
not  perpetuate  the  outworn  theory  of  the  bal: 
ance  of  power :  so  say  the  first  class  of  objectors. 
And  in  substantial  agreement  with  them  is  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  former  German  Chan- 
cellor, who  declared  in  one  of  his  peace  speeches 
that  "the  English  balance  of  power  must  dis- 
appear, because  it  is,  as  the  English  poet  Shaw 
recently  said, '  a  hatching  of  other  wars. '  ' '  But 
it  is  in  the  striking  unanimity  of  opinion  between 
the  former  German  Chancellor  and  our  class  of 
objectors  that  the  danger  in  the  theories  pre- 
sented by  the  latter  seems  to  lie.  Of  course  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  wished  the  balance  of  power 
to  be  abandoned  because  it  stood  in  the  way  of 
German  mastery  of  Europe  and  beyond  that  of 
the  world,  or,  as  he  preferred  to  put  it,  such 
a  theory  stood  in  the  way  of  ' '  the  inviolable  and 
strong  position  of  Germany."  On  the  other 
hand  the  friends  of  internationalism  wish  to 
abandon  the  theory  because  it,  in  their  opinion, 
prevents  the  realization  of  their  hopes.  Which 
of  the  two  is  right? 

It  seems  fairly  clear  that  the  first  result  of 
such  an  abandonment  will  be  the  mastery  of 
Germany  in  Europe  and  probably  throughout 
the  world.  But  will  such  a  situation  produce, 
in  turn,  internationalism  ?  Will  the  Power  which 
commenced  the  war  by  proclaiming  that ' '  neces- 
sity knows  no  law,"  which  has  since  broken 
nearly  all  the  rules  of  international  law  which 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  attainment  of  its  desires, 
be  a  fit  guardian  of  the  new  internationalism 


86  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

which  is  to  bring  relief  to  a  war  worn  world? 
And  even  had  Germany  shown  the  greatest  re- 
spect for  the  law  it  is  doubtful  if  an  internation- 
alism imposed  by  one  nation  according  to  its 
own  interpretation  on  the  other  Powers  will  be 
either  a  lasting  or  a  good  one.  For  the  inter- 
national mind  is  not  the  property  of  any  one 
nation ;  it  draws  its  inspirations  from  every  cor- 
ner of  the  earth,  and  even  the  most  catholic  of 
Powers — and  Germany  can  hardly  claim  this 
distinction — is  too  narrow  to  be  its  true  inter- 
preter. Finally  it  is  very  doubtful  if  this  mod- 
ern reincarnation  of  the  Roman  Empire  will 
prevent  war  in  the  future;  the  Roman  Empire 
had  plenty  of  wars,  but  they  were  termed  re- 
bellions and  civil  tumults. 

The  real  internationalism  for  which  we  all 
must  strive  is  a  free  grouping  of  free  Powers, 
each  contributing  its  best  to  the  common  good, 
and  this  can  never  be  brought  about  by  the 
hegemony  of  any  one  Power,  it  can  only  be  built 
up  when  something  like  a  balance  of  power  is 
restored  to  Europe.  And  so  it  would  appear 
that  all  internationalists  who  wish  a  real  adop- 
tion of  their  plans  must  work,  first  of  all,  for  the 
establishment  of  a  world  balance  of  power,  But 
that  balance  is  now  endangered  by  the  preten- 
sions of  the  Teutonic  Powers  and  can  only  be 
restored  when  those  Powers  are  defeated  in  the 
field.  Internationalism,  then,  is  not  like  that 
1 l  something  wonderful,  grand  and  good ' '  of  Kip- 
ling's  " Rhyme  of  the  Banderlog"  that  is  "won 
by  merely  wishing  we  could. ' '    Under  the  pres- 


BALANCE  OP  POWER  87 

ent  circumstances  it  must  be  fought  for  and 
won  by  the  sword. 

Finally:  it  was  just  that  policy  of  abstention 
from  the  conflict,  that  taking  of  position  above 
the  claims  of  either  side,  that  desire  to  impress 
on  each  the  dictates  of  internationalism  that 
marked  the  policy  of  the  United  States  from  the 
summer  of  1914  until  the  spring  of  1917.  And 
how  did  it  succeed?  Our  plea  for  international 
right  was  listened  to  by  Germany  just  so  long 
as  she  felt  that  the  danger  from  our  entry  into 
the  war  outweighed  the  advantage  to  be  secured 
from  acting  contrary  to  our  desires.  In  other 
words  we  were  reckoned  by  Germany,  not  as  an 
international  force  but  as  a  factor  in  the  world 
balance  of  power.  And  when  she  felt  that  our 
weight  as  such  a  factor  was  not  to  be  considered 
against  the  gain  to  be  derived  from  the  unre- 
stricted use  of  the  submarine  she  broke  with  us 
and  with  internationalism  and  went  her  own 
way.  We  have  learned  that  we  cannot — at  least 
in  dealing  with  such  a  Power  as  Germany — act 
as  a  force  for  internationalism  unless  we,  at  the 
same  time,  hold  the  balance  of  power  which  will 
make  our  views  respected.  And  this  balance 
of  power  must  be  fought  for.2 

The  second  class  of  objectors  claim  that  we 
have  no  concern  in  the  European  balance  of 
power  and  that  our  best  policy  lies  in  abstention 
from  European  affairs  and  a  careful  cultivation 

2  For  a  discussion  of  the  broader  phases  of  internationalism 
and  the  war  see  the  chapter  "The  World  Paril  and  World 
Peace,"  infra. 


88  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  the  relations  with  our  South  American  neigh- 
bors— of  Pan- Americanism.3    This  is  the  tradi- 
tional American  policy,  hallowed  by  its  associa- 
tion with  Washington's  Farewell  Address  and 
with  the  second  part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Moreover  it  was,  during  the  greater  part  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  the  only  possible  policy 
for  us.    For  we  had  before  us  a  continent  three 
thousand  miles  broad  to  be  cultivated  and  to 
be  brought  into  the  sphere  of  American  influ- 
ence.   In  the  face  of  such  a  task  it  was  abso- 
lutely impossible  for  us  to  give  any  attention 
to    European   affairs,    even   had   we   had   the 
strength  to  make  our  influence  felt,  which  was 
obviously  not  the  case.    Add  to  that  the  fact  that 
we  had,  during  the  first  half  of  the  century,  to 
deal  with  the  question  of  slavery  and  then  to 
wage  a  gigantic  war  to  settle  the  problem.    It 
is  clear  that  any  lessening  of  attention  from  the 
task  in  hand  could  be  little  less  than  fatal.    Nor 
were  the  dangers  from  such  a  policy  of  absten- 
tion sufficient  to  cause  any  uneasiness.     The 
Atlantic  barrier  was  a  strong  protection  for  it 
was  almost  impossible  for  any  European  Power, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  England  with  her 
strong  navy  and  her  Canadian  base,  to  wage 
war  with  us  across  it.     And  England,  in  the 
years  following  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  was  suffi- 
ciently occupied  elsewhere  and  had  no  desire 
to  wage  war  with  us.    Moreover  nations  lived 
more  unto  themselves  in  those  simpler  days,  and 

a  This  topic  is  treated  in  its  broader  aspects  in  the  chapter 
"The  World  Peril  and  the  Two  Americas,"  infra. 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  89 

the  present  network  of  international  trade  and 
credit  was  in  a  far  more  rudimentary  stage. 
Even  the  great  Napoleonic  wars,  involving  all 
Europe,  do  not  seem  to  have  greatly  influenced 
more  than  one  phase  of  our  economic  activity, 
our  seaboard  commerce.  We  lived  a  nation 
apart,  occupied  with  our  task  of  developing  the 
North  American  continent,  and  Europe  paid 
little  attention  to  us  and  we  to  Europe. 

But  today  the  situation  is  utterly  different. 
In  the  first  place  the  task  of  developing  and 
Americanizing — to  use  a  popular  term — the 
North  American  continent  is  finished  and  our 
activities  have  begun  to  overflow  into  other 
fields.  Not  that  it  has  more  than  begun,  for 
our  exports  of  manufactured  goods  are  still 
small  in  relation  to  our  home  consumption,  and 
yet  these  exports  are  constantly  increasing. 
Then  too  the  international  network  of  trade 
and  credit  is  now  so  well  developed  that  we  can 
no  longer,  in  these  spheres  of  life,  live  to  our- 
selves. In  comparison  to  the  Napoleonic  wars 
the  effects  of  the  present  world  war  on  our  eco- 
nomic life  seem  almost  as  a  mountain  to  a  mole 
hill.  Finally,  to  our  no  small  disturbance  of 
mind,  we  are  realizing  that  the  Atlantic  is  no 
longer  the  barrier  against  invasion  that  it  was 
even  a  quarter  century  ago,  that  improvements 
in  military  technique  and  in  transportation  have 
made  it  possible  to  make  at  least  a  most  de- 
structive raid  on  our  coast  cities,  that  sub- 
marines may  soon,  if  not  now,  be  able  to  cross 
the  ocean  and  raid  our  commerce.    Just  as  Great 


90  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Britain  has  learned  that  her  real  frontier  is  not 
the  Channel  but  the  valley  of  the  Meuse — to 
quote  Lord  Kitchener's  expression— so  we  are 
learning  that  our  first  line  of  defence  is  not  the 
Atlantic  coast  but  a  proper  maintenance  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe.  Otherwise  the  bat- 
tle will  be  fought  on  our  own  territory  and  we 
will  pay  heavily,  no  matter  what  the  outcome 
be.  The  European  balance  of  power  is  the  first 
line  of  trenches  in  American  defence. 

And  what  would  be  the  effect  of  a  German 
supremacy  in  Europe?  Can  we  be  sure  that 
such  a  Power  would  leave  us  in  peace  to  pursue 
our  Pan-American  policy?  Has  Germany  no 
interests  in  South  America  to  be  defended  and 
enlarged?  It  would  be  perfectly  possible  to  cite 
any  number  of  Pan-German  writers  who  advo- 
cate the  extension  of  the  German  colonial  empire 
to  South  America.  Of  these  perhaps  the  most 
notable  is  Tannenberg,  who  frankly  earmarks 
southern  Brazil  and  the  Argentine  for  Germany 
in  his  "Deutschland  um  1950."  But  it  may  be 
admitted  that  too  much  attention  must  not  be 
paid  to  irresponsible  vaporings  such  as  this. 
That  they  have  been  widely  read  in  Germany 
is  certain,  but  that  they  have  had  or  will  have 
any  effect  on  German  official  action  is  far  from 
sure.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  extremely 
doubtful  if  it  is  advisable  to  put  too  much  confi- 
dence in  the  statement  of  Count  von  Bernstorff 
that  Germany  had  no  intention  of  gaining  terri- 
torial acquisitions  in  South  America,  for  such 
a  statement  was,  under  the  circumstances,  the 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  91 

only  one  that  the  German  representative  to  this 
country  could  have  made.  One  is  reminded  of 
the  answer  Bismarck  is  said  to  have  made  to  an 
inconvenient  question:  "No,  but  I  would  have 
told  you  that  anyway." 

Probably  the  best  guide  to  the  extent  of  the 
danger  Germany  may  be  in  the  future  to  Pan- 
Americanism  is  found  in  the  actual  situation  in 
South  America.  That  there  are  many  Germans 
settled  there,  that  these  immigrants  are  fairly 
well  concentrated  in  southern  Brazil,  that  Ger- 
mans have  acquired  no  small  interests  there  and 
have  built  up  a  large  trade,  the  largest  foreign 
trade  in  some  states  and  a  very  respectable  com- 
petitor in  almost  all  the  others,  may  be  taken 
as  almost  undoubted  facts.  That  any  attempt 
by  American  interests  to  push  their  own  trade 
at  the  expense  of  these  German  interests  will 
lead  to  friction  between  the  two  countries  is  at 
least  possible.  And  the  extent  of  this  friction 
as  well  as  the  lengths  to  which  Germany  will  go 
in  defence  of  her  interests  will,  in  all  probabil- 
ity, depend  on  the  condition  in  which  she 
emerges  from  the  present  war.  A  triumphant 
Germany,  drunk  with  power,  will  probably  listen 
much  more  attentively  to  the  appeal  of  the  Pan- 
German  and  of  the  South  American  vested  in- 
terests than  a  Germany  that  has  tried  to  control 
Europe  and  failed.  And  if  the  other  countries 
of  Europe  are  beaten  and  discouraged  they,  our 
potential  allies,  will  be  the  less  willing  to  help 
us  when  this  possible  day  of  reckoning  comes. 

But  Germany  will  not  probably  try  the  game 


92  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

alone :  and  in  this  lies  perhaps  the  greatest  ele- 
ment of  danger.  The  Zimmermann  note  ought 
to  prove  to  us  that  Germany  is  willing  to  utilize 
all  the  discordant  elements  in  Pan-America  to 
further  its  designs  if  necessary.  And  if  we 
allow  Germany  to  become  the  master  of  Europe 
and  the  strongest  single  Power  in  the  world,  we 
must  expect  that  there  will  be  plenty  of  real- 
politikers  in  South  America  who  will  think  they 
see  advantages  in  alliance  with  such  a  state. 
Our  only  defence  against  such  a  possibility  is 
to  prevent  Germany  from  gaining  such  a  posi- 
tion. Remember  that  Germany  has  never  recog- 
nized the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  that  her  only 
official  pronouncement  on  it,  apart  from  the 
statement  of  Von  Bernstorff  referred  to  above, 
is  Bismarck's  declaration  that  it  was  ah  "inter- 
national impertinence. ' '  This  phase  of  the  ques- 
tion ought  not  perhaps  to  be  stressed  too  much, 
but  it  ought  not  to  be  forgotten. 

Let  us  suppose,  however,  for  the  moment, 
that  all  the  foregoing  is  pure  moonshine,  that 
Germany  has  not  and  never  will  have  any  de- 
signs on  South  America  other  than  the  exploita- 
tion of  economic  opportunities:  even  then  can 
we  feel  that  the  danger  from  a  German  mastery 
of  Europe  is  not  worth  consideration!  Let  us 
also  put  the  danger  of  a  military  attack  by  Ger- 
many on  the  United  States  out  of  our  minds  and 
simply  consider  Germany  as  confining  her  active 
intervention  to  continents  other  than  the  Amer- 
icas. How  then  would  we  stand?  Remember 
that  we  are  becoming  more  and  more  a  country 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  93 

of  foreign  export  and  that  Germany  is,  with  the 
possible  exceptions  of  England  and  Japan,  our 
only  great  competitor.  But  this  economic  ri- 
valry is  no  longer  merely  a  question  of  cheap 
manufacture  and  able  salesmanship:  govern- 
ments are  more  and  more  coming  to  the  aid  of 
their  exporters,  and  the  political  factor  will  also 
have  to  be  reckoned  with.  To  take  one  illustra- 
tion: In  the  midst  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war 
Germany  took  advantage  of  Russia's  weakness 
to  negotiate,  as  a  price  of  her  benevolent  neu- 
trality, a  commercial  treaty  which  placed  Ger- 
man goods  at  an  enormous  advantage  in  the 
Russian  market.  A  Germany,  mistress  of 
Europe  and  enormously  strong  in  the  outside 
world,  will  be  in  a  position  by  bribes  or  threats 
to  enhance  greatly  her  intrinsically  strong  eco- 
nomic position  with  the  other  nations  of  the 
world.  If  we  build  up  a  market  in  a  given  coun- 
try we  may  find  that  Germany,  through  political 
means,  has  been  able  to  force  in  her  own  goods 
at  an  advantage.  The  doctrines  of  the  Man- 
chester school  have  been  a  little  out  of  date  since 
governments  have  come  into  the  arena  behind 
their  traders. 

Nor  is  it  merely  in  the  economic  sphere  that 
we  will  suffer.  Whenever  we  wish  to  adopt  any 
given  line  of  world  policy,  whenever  we  wish  to 
push  any  idea  from  the  Open  Door  to  the  League 
to  Maintain  Peace,  we  will  find  that  we  will  have 
to  reckon  with  a  Germany  far  more  able  than 
we  are  to  impose  her  wishes  on  the  world.  For, 
in  the  last  resort,  the  value  of  an  idea  or  a  policy 


94  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

in  world  politics  depends  on  the  amount  of  force 
that  can  be  brought  behind  it,  and  if  Germany 
be  left  mistress  of  Europe  we  can  easily  see  that 
the  European  nations  at  least  will  look  far  more 
for  their  direction  to  the  Power  that  is  able  to 
enforce  its  wishes  than  to  the  United  States, 
however  convincingly,  as  arguments,  its  wishes 
may  be  set  forth.  I  do  not  claim  that  this  repre- 
sents an  ideal  situation,  let  us  hope  that  a  better 
one  may  come ;  but  such  seems  to  be  the  world 
as  it  is  at  present. 

And  so  for  these  reasons  it  would  appear  that 
the  United  States  must  be  vitally  interested  in 
the  maintenance  of  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe.  Not  only  for  our  defence  but  in  order 
that  we  may  count  for  something  in  the  world, 
economically  and  politically,  it  is  necessary  for 
us  to  defeat  any  German  attempt  to  win  the  mas- 
tery of  Europe.  The  old  days  of  isolation  are 
past,  we  are  a  world  Power  with  interests  in 
every  part  of  the  earth,  and  as  a  world  Power 
must  we  think  and  act. 

But,  you  may  say,  the  days  of  extreme  Ger- 
man danger  are  past :  peace  votes  in  the  Reichs- 
tag, statements  by  public  men  disclaiming  im- 
perialistic views  show  that  Germany  has  no 
intention  of  becoming  a  danger  to  Europe. 
Moreover,  the  military  outlook  at  present  is 
favorable  for  the  Allies  with  the  Germans  al- 
most everywhere  on  the  defensive,  save  for 
counter  attacks,  and  that  ought  to  prove  that  the 
chance  of  a  Germany  triumphant  over  united 
Europe  is  slim  today  and  growing  slimmer.    As 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  95 

to  the  first  objection  I  would  merely  call  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  it  is  only  because  of  a  weak- 
ening of  German  strength,  a  disappointment  of 
German  hopes,  that  these  voices  for  peace  have 
been  raised.  In  December,  1915,  when  the  Ger- 
man tide  was  high,  the  Reichstag  voted  for  a 
program  of  annexations.  If  in  July,  1917,  they 
vote  for  peace  it  does  not  necessarily  mean  that 
they  have  become  converts  to  internationalism, 
it  might  merely  mean  that  they  feel  that  a  peace 
negotiated  at  this  time  will  be  more  favorable 
than  one  negotiated  later  and  under  the  some- 
what vague  formula  "no  annexations  and  no 
indemnities" — an  independent  Poland  under  a 
Hapsburg  prince,  or  Belgium  forced  into  eco- 
nomic dependence  on  Germany  would  not  be 
" annexations" — they  hope  to  gain  their  ends. 
Nor  are  the  annexationists  by  any  means  dead 
in  Germany :  they  will  revive  at  the  first  German 
success.  Indeed  the  lamentable  military  collapse 
of  the  Russian  Republic  at  the  time  of  present 
writing  may  probably  be  counted  on  to  revive 
the  hopes  and  influence  of  this  gentry  and  cor- 
respondingly depress  those  of  the  peace  party 
in  Germany.  Nor  is  the  present  military  situa- 
tion one  to  give  rise  to  any  great  hopes  of  a 
speedy  victory.  For  a  non-military  man  to  at- 
tempt a  diagnosis  of  that  side  of  the  question 
would  undoubtedly  be  unwise,  but  a  glance  at 
the  military  map  as  it  is  at  present  would  seem 
to  show  that  Germany  is  far  from  a  beaten  na- 
tion. It  would  seem  to  be  obvious  that  only  by 
the  strongest,  most  united  effort  in  the  military 


96  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

line  can  the  balance  of  power  be  brought  back 
to  Europe  or  Germany  be  brought  to  reason. 

But  there  is  one  plan  which  has  seemingly 
captured  all  German  minds :  those  of  the  peace 
party  as  well  as  the  annexationists.  It  is  a  plan 
so  plausibly,  so  ostensibly  reasonable  that  it  has 
seemed  to  many  Americans  a  perfectly  possible 
settlement  for  the  European  difficulty.  And  yet 
within  it,  as  it  is  brought  forward  by  the  German 
leaders,  lurks  no  small  danger  to  the  peace  of 
Europe  and  to  the  balance  of  power.  This  is 
the  celebrated  scheme  for  the  constitution  of 
' '  Mitteleuropa, "  a  federation  of  states  extend- 
ing from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and  in- 
cluding the  present  Germany,  Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey,  most  if  not  all  of  the  Balkan  states  and 
undoubtedly,  in  the  present  scheme,  a  reconsti- 
tuted kingdom  of  Poland.  These  states  are  not 
to  form  one  government  but  are  to  act  as  a  unit 
in  questions  of  economic,  military  and  foreign 
policy.  One  tariff,  one  federated  and  unified 
army,  one  policy  toward  outside  states  seem  to 
be  the  characteristics  of  this  new  world  group 
as  sketched  by  its  ablest  advocate,  Herr  Nau- 
mann  in  his  "Mitteleuropa,"  published  about  a 
year  ago.  Now  against  such  a  federation  as  this 
we  can  have  no  objection  unless  it  in  any  way 
harms  interests  vital  to  us.  In  other  words,  we 
can  feel  no  resentment  if  one  state  or  group  of 
states  allies  with  another  state  or  group  unless 
thereby  policies  inimical  to  ours  be  strengthened 
or  the  balance  of  power  disturbed  to  our  dis- 
advantage.   On  these  lines  alone,  then,  we  can 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  97 

criticize  this   new  German   scheme   of  Mittel- 
europa. 

Does  it  strengthen  policies  inimical  to  us? 
This  will  depend  a  great  deal  on  the  policy  and 
position  of  the  Central  European  Powers  after 
the  war.  If  Germany  wins,  the  present  policy 
will,  doubtless,  be  continued  and  that  this  policy 
is  inimical  to  the  United  States  can  hardly  be 
denied.  Remember  the  statement  of  Prince  von 
Biilow,  not  primarily  a  Pan-German,  that  "the 
anger  which  is  so  widely  felt  in  Germany  against 
the  American  people  with  whom  they  had  such 
friendly  feelings  is  only  too  natural  and  com- 
prehensible. ' '  The  Germans  feel  that  our  policy 
of  neutrality  has  been  hypocritical,  that  up  to 
the  outbreak  of  war  we  were  really  aiding  the 
cause  of  the  Allies,  and  for  this  alleged  hypoc- 
risy and  opposition  they  will  desire,  if  possible, 
to  secure  revenge.  If  Germany  is  defeated  her 
policy  may  change  due  to  the  necessities  of  a 
new  position;  and  even  if  this  policy  of  hos- 
tility continues  defeat  will  greatly  lessen  the 
harm  her  revengeful  spirit  can  do  us.  But  if 
Mitteleuropa  means  a  strengthening  of  the  Ger- 
man strength  and  the  present  policies  continue 
then,  for  us,  Mitteleuropa  cannot  help  but  be 
a  vital  problem. 

Will  it  destroy  the  balance  of  power?  In  the 
first  place  it  must  be  noted  that  in  all  questions 
dealing  with  foreign  relations  as  well  as  in  all 
military  matters  this  new  Mitteleuropa  is  to  act 
as  a  unit ;  indeed  in  dealing  with  its  aspects  as 
an  international   force   it  may  be  practically 


98  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

treated  as  one  Power.  And  how  strong  will  this 
new  Power  be?  If  we  add  to  it  the  population 
of  the  new  kingdom  of  Poland — and  the  an- 
nouncements made  from  German  sources  as  to 
the  new  state  leave  no  doubt  but  that  it  is  to 
be  considered  as  part  of  the  new  group  forma- 
tion— it  will  possess  about  one  hundred  and  sixty 
millions  of  population.  What  else  in  Europe 
can  compare  with  it?  France  with  forty  mil- 
lions, Italy  with  several  millions  less,  Russia 
with  about  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  mil- 
lions, the  British  Empire  with  between  two  and 
three  times  as  many.  Outside  of  Europe  the 
only  Powers  that  can  compare  with  it  are  the 
United  States  with  one  hundred  million,  Japan 
with  fifty  million  and  China  with  between  three 
and  four  hundred  million.  But  of  the  Powers 
which  are  strong  enough  to  meet  Mitteleuropa, 
Russia  and  the  British  Empire,  the  first  is  and 
probably  will  be  for  some  years  to  come  a  prey 
to  civil  dissensions  and  the  second  is  too  wide- 
spread for  the  rapid  concentration  necessary  in 
the  early  part  of  a  war.  The  United  States  is 
too  far  away  to  render  effective  help  until  some 
time  has  passed,  and  of  the  two  Asiatic  coun- 
tries, one  is  interested  merely  in  the  affairs  of 
the  Far  East ;  and  the  other,  China,  is  too  weak 
as  an  organized  Power  to  count  for  much,  for 
some  time  to  come,  among  the  nations  of  the 
world.  It  would  appear  that,  for  a  term  of 
years  at  least,  Mitteleuropa  would  be  the  strong- 
est single  force  in  world  politics. 
But,  it  may  be  argued,  this  would  not  be  a 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  99 

great  danger  because  Mitteleuropa  would  be, 
from  the  very  nature  of  its  composition,  an 
international  and  not  a  national  force.  For  it 
would  consist  of  Turks,  Slavs,  Italians,  as  well 
as  Germans;  indeed  the  latter  would  represent 
a  minority  among  the  population.  Far  from 
being  a  cause  of  war  it  would  be  a  mediating 
force  between  Slav  and  Teuton  which  would 
make  for  peace.  Such  is  the  argument  as  Nau- 
mann  presents  it.  But  is  it  absolutely  true? 
It  is  not  always  the  majority  which  rules  in  a 
state ;  indeed  as  a  general  rule  a  minority,  well 
organized,  well  educated  and  knowing  clearly 
what  it  wants,  can  impose  its  will  on  a  ma- 
jority, ill  organized  and  lacking  education  and 
a  plan  of  action.  And  such  is  the  situation  in 
the  countries  which  would  make  up  Mittel- 
europa. In  only  one,  Bulgaria,  would  the  Slav 
element  be  in  a  position  to  force  concessions 
from  the  ruling  German  caste,  and  the  Bulgarian 
Slav  is  hardly  a  good  spokesman  for  his  racial 
brothers  in  Austria  and  Germany.  For  with  the 
south  Slav  he  is  a  rival,  and  as  yet  he  feels  little 
interest  in  the  fate  of  the  Pole  or  the  Czech. 
A  few  compensations  in  the  economic  sphere 
would  probably  win  his  support  to  a  policy  of 
Germanization  in  Poland  or  Austria.  Mittel- 
europa would  pass  under  the  rule  of  Berlin  be- 
cause there  has  been  situated  the  directing  force 
that  has  carried  on  the  war  which  had  created 
it;  a  victory  of  Germany  in  this  war  would  al- 
most certainly  mean  the  supremacy  of  Prussian- 
ism  among  the  entire  group.    Indeed  Naumann, 


100  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

although  in  guarded  terms — for  his  book  was 
not  written  for  German  consumption  alone — 
practically  takes  this  view.  ' '  Mitteleuropa, ' '  he 
declares,  "will  in  its  kernel  be  German;  it  will 
of  course  use  the  German  language  as  a  medium 
of  communication."  And  the  very  mixed  feel- 
ings with  which  this  book  was  received  in  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire  show  that  the  think- 
ers of  the  Dual  Monarchy  seem  to  have  their 
doubts  as  to  where  the  leadership  of  the  new 
group  formation  would  be  situated. 

We  may  take  it  as  reasonably  certain,  then, 
that  Mitteleuropa  would  be,  in  its  external  rela- 
tions, merely  a  projection  of  Germany  from 
Hamburg  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  That  such  a 
group  formation  would  be  a  danger  to  the  bal- 
ance of  power  and,  therefore — if  my  preceding 
argument  be  accepted — to  us,  can  hardly  be 
doubted.  How  then  is  it  to  be  defeated?  If  we 
consider  that  one  of  the  greatest  dangers  in  the 
whole  scheme  lies  in  its  direction  by  Germany, 
then  obviously  our  first  task  must  be  a  defeat 
of  Germany  such  as  will  teach  to  all  the  un- 
wisdom of  following  the  lessons  and  guidance 
of  the  forces  now  ruling  in  Berlin.  A  defeat  of 
Germany  will  probably  mean  the  revival  of  fed- 
eralism in  Austria  and  the  gain  of  the  non-Ger- 
man nationalities  throughout  Central  Europe; 
the  victory  of  Germany  will  probably  mean  the 
victory  of  Teutonism  and  the  defeat  of  these 
hopes. 

But  once  Germany  is  defeated;  what  then? 
The  usual  method  advocated  is  the  division  of 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  101 

the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  parts  going  to 
Italy,  Rumania,  Serbia  and  Russia;  the  possi- 
ble formation  of  an  independent  kingdom  of 
Bohemia,  and  the  allowance  of  Hungary  and 
Austria  proper  to  go  their  own  way,  the  former 
probably  as  an  independent  kingdom,  the  latter 
probably  as  part  of  the  German  Empire.  But 
it  is  my  personal  conviction  that  such  a  plan 
would,  in  the  end,  prove  unwise.  Hungary 
would,  as  in  the  days  of  Andrassy,  probably  find 
that  its  sole  dependence  against  Russia  would 
be  in  alliance  with  Germany.  Rumania  would, 
very  probably,  follow  the  same  course.  Bul- 
garia, overshadowed  by  the  new  Serbia,  would 
gravitate  toward  this  Central  European  group, 
and  Serbia,  surrounded,  would  find  herself  in 
much  the  same  position  as  in  1914.  Such  a  pro- 
ject would  restore  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe,  but  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  it 
would  make  for  peace. 

The  supposition  on  which  the  majority  of  the 
advocates  of  the  foregoing  scheme  base  their 
assumptions  is  that  Austria  is  irretrievably 
bound  to  Germany.  But  is  this  true?  Has  the 
present  Austrian  policy  been  consistently  fol- 
lowed in  the  Dual  Monarchy?  If  we  examine 
closely  we  will,  I  think,  find  that  the  present  pol- 
icy has  by  no  means  been  consistently  followed 
since  1871,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  there  seem 
to  have  been  two  policies :  one  the  policy,  origi- 
nated by  Andrassy  and  especially  associated 
with  Hungarian  statesmen,  looking  to  Germany 
for  support  and  regarding  Russia  and  Slavdom 


102  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

generally  with  hostility;  the  other,  associated 
with  various  Polish  and  Czech  statesmen,  en- 
deavoring to  steer  a  middle  course  between  Rus- 
sia and  Germany,  and  not  particularly  friendly 
or  hostile  to  either.  Moreover  we  will  discover 
that  this  latter  policy  has  never  been  without 
advocates  in  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  finally  that 
it  seems  to  be  the  policy  pursued  by  the  present 
Emperor,  Charles,  since  his  accession.  And  it 
is  to  be  further  noted  that  this  more  interna- 
tional foreign  policy  will  also  bring  with  it  a 
more  reasonable  method  of  treating  the  non- 
German  elements  within  the  Empire ;  indeed  the 
new  Austrian  policy  seems  to  be  directed  toward 
greater  cooperation  with  these  elements  in  in- 
ternal matters.  If  these  Slav  elements  can  be 
strengthened  so  as  to  present  a  firm  front 
against  the  German  ones,  then  Mitteleuropa 
will,  very  likely,  present  much  less  of  a  danger. 
A  regenerated  federalized  Austria-Hungary 
might  be  a  safe  focus  around  which  a  safe  Mit- 
teleuropa might  form,  but  Germany,  at  present, 
can  hardly  be  considered  as  such  a  one. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  there  is  here  a  prob- 
lem for  the  diplomatist  as  well  as  for  the  soldier. 
Just  to  what  extent  it  will  be  found  necessary 
to  take  away  portions  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire  in  the  interests  of  nationality  and  of 
international  right  is  difficult. at  this  juncture 
to  say  and  probably  useless  to  discuss.  But  is 
it  not  possible  to  adopt  the  method  advocated 
toward  Germany  by  Lloyd-George  and  state 
that  with  such  a  regenerated  and  federalized 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  103 

Austria-Hungary  it  will  be  possible  to  deal 
far  more  generously  than  with  an  Austria- 
Hungary  under  Teuton  control,  as  at  present? 
For,  in  our  case  at  least,  the  main  objective  of 
our  attack  is  Germany :  we  are  not  even  at  war 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  and  this 
ought  to  enable  us  to  give  to  the  latter  more 
consideration  when  the  time  of  settlement  comes. 
There  is  another  feature  of  the  plan  of  Mittel- 
europa,  as  at  present  brought  forward,  which 
presents  serious  danger.  This  is  the  question 
of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles.  A  Mittel- 
europa  extending  from  Hamburg  to  the  Persian 
Gulf  would  be  in  a  position  to  close,  at  will, 
every  economic  outlet  of  the  Russian  Empire  in 
Europe  except  the  port  of  Archangel,  frozen 
during  half  the  year.  Again  the  inclusion  of 
the  new  kingdom  of  Poland  in  the  German  group 
would  take  from  Russia  the  greater  part  of  its 
industrial  area,  situated  in  Russian  Poland. 
There  is  a  rapidly  developing  manufacturing 
district  in  southern  Russia,  but  this  does  not,  as 
yet,  seem  equal  in  importance  to  that  of  Russian 
Poland.  Nor  is  a  period  of  internal  settlement, 
with  all  the  unrest  which  attends  it,  a  favorable 
time  for  industrial  development,  and  it  would 
appear  that  Russia  is  likely  to  pass  through 
such  a  period  of  internal  reorganization  in  the 
years  following  the  war.  If  this  German  plan 
is  carried  out  and  Russia  loses  the  control  of  her 
economic  outlets  as  well  as  her  largest  industrial 
districts  the  result  will  almost  certainly  be  to 
bring  the  new  Russian  Republic  into  a  more  or 


104  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

less  complete  economic  dependence  on  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.  Germany,  which  before  the  war 
had  such  a  strong  economic  hold  on  Russia, 
would  easily  build  it  up  again  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  peace  and  this  hold  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  shake  off.  Moreover  if  she  seeks,  as 
she  will  have  to,  other  economic  outlets,  through 
Persia  to  the  Persian  Gulf  or  in  the  Far  East, 
she  will  almost  certainly  collide  with  the  inter- 
ests of  Great  Britain  and  would  thereby  be 
brought,  as  in  the  years  before  1908,  into  po- 
litical as  well  as  economic  subjection  to  Mittel- 
europa.  Such  an  outcome  would,  almost  cer- 
tainly, upset  the  balance  of  power. 

We  must  insist  then  that  this  new  Polish  king- 
dom, if  formed,  shall  have  its  closest  bond  with 
the  Russian  Republic  which  has  an  economic 
need  of  it  and  not  with  the  German  Empire,  to 
which  it  would  be  merely  a  useless  competitor. 
Also  we  must  make  sure  that  at  least  one  of 
Russia's  economic  outlets,  that  through  the 
Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  remains  free  to 
her.  Two  methods  have  been  suggested  in  deal- 
ing with  the  latter  problem :  one  that  the  Straits 
be  handed  over  to  Russia,  the  other  that  they 
be  internationalized.  The  former  solution  is 
open  to  several  grave  difficulties.  In  the  first 
place  it  has  been  renounced  by  the  Russian  Re- 
public itself  in  an  official  statement.  Again  it 
would  undoubtedly  stir  up  a  large  amount  of 
hostile  feeling  in  the  Balkan  states,  notably  in 
Bulgaria  and  Rumania.  Finally  the  Germans 
claim  that  Russia  would  use  her  possession  of 


BALANCE  OF  POWER  105 

Constantinople  to  close  the  Hamburg-Persian 
Gulf  route  to  the  East  in  favor  of  the  more  east- 
ward routes  across  Russia.  But  none  of  these 
objections  can  be  brought  against  internation- 
alization as  a  solution.  True,  such  a  method 
has  been  a  little  discredited  by  later  events,  but, 
unless  the  world  goes  to  war  again  in  the  next 
half  century,  which  is  doubtful,  such  an  inter- 
national government  at  Constantinople  would 
have  some  years  in  which  to  become  firmly 
established. 

But  it  must  be  again  stated  that  all  these  solu- 
tions are  secondary  at  present.  Against  all  of 
them  Teutondom  will  fight,  and  until  Teutondom 
is  defeated  there  is  no  chance  of  their  being 
carried  out.  Our  first  duty  is  to  defeat  Germany 
and  then  we  can  solve  such  problems  in  a  way, 
it  is  to  be  hoped,  to  give  satisfaction  to  all. 

Thus  we  have  seen  that  every  world  plan, 
even  the  most  moderate,  thus  far  brought  for- 
ward by  official  Germany  contains  danger  to  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  in  the  world. 
And  if  it  be  advocated  that,  to  us,  the  problem 
of  the  balance  of  power  is  a  vital  one,  then  the 
war  against  Germany  will  have  an  added  reason, 
the  phrase  "a  world  safe  for  democracy"  will 
have  an  added  meaning.  For  if  we  are  a  world 
Power,  as  a  world  Power  we  must  think  and  act ; 
and  these  problems  demand  our  serious  con- 
sideration. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  WORLD  PERIL  AND  THE  TWO 
AMERICAS 

Clifton  R.  Hall 

For  nobody  in  the  world  is  the  progress  of 
civilization  more  discouraging  than  for  the  Tin- 
neighborly  man.  If  it  is  still  too  early  in  his- 
tory to  contend  that  the  hermit  in  his  wilderness 
retreat  and  the  castaway  on  his  lonely  island 
are  conceivable  to  us  today  only  as  romantic 
figures  of  a  past  of  somewhat  doubtful  authen- 
ticity, certainly  there  are  few,  and  increasingly 
fewer,  spots  on  earth  capable  of  ministering  to 
the  comforts  of  man  or  of  stimulating  his  am- 
bition or  avarice,  where  the  hermit  can  be  guar- 
anteed his  solitude  or  the  castaway  his  oblivion. 
Relentlessly  humanity  fulfills  its  divine  com- 
mission to  multiply  and  possess  the  earth,  and 
so  inevitable  is  the  process  that  one  is  fain  to 
recognize  a  Providence  that  has  made  neighbor- 
liness  a  human  instinct  with  direct  purpose  to 
safeguard  the  future. 

As  with  men,  so  with  nations.  The  age  of 
peoples  living  apart  and  undisturbed,  or  wan- 
dering over  unoccupied  regions  where  bound- 
aries were  superfluous  and  sustenance  provided 

106 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  107 

by  nature  was  to  be  had  for  the  taking,  are 
more  remote  in  our  thought  but  hardly  less 
compatible  with  our  standards  of  living  than 
the  times  when  winds  and  sails  and  flintlocks 
and  horses  were  the  reliance  of  peoples  who 
now  tremble  for  their  safety  despite  the  re- 
sources of  steam  and  electricity,  the  submarine, 
the  motor  and  high  explosives.  The  children 
of  men  are  all  thrust,  will  they,  nill  they,  into 
a  single  crib,  where  they  may  nestle  together 
in  harmony  or  scratch  out  one  another's  eyes, 
their  freedom  of  choice  being  conditioned  only 
by  the  necessity  of  recognizing  that  others  are 
inevitably  in  the  same  crib,  and  at  rather  un- 
comfortably close  quarters. 

For  few  nations  in  the  world's  history  has 
the  romantic,  relatively  untroubled  period  of 
isolation  been  so  delightfully  prolonged  as  for 
the  United  States.  Our  forefathers  were  intro- 
duced by  fortune  to  a  vast  and  rich  domain, 
where  boundless  lands,  huge  forests  and  mighty 
rivers  challenged  the  imagination  and  tenacity 
of  generations  to  come  and  where  only  the  sav- 
age, few  and  poorly  equipped  Indians — who, 
except  as  allies  of  white  men,  rarely  showed 
formidable  offensive  strength — disputed  their 
rule.  Until  well  toward  the  end  of  the  last  cen- 
tury, Americans,  battling  with  and  subduing 
to  their  profit  and  comfort  this  great  empire 
of  nature,  found  neither  strength  nor  leisure 
to  turn  their  attention  elsewhere,  and  their  geo- 
graphical isolation  became  a  sort  of  ideal  pro- 
vincialism, exalted  by  dreams  of  their  infant 


108  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

country's  transcendent  maturity  and  by  satis- 
faction in  the  importance  of  their  own  labors  as 
a  constructive  means  to  so  noble  an  end. 

In  this  isolation  they  were  confirmed,  more- 
over, after  their  successful  revolution  from 
England,  by  an  appreciation  of  their  present 
feebleness.  The  young  nation,  exhausted  by  the 
struggle,  unskilled  in  government,  empty  in 
pocket,  insignificant  in  population,  needed  time 
and  experience  to  order  its  course,  solve  its 
problems  and  develop  its  enormous  potential- 
ities ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  its  leaders,  con- 
templating the  fierce  strife  of  the  European 
monarchies  for  each  other 's  possessions  and  the 
ruthless  gobbling  up  of  the  little  states  by  their 
great  neighbors,  looked  upon  the  hundreds  of 
leagues  of  ocean  tossing  between  their  continent 
and  Europe  as  the  "aegis  of  democracy"  and 
presented  the  principle  of  isolation  to  their 
countrymen  as  a  lamp  divinely  lighted  to  guide 
their  footsteps  along  the  highway  of  history. 

In  this  spirit  Washington  addressed  to  his 
fellow  citizens  his  classic  message  of  farewell : 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard 
to  foreign  nations  is,  in  extending  our  commer- 
cial relations,  to  have  with  them  as  little  political 
connection  as  possible.  .  .  .  Why,  by  interweav- 
ing our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe, 
entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils 
of  European  ambition,  rivalship,  interest  or 
caprice  ? ' ' 

Jefferson,  chief  apostle  of  American  democ- 
racy, harped  constantly  on  the  same  string : 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  109 

"Determined  as  we  are  to  avoid,  if  possible, 
wasting  the  energies  of  our  people  in  war  and 
destruction,  we  shall  avoid  implicating  our- 
selves with  the  Powers  of  Europe,  even  in  sup- 
port of  principles  which  we  mean  to  pursue. ' ' 

And  again: 

"We  have  a  perfect  horror  at  everything 
like  connecting  ourselves  with  the  politics  of 
Europe." 

Similar  sentiments  were  reiterated  by  most 
of  the  fathers  whose  foresight  best  deserved 
the  nation's  heed,  and  the  principle  of  isolation 
became  ingrained  in  the  American  character. 

Regarding  the  possessions  of  European  Pow- 
ers that  remained  in  America  at  the  close  of  the 
Revolution,  the  same  policy  commended  itself. 
Aside  from  the  British  possessions  in  Canada 
and  the  West  Indies,  regarded,  on  the  whole, 
as  safe  and  economically  profitable  neighbors, 
the  great  bulk  of  the  western  hemisphere  was 
in  the  hands  of  Spain,  whose  immense  colonial 
empire  stretched  over  both  continents  from  the 
Mississippi  to  the  Pacific  and  from  the  Great 
Lakes  to  Cape  Horn,  including  Florida,  the  en- 
tire coastline  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  the 
principal  islands  of  the  West  Indies,  and  ex- 
cluding nothing  of  great  importance  except 
Brazil,  which  belonged  to  Portugal. 

Toward  this  enormous  institution — the  Span- 
ish Empire  of  the  Indies — the  people  of  the 
United  States  were  complacent.  Ardent  demo- 
crats, they  could  not,  of  course,  sympathize  with 
a  system  of  government  which  saddled  upon  its 


110  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

colonists  a  bureaucracy — a  graded  organization 
of  Spanish-born  officials — far  less  representa- 
tive, less  efficient  and  more  oppressive  than  that 
of  England,  which  had  driven  them  to  revolt; 
nor  could  they,  who  had  writhed  and  protested 
under  the  British  trade  regulations,  condone  a 
commercial  system  that  exploited  and  wrung 
its  subjects  in  America  for  the  profit  of  the 
king's  exchequer  and  of  favored  mercantile  in- 
terests in  distant  Spain ;  but,  as  shrewdly  prac- 
tical countrymen  of  Yankee  Doodle,  they  saw 
readily  enough  the  advantage  to  themselves  of 
having  as  their  neighbor  decrepit  old  Spain 
rather  than  some  vigorous  Power  with  an  ag- 
gressive imperial  policy.  The  infant  Hercules 
could  well  afford  to  let  Spain  sleep  on  next 
door,  while  he  toughened  his  sinews  and  took 
on  wisdom;  then,  if  his  destiny  pointed  to  the 
Pacific  or  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  as  he  was  begin- 
ning to  fancy  it  might,  the  matter  could  be  at- 
tended to.  With  regard  to  Central  America, 
Panama  and  far  away  South  America  he  had 
little  knowledge  and  no  ambitions  whatever. 

But  Spain  was  not  permitted  to  slumber  while 
the  young  giant  grew  to  man's  estate.  The  ter- 
rific explosion  of  the  French  Revolution  shook 
all  Europe  wide  awake,  and,  as  its  last  phase, 
came  the  parvenu  conqueror  Napoleon,  irrev- 
erently erasing  the  boundaries  of  old  mon- 
archies and  shaping  them  to  his  designs  of 
world  dominion.  No  imperial  scheme  could 
possibly  overlook  Spain,  rich  and  ripe  for  the 
plucking,    and    in    1807    Napoleon's    veterans 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  111 

marched  across  the  Pyrenees  and  a  new  and 
pregnant  chapter  in  American  history  began; 
for  the  subversion  of  Spain  meant  the  disinte- 
gration of  her  empire  in  America. 

The  Spanish  colonies  rose  in  revolt,  a  revolt 
with  more  than  the  usual  complexity  of  causes 
attending  popular  upheavals — patriotic  Span- 
iards against  the  French  rulers  arbitrarily  im- 
posed upon  them,  disgruntled  American-born 
Creoles  against  the  overbearing  Spanish-born 
official  class,  champions  of  free  trade  and  open 
markets  against  the  old,  deadening  commercial 
monopoly — but  in  its  final  stages  it  became 
quite  definitely  a  revolution  against  the  sov- 
ereignty of  Spain  herself.  The  reason  for  this 
is  to  be  found  in  Europe. 

Napoleon's  grandiose  schemes  of  universal 
empire  had  brought  about  his  ruin.  Driven  by 
the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  the  European 
monarchs  sank  their  differences  with  one  an- 
other, combined  against  the  common  enemy, 
crushed  him  at  last  and,  with  thanksgiving  in 
their  hearts  for  their  deliverance,  set  about  re- 
storing and  safeguarding  their  tottering  thrones 
that  had  so  nearly  crashed  down  in  ruin.  Thus 
originated  the  ' '  Holy  Alliance, ' '  *  a  league  of  the 
rulers  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria  and  France, 
united  to  "put  an  end  to  the  system  of  repre- 
sentative governments  in  whatever  country  it 

1  The  term  ' '  Holy  Alliance ' '  is  here  used  loosely  to  desig- 
nate the  permanent'  (Quadruple)  alliance  which  England  re- 
pudiated, rather  than  the  original  fantastic  Holy  Alliance  of 
Czar  Alexander  I,  with  whose  principles  England  declared  her- 
self in  sympathy. 


112  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

may  exist,"  to  "prevent  its  being  introduced  in 
those  countries  where  it  is  not  yet  known"  and 
to  uphold  the  "legitimate"  sovereignty  of  those 
royal  families  ordained  of  God  and  divinely 
appointed  to  the  governance  of  men.  Under 
its  auspices  popular  movements  in  Italy  and 
Spain  were  snuffed  out  without  mercy  and,  en- 
couraged by  its  support,  King  Ferdinand  VII 
of  Spain,  contemptible  in  character  and  in  in- 
tellect, entered  upon  a  policy  of  reactionary 
absolutism  for  the  kingdom  and  colonies  under 
his  rule.  His  unenlightened  action  was  the  coup 
de  grace  to  loyalty  to  the  Spanish  monarchy  in 
America,  where  the  revolution  promptly  gained 
an  elan  it  had  not  had  before.  Ferdinand's 
cause  came  to  depend  more  and  more  upon  the 
inadequate  force  of  soldiers  sent  from  Spain, 
and  by  1822  his  colonial  empire  had  practically 
ceased  to  exist  and  the  infatuated  monarch  could 
only  turn  weakly  and  expectantly  to  the  deus 
ex  machina  in  the  person  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
and  pitifully  beg  his  lost  possessions  at  its 
hands. 

What  might  have  been  the  fate  of  the  new- 
born democracies,  had  they  stood  alone  or  with 
only  the  United  States  at  their  back,  to  defy 
the  conquerors  of  Napoleon,  may  be  conjectured. 
But,  fortunately  for  America,  England  derived 
no  comfort  from  the  prospect  of  a  crusade 
against  representative  government  or  of  burly 
European  autocrats  elbowing  her  overseas  col- 
onies and  closing  South  American  ports  to  her 
trade;  and,  to  the  delight  of  our  anxious  ad- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  113 

ministration,  the  British  foreign  office  took  the 
initiative  in  suggesting  the  identity  of  Eng- 
land's interests  with  our  own  and  inviting  us 
to  a  joint  declaration  against  interference  by 
the  Holy  Alliance  in  American  affairs.  Presi- 
dent James  Monroe  might  have  been  pardoned 
had  he  embraced  the  tempting  proposal  without 
qualification,  but  his  astute  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Quincy  Adams,  perceiving  that  England's 
self-interest  absolutely  assured  us  of  her  sup- 
port, urged  the  advantages  of  a  separate  pro- 
nouncement by  the  United  States  alone,  which, 
instead  of  presenting  us  to  the  world  as  a  mere 
"  cock-boat  in  the  wake  of  the  British  man-of- 
war,"  would  preserve  our  traditional  policy  of 
"no  alliances,"  leave  our  hands  free  for  the 
future  and  win  us  international  prestige  with 
no  attendant  risk.  Accordingly,  on  December 
2, 1823,  the  President's  message  announced  that 
the  American  continents  "are  henceforth  not 
to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  coloniza- 
tion by  any  European  powers,"  that  we  should 
regard  any  attempt  on  their  part  "to  extend 
their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere 
as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety,"  and 
that  "we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for 
the  purpose  of  oppressing"  the  new  republics 
"or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  des- 
tiny, by  any  European  power,  in  any  other  light 
than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  dis- 
position toward  the  United  States." 

This  was  the  famous  Monroe  Doctrine.    It  is 
doubtless  true  that,  if  its  announcement  seemed 


114  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

to  dissipate  successfully  the  menace  of  the  Hdly 
Alliance  against  America,  the  true  explanation 
of  that  happy  result  is  to  be  found  rather  in 
British  ships  and  guns  than  in  an  American 
paper  pronunciamento.  It  may  also  be  admit- 
ted that  the  doctrine  originated  primarily  in 
selfishness  rather  than  in  altruism,  that  our 
statesmen  were  thinking  more  of  the  security 
of  the  United  States  than  of  the  liberty  of  the 
struggling  colonists.  Still,  the  fact  remains 
that,  thus  early  in  her  national  existence,  the 
United  States  appeared  before  the  world  as  the 
avowed  champion  of  American  democracy  and 
of  the  right  of  the  peoples  of  the  western  hemi- 
sphere to  work  out  their  own  institutions  in 
their  own  way. 

In  Latin  America  these  evidences  of  the  sup- 
port and  good  will  of  the  democrats  of  the  north 
fell  on  no  sterile  ground.  Enthusiasm  for  the 
United  States  was  universal,  the  names  of  her 
Revolutionary  heroes  were  on  all  lips,  the  con- 
stitutions of  the  new  states,  to  be  imposed  on 
an  incongruous  citizenry  of  Latins,  Indians  and 
blacks,  copied  with  flattering  if  regrettable  fi- 
delity the  fundamental  laws  of  a  people  schooled 
for  generations  in  the  intricacies  of  ''checks 
and  balances,"  and  in  1824,  when  the  " libera- 
tor," Simon  Bolivar,  pursuing  his  dream  of  a 
league  of  free  American  republics,  proposed  the 
first  Pan-American  congress  of  history,  to  be 
held  at  Panama  for  the  purpose  of  formulating 
a  common  policy  with  regard  to  American  af- 
fairs, an  urgent  invitation  was  sent  to  Wash- 
ington. 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  115 

Unhappily,  the  faith  of  Bolivar  and  his  com- 
patriots in  the  readiness  of  the  United  States 
to  preside  over  and  to  protect,  as  an  elder  sis- 
ter, a  happy  family  of  American  democracies 
was  doomed  to  disappointment.  In  truth,  the 
United  States  was  not  worthy  at  that  time  to 
pose  as  sponsor  for  a  league  of  freedom,  for 
she  herself,  despite  the  lofty  sentiments  of  her 
Declaration  of  Independence,  was  polluted  by 
slavery.  The  half  century  of  struggle  between 
the  North  and  South  had  already  begun,  and 
the  nation's  counsels  were  conducted  and  her 
policies  determined  with  that  issue  always  in 
mind.  Its  baleful  influence  on  American  demo- 
cratic solidarity  appeared  at  once  in  the  pro- 
tests of  Southern  Congressmen  against  sending 
delegates  to  the  Panama  Congress,  upon  the 
ground  that  that  body  was  to  include  negroes 
in  its  membership  and  that  among  its  projects 
was  the  recognition  of  black  Haiti  as  a  free 
state  and  the  emancipation  of  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico  from  the  tyranny  of  Spain.  Could  their 
own  negroes  be  kept  reconciled  to  bondage,  they 
asked,  when  they  connived  at  investing  black 
skinned  islanders  with  the  rights  of  man?  So 
long  did  they  succeed  in  delaying  the  departure 
of  our  delegates  that  when  they  finally  reached 
Panama  the  congress  had  adjourned  and  the 
name  of  the  United  States  had  ceased  to  be  one 
to  conjure  with  in  the  cause  of  democratic  Pan- 
Americanism. 

This  deplorable  episode  was  but  the  beginning 
of  a  long  period  of  estrangement,  ranging  from 


116  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

indifference  to  open  hostility,  between  the  United 
States  and  her  southern  neighbors.  The  full 
vigor  and  genius  of  our  people  were  turned  to 
the  occupation  and  development  of  the  great 
West  and  pace  for  pace  with  the  movement  of 
settlers  into  the  new  land  went  the  eternal  con- 
troversy over  slavery.  The  Southern  champions 
in  Congress,  foreseeing  and  dreading  the  over- 
whelming of  their  cherished  institution  by  the 
preponderance  of  free  labor  in  the  West,  fought 
the  battle  for  slavery  over  again  whenever  the 
admission  of  a  new  State  to  the  Union  was  pro- 
posed, and,  when  their  defeat  appeared  unavoid- 
able in  the  territory  then  possessed  by  the 
nation,  raised  the  cry,  "more  land  for  slavery!" 
The  South  became  avowedly  imperialistic. 
Slave  holders  poured  across  the  southern  border 
into  the  Mexican  territory  of  Texas,  defied  the 
Mexican  laws  against  slavery,  and  finally,  in 
1836,  threw  off  the  rule  of  Mexico  and  knocked 
at  the  door  of  the  Union.  In  1846  pro-slavery 
interests  forced  on  Mexico,  exhausted  by  inter- 
nal strife  and  helpless  to  protect  herself,  as 
unjust  a  war  as  ever  a  great  nation  waged 
against  a  smaller,  and  ravished  from  her  Cali- 
fornia, New  Mexico  and  Arizona.  Cuba  also, 
the  richest  jewel  remaining  to  Spain  in  Amer- 
ica, kindled  their  covetous  eyes.  Filibusters, 
equipped  in  our  Gulf  States,  regardless  of  inter- 
national obligations  and  municipal  law,  har- 
assed her  coasts  and  towns,  official  offers  of 
purchase  to  Spain  were  couched  in  almost  dic- 
tatorial terms,  and  the  climax  was  reached  when, 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  117 

in  1854,  the  American  ministers  to  England, 
France  and  Spain — two  of  them  slaveholders 
and  the  third  devoted  to  Southern  interests — 
met  at  Ostend  in  Belgium  and  united  in  a  mani- 
festo advising  the  United  States,  in  case  Spain 
proved  indisposed  to  part  with  Cuba,  to  "wrest 
it  from  her  if  we  possess  the  power." 

Our  Civil  War,  by  abolishing  slavery,  de- 
stroyed the  damning  inconsistency  in  our  de- 
mocracy, but  neither  then  nor  afterward  was 
anything  accomplished  toward  cementing  the 
broken  links  of  Pan-Americanism.  The  re- 
deemed Union,  after  the  necessary  reconstruc- 
tion, entered  upon  a  marvellous  era  of  material 
development — the  age  of  big  business,  trusts, 
railroad  extension,  wars  between  capital  and 
labor,  controversies  over  the  tariff  and  the  cur- 
rency. Hence  it  emerged,  toward  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  full  of  strength,  re- 
source and  optimism,  conscious  that  its  internal 
problems  were  well  on  the  way  to  a  solution 
and  its  natural  wealth  in  process  of  exploitation, 
with  a  keen  sense  of  its  destiny,  the  eye  of  an 
entrepreneur  alert  for  new  avenues  to  useful- 
ness, progress  and  profit,  and  a  complacent  ap- 
preciation of  its  significance  as  the  home  of 
freedom  and  opportunity  for  all  the  world  and 
as  the  eldest  and  most  successful  expositor  of 
the  success  of  democracy  in  a  great  nation,  and 
with  a  sincere  benevolence,  not  without  some 
tincture  of  superiority,  toward  oppressed  and 
unfortunate  peoples  on  whom  the  blessings  of 
freedom  had  been  bestowed  in  less  measure. 


118  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

This  splendid  period  of  growth  and  coordina- 
tion of  national  resources  had  one  inevitable 
result — it  tore  away  whatever  remained  of  our 
chrysalis  of  isolation  and  precipitated  us  into 
the  mid-current  of  world  affairs.  Already  we 
were  the  world's  greatest  producers  of  raw  ma- 
terials, with  a  surplus  beyond  our  own  needs 
seeking  a  market ;  and  when  we  conned  the  les- 
sons of  our  census  and  the  reports  of  our  im- 
migration bureau  it  required  no  effort  of  the 
imagination  to  prefigure  the  time  when  the  yield 
of  our  fields  and  mountains  would  be  inadequate 
to  supply  our  teeming  population  and  when  our 
manufactures,  multiplied  enormously  in  re- 
sponse to  increased  demands,  might  be  ex- 
changed abroad  for  the  foods  and  minerals  of 
other  lands.  The  economic  law  of  interdepend- 
ence among  nations  made  us  a  world  Power 
and  constrained  us  to  dig  the  Panama  Canal. 

While  still  a  weak  and  provincial  nation,  the 
United  States  had  been  glad  to  subscribe  to  any 
arrangement  with  European  states  that  would 
save  the  face  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  secure 
•  us  equal  rights  with  others  to  use  the  projected 
waterway.  Now,  however,  that  we  were  indis- 
putably the  paramount  Power  in  America,  with 
long  coastlines  on  both  oceans,  containing  har- 
bors for  our  vessels  of  war  and  trade,  any  trans- 
isthmian  canal  must  become  the  strategic  centre 
for  our  commerce  and  our  naval  strategy — in 
the  words  of  President  Hayes,  "part  of  the 
coastline  of  the  United  States"— as  necessary 
for  us  to  control  as  the  capital  of  our  Govern- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  119 

ment  or  the  funds  of  our  treasury.  And,  need- 
less to  say,  the  control  of  the  canal  implied 
control  also  of  the  principal  routes  by  which  it 
could  be  reached — the  great  sea  lanes  between 
the  islands  of  the  Caribbean  and  important  posi- 
tions commanding  its  termini  in  both  oceans. 

Thus  consideration  for  our  future  as  a  world 
Power  urged  us  southward,  into  closer  and 
closer  contact  with  our  one  time  admirers,  the 
Latin  Americans,  whose  sentiments  toward  us, 
however,  had  undergone,  not  without  reason, 
a  process  of  refrigeration  and  who  now  re- 
garded us  with  distrust  as  conscienceless  inter- 
lopers, intent  on  securing  plenty  of  room  for 
ourselves  by  a  resolute  elbowing  policy. 

Our  initial  plunge  into  the  unfamiliar  waters 
of  the  Caribbean  did  not  allay  their  apprehen- 
sions. Our  war  with  Spain  in  1898  was  fought 
from  a  variety  of  motives,  but  of  the  dominant 
one — sympathy  for  the  outraged  Cubans  (and 
that  it  was  so  nobody  who  remembers  the  senti- 
ments or  has  read  the  newspapers  of  that  year 
can  doubt) — our  people  had  no  reason  to  be 
ashamed.  Still,  other  less  unselfish  impulses 
appearing  in  the  background  appealed  to  our 
startled  neighbors,  and  to  Europe  as  well,  as 
more  in  accord  with  our  reputed  national 
shrewdness  and  materialism,  and  the  terms  of 
peace  served  but  too  well  to  bear  out  their  sus- 
picions, for  we  proceeded  not  only  to  pocket 
Porto  Eico  and  the  Philippines  but  to  force 
upon  Cuba,  for  whose  liberties  we  professed 
to  have  been  wielding  the  righteous  sword,  a 


120  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

tutelage  which  conditioned  her  nominally  de- 
clared sovereignty  by  our  own  conception  of 
her  needs,  and  to  exact  a  substantial  recom- 
pense for  our  services  in  the  form  of  naval 
bases  on  her  soil. 

The  end  of  the  war  brought  the  American 
people,  somewhat  to  their  surprise  and  almost 
against  their  will,  face  to  face  with  the  fact  that 
their  old  practice  of  aloofness  from  others '  con- 
cerns had  been  relegated  forever  to  the  nation's 
collection  of  outgrown  antiquities.  Henceforth 
our  policies  were  to  be  cast  in  an  international 
mould. 

Our  first  step  was  impossible  to  mistake.  We 
must  build  and  own  the  canal.  England,  with 
whom  we  had  an  embarrassing  treaty  on  the 
subject,  was  told  that,  controlling  as  she  did 
the  Suez  waterway,  she  could  not  in  propriety 
insist  upon  rights  in  "  a  canal  and  a  half. ' '  Con- 
vinced, less  perhaps  by  the  force  of  our  logic 
than  by  her  desire  for  our  friendship,  in  view 
of  the  menacing  rise  of  German  maritime  power, 
she  obligingly  withdrew,  and  ' '  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty  [1901]  was  a  turning  point  in  the 
history  of  the  West  Indies,  in  that  it  was  a 
formal  recognition  of  the  transference  of  naval 
supremacy  in  the  Caribbean  from  Great  Britain 
to  the  United  States. ' '  The  Panama  route  was 
decided  upon,  and  although  Colombia,  sovereign 
over  that  territory,  interposed  obstacles  to  our 
impatient  will,  our  Presidential  chair  was  occu- 
pied by  a  "man  of  action,"  and  Mr.  Roosevelt 
"took  Panama  while  Congress  debated." 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  121 

Americans  whose  faith  in  the  unswerving 
justice  of  the  United  States  to  weaker  nations 
has  been  fortified  by  the  Roosevelt  and  John 
Hay  versions  of  what  occurred  in  Panama  in 
1903  will  do  well  to  consult  an  unbiased  his- 
torian's account  of  those  events.  Here  it  needs 
only  to  be  observed  in  passing  that  the  Panama 
revolution  was  projected  in  this  country  and 
anticipated  with  equanimity  by  our  Government 
several  weeks  before  it  actually  broke  out ;  that 
under  a  more  than  doubtful  construction  of  an 
old  treaty  dating  from  1846 — a  construction  re- 
pudiated by  Colombia  and  by  Latin  Americans 
generally — we  resorted  to  forcible  means  to  ob- 
struct the  operations  of  the  Colombian  troops 
attempting  to  suppress  the  rebels;  that  in  rec- 
ognizing the  Republic  of  Panama  only  three 
days  after  its  declaration  of  independence  we 
violated  principles  regarding  recognition  which 
we  ourselves  had  announced  with  unction  in  the 
case  of  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies  and 
for  a  far  less  heinous  disregard  of  which,  with 
reference  to  the  recognition  of  the  belligerency 
of  the  Confederacy  in  our  Civil  War,  we  had 
bitterly  denounced  England ;  and  that  the  prin- 
cipal justification  alleged  for  our  action — that 
the  canal  was  a  world  necessity,  the  enjoyment 
of  which  by  humanity  self-seeking  officials  of 
a  single  turbulent  nation  could  not  be  permitted 
to  prevent — must  be  thrown  out  of  court  as  ir- 
relevant, since  the  question  at  issue  with  Colom- 
bia was  not  the  granting  or  denial  of  the  desired 
concessions,  but  rather  the  amount  of  money 


122  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

we  were  to  pay  for  them.  It  is  at  least  a  profit- 
able reflection  whether  a  nation  that  spent  over 
half  a  billion  dollars,  composed  in  considerable 
part  of  pensions  and  "pork,"  in  the  year  1903, 
might  not  well  have  afforded  to  add  an  addi- 
tional item  of  a  few  millions  for  the  sake  of 
avoiding  all  appearance  of  injustice  and  con- 
serving the  good  will  of  the  people  of  a  whole 
continent. 

Whether  Mr.  Roosevelt  or  the  Colombians 
had  the  right  of  it,  the  Panama  episode  did 
more  than  any  other  event  in  our  history  to 
arouse  against  us  the  resentment,  distrust  and 
fear  of  Latin  Americans.  To  them  we  seemed 
to  stand  revealed  in  our  true  character — the 
"Colossus  of  the  North,"  bestriding  both  the 
Americas  and  appropriating  them  to  our  de- 
signs. Their  alarm  increased  when,  in  1900, 
we  intervened  in  Cuba  to  repair  the  creaking 
machinery  of  government.  They  whispered  sar- 
donically that  Uncle  Sam  was  removing  his  dis- 
guise as  "general  benefactor"  and  preparing 
soullessly  to  gobble  the  next  morsel  that  invited 
his  perennial  appetite,  and  surprise  and  mysti- 
fication followed  our  prompt  withdrawal  after 
order  was  restored. 

Not  only  in  the  Americas  did  the  stretching 
of  Uncle  Sam  *s  limbs  occasion  discomfort.  The 
great  commercial  nations  looked  askance  at  our 
growing  ambitions  and  extended  activities.  Par- 
ticularly so  did  Germany.  Coming  too  late  into 
the  family  of  nations  to  share  in  the  partition 
of  North  America  and  Africa  into  colonial  do- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  123 

mains,  no  nation  was  more  conscious  of  its  im- 
perial destiny  or  more  alive  to  the  necessity  of 
providing  homes  for  its  population  and  markets 
for  its  products.  If  Germany  was  to  take  the 
forward  place  in  world  affairs  to  which  her  na- 
tional character  and  ambitions  assigned  her, 
some  resource  must  be  found  to  offset  the  handi- 
cap of  restricted  territory.  All  the  world  knows 
that  it  was  supplied  by  perfection  of  organiza- 
tion, by  the  application  of  the  uncanny  German 
genius  for  taking  pains,  sentimentalized  by  an 
unwearying  propaganda  devoted  to  the  glorifi- 
cation of  German  efficiency,  and  rhapsodized 
into  a  crusader's  vision  of  the  diffusion  of  Teu- 
tonic "Kultur."  Thus  equipped,  she  entered 
the  battle  for  the  world's  wealth  and  the  world's 
power,  her  producing,  selling  and  fiscal  organ- 
izations combined  with  intricate  perfection,  her 
young  subjects  trained  as  specialized  agents  for 
the  conquest  of  new  markets  for  her  com- 
modities, her  capital  ventured  in  large  amounts 
and  often  at  dangerously  speculative  rates  in 
investments  calculated  to  win  her  credit  and 
consequently  business  abroad,  and  behind  all 
the  purse  and  the  strong  arm  of  her  centralized 
Government.  Coincidently  with  the  expansion 
of  her  trade  proceeded  the  augmentation  of  her 
navy,  regarded  as  the  necessary  guarantee  of 
her  success.  In  the  early  years  of  the  twentieth 
century  the  mushroom  growth  of  both  brought 
consternation  to  her  rivals;  all  of  them  save 
England  were  speedily  distanced,  and  she,  de- 
spite extraordinary  exertions,  had  ample  reason 
for  concern. 


124  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

No  field  of  expansion  afforded  more  attractive 
possibilities  than  the  American;  and  German 
money,  German  goods  and  German  immigrants 
were  already  pouring  into  the  most  promising 
localities.  In  every  respect,  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  seemed  a  bogey  to  German  ambi- 
tions, and  most  intolerable  of  all  was  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  denying  her  forever  a  single 
square  foot  of  territory  in  the  hemisphere. 

No  one  familiar  with  German  habits  of 
thought  and  "practical"  methods  could  enter- 
tain a  doubt  as  to  how  the  empire  would  deal 
with  such  a  situation.  It  was  resolved,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  to  defer  to  the  United  States 
and  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  only  so  far  as  ex- 
pediency might  dictate;  and  expediency,  to  the 
German  mind,  has  usually  been  measured  in 
terms  of  battleships  and  ordnance.  In  1898 
the  sentiments  of  the  Kaiser  appeared  in  his 
efforts  to  effect  a  coalition  of  European  Powers 
to  compel  us  to  relax  our  pressure  on  Spain  and 
in  his  reported  observation:  "If  I  had  had  a 
larger  fleet,  I  would  have  taken  Uncle  Sam  by 
the  scruff  of  the  neck. ' '  When  Dewey,  victorious 
over  the  Spaniards,  occupied  Manila  Bay,  a 
German  squadron,  present  ostensibly  to  protect 
German  interests  against  the  insurgents,  thrust 
itself  between  our  ships  and  the  town  and  ren- 
dered itself  so  obnoxious  as  to  draw  from  Dewey 
the  outburst :  ' i  Tell  Admiral  Diederichs  that  if 
he  wants  a  fight  he  can  have  it  right  now!" 
The  first  German- American  armed  conflict  might 
well  have  materialized  forthwith,  had  not  the 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  125 

behavior  of  the  British  commander,  also  on  the 
scene,  conveyed  to  the  Germans  a  distinct  im- 
pression of  Anglo-American  amity. 

Some  day  a  historian  will  tell  the  interesting 
story  of  the  rapprochement  between  England 
and  the  United  States  which  has  now  produced 
such  gratifying  results,  and  he  may  well  be  able 
to  show  a  relationship  between  increasing  Brit- 
ish amenities  to  us  and  the  rise  of  the  German 
menace.  An  outstanding  affection  for  us  has 
not  always  been  a  British  peculiarity.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  the  advantages  to  England 
of  America's  friendship  during  those  disturbing 
years  were  obvious,  and,  in  the  light  of  what 
we  already  know  of  Germany's  intentions  to- 
ward us  and  our  own  blind  helplessness  to  pro- 
tect ourselves,  we  may  confess  with  gratitude 
that  we  have  by  no  means  least  benefited  by 
the  Anglo-Saxon  family  reunion. 

The  Manila  episode  was  only  the  first  rustle 
of  the  rising  hurricane.  Judicious  German 
loans  to  impecunious  Latin  American  countries, 
which  the  latter  proved  providentially  unable 
to  pay,  were  recurrent  pretexts  for  the  employ- 
ment of  Teuton  strong  arm  methods,  and  most 
disquieting  ones  for  Uncle  Sam.  On  one  oc- 
casion, in  1902,  the  Kaiser's  grip  upon  the  collar 
of  recalcitrant  Venezuela  was  broken  only  by 
President  Roosevelt's  threat  to  dispatch  Ad- 
miral Dewey  to  the  scene  of  action.  Again,  in 
1907,  the  claims  of  Germany  and  other  Euro- 
pean states  upon  the  bankrupt  treasury  of  Santo 
Domingo  forced  the  President  to  one  of  the 


126  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

most  significant  extensions  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine that  has  ever  been  made.  By  agreement 
with  the  debtor  state,  officials  from  the  United 
States  were  appointed  to  administer  the  Do- 
minican customs  in  the  interest  of  foreign  cred- 
itors, upon  the  principle  that  "we  must  make 
it  evident  that  we  do  not  intend  to  permit  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  be  used  by  any  nation  on 
this  continent  as  a  shield  to  protect  it  from  the 
consequences  of  its  own  misdeeds  against  for- 
eign nations,"  and,  in  cases  of  wrong  doing  or 
impotence  of  American  states,  causing  just 
grievances  to  their  creditors,  the  United  States 
may  be  forced  "to  the  exercise  of  an  interna- 
tional police  power." 

Such  disconcerting  experiences  as  these  at 
length  convinced  our  people  of  the  necessity  of 
formulating  a  practical  American  program.  Of 
recent  years,  Latin  American  cartoonists  have 
been  fond  of  depicting  the  long,  striding  legs, 
longer  arms  and  clutching,  bony  fingers  of  im- 
perialistic Uncle  Sam;  but,  with  the  evidence 
all  in,  the  worst  that  can  fairly  be  said  against 
our  policy  is  that  it  has  concerned  itself  (1) 
with  the  reassertion  of  a  somewhat  amplified 
Monroe  Doctrine — amplified  to  meet  new  exi- 
gencies as  they  have  arisen;  (2)  with  the  as- 
sumption of  an  amount  of  control  over  small, 
irresponsible  Latin  American  countries  suffi- 
cient to  anticipate  the  designs  of  ambitious 
European  Powers  on  their  integrity;  and  (3) 
with  the  creation  of  a  scientific  system  of  de- 
fences for  the  canal,  including  the  command  of 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  127 

the  principal  sea  routes  into  the  Caribbean  and 
the  occupation  by  ourselves,  or  the  exclusion 
of  rival  nations  from,  the  important  naval  bases 
near  its  Atlantic  and  Pacific  termini. 

These  three  elements  in  our  policy  are,  in- 
deed, closely  interrelated  and  may  be  thought 
of  as  parts  of  one  big  plan — the  perfection  of 
the  defences  and  the  insurance  of  the  security 
of  the  United  States,  regarding  our  West  India 
islands  and  the  Canal  Zone  as  integral  factors 
in  a  single  problem.  There  have  been,  since 
the  Roosevelt  pronouncement  regarding  Santo 
Domingo,  two  significant  extensions  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  The  first,  in  1912,  occasioned  by 
the  rumor  that  Japanese  commercial  interests, 
closely  allied  with  the  Japanese  Government, 
were  negotiating  with  Mexico  for  concessions 
of  territory  on  Magdalena  Bay  in  Lower  Cali- 
fornia, was  the  " Lodge  resolution"  to  the  effect 
that  "when  any  harbor  or  other  place  in  the 
American  continents  is  so  situated  that  the  oc- 
cupation thereof  for  naval  or  military  purposes 
might  threaten  the  communications  or  the 
safety  of  the  United  States,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  could  not  see  without  grave 
concern  the  possession  of  such  harbor  or  other 
place  by  any  corporation  or  association  which 
has  such  a  relation  to  another  Government,  not 
American,  as  to  give  that  Government  practical 
power  or  control  for  naval  or  military  pur- 
poses." 

The  second  is  still  more  interesting.  For 
years  the  immense  oil  fields  of  Mexico   and 


128  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

northern  South  America  have  been,  like  other 
deposits  of  raw  materials  in  Latin  America,  the 
basis  of  heavy  investments  of  foreign  capital. 
A  new  international  significance  has  recently 
attached  to  oil,  from  the  fact  that  it  is  being 
substituted  for  coal  as  fuel  for  battleships,  and, 
at  no  very  distant  date,  oiling  stations  and  the 
control  of  oil  supplies  must  figure  largely  in 
the  estimates  of  naval  experts.  Thus  the  ques- 
tion of  the  control  of  American  oil  properties 
becomes  a  matter  of  concern  in  our  plans  of 
national  defence,  and  when  in  1913  it  was 
learned  that  the  great  British  firm  of  Pearson 
and  Son,  already  heavily  interested  in  Mexican 
oil,  was  concluding  negotiations  with  the  Colom- 
bian Government  which  gave  it  a  monopoly  of 
valuable  deposits  in  that  country,  with  the  right 
to  construct  pipe  lines,  railroads  and  docks,  our 
Government  was  aroused  and  expressed  its  dis- 
pleasure so  strongly  that  the  Pearson  projects 
were  abandoned.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
deftly  fitted  to  the  situation  by  President  Wilson 
in  his  speech  at  Mobile,  in  which  he  declared: 
"States  that  are  obliged,  because  their  territory 
does  not  lie  within  the  main  field  of  modern 
enterprise  and  action,  to  grant  concessions  are 
in  this  condition,  that  foreign  interests  are  apt 
to  dominate  their  domestic  affairs.  .  .  .  What 
these  states  are  going  to  seek,  therefore,  is  an 
emancipation  from  the  subordination,  which  has 
been  inevitable,  to  foreign  enterprise.  .  .  .  The 
United  States  .  .  .  must  regard  it  as  one  of  the 
duties  of  friendship  to  see  that  from  no  quarter 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  129 

are  material  interests  made  superior  to  human 
liberty  and  national  opportunity." 

In  the  turbulent  little  republics  of  Central 
America  and  the  West  Indies  we  have,  of  late 
years,  constantly  interfered  and  taken  upon  our- 
selves new  burdens,  with  slight  advantage  to 
ourselves,  for  the  simple  reason  that  we  were 
compelled  to  do  so  or  to  hand  over  regions 
strategically  vital  to  us  to  our  most  formidable 
rivals,  especially  Germany.  The  world  is  just 
beginning  to  comprehend  and  to  shiver  as  it 
should  at  the  story  of  German  machinations; 
and  of  all  the  reckless  sleepers  saved  by  grace 
rather  than  by  prescience,  Uncle  Sam  has  as 
good  reason  as  any  for  self-gratulation. 

An  excellent  illustration  is  Haiti.  That  negro 
island  republic,  endowed  by  nature  with  a  pro- 
fusion of  riches,  and  endowed  by  man  with 
ignorance,  improvidence  and  chronic  revolution, 
has  been  for  a  century  a  pathetic  instance  of 
neglected  possibilities.  Once  a  colony  of  France 
and  still  French  in  speech,  its  finances  were 
controlled,  until  seven  years  ago,  by  a  French 
banking  corporation.  German  interests,  how- 
ever, were  active  there,  as  everywhere  else,  and 
in  1910  were  powerful  enough  to  secure  a  re- 
organization of  the  bank  which  would  give  them 
a  share  in  the  country's  fiscal  affairs.  The 
French  Government,  as  nervous  at  the  prospect 
of  embarking  in  such  a  venture  with  Germans 
as  their  sole  associates  as  Red  Riding  Hood 
had  reason  to  be  in  her  woodland  walk  with  the 
wolf,  insisted  on  having  a  third  party  along, 


130  THE  WOBLD  PERIL 

and  the  final  adjustment,  on  its  face,  gave 
Frenchmen  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  stock,  Amer- 
icans forty  per  cent.,  and  Germans  only  ten  per 
cent. ;  but  there  was,  perhaps,  some  significance 
in  the  fact  that  the  principal  American  holders 
bore  unmistakable  German  names.  Be  that  as 
it  may,  the  bank  was  not  the  last  word  in  the 
story.  In  1914  and  1915,  Haiti  was  convulsed 
by  two  of  her  habitual  revolutions  and  when 
the  smoke  had  cleared  away  it  appeared  that 
the  revolutionary  leaders  had  contracted  loans 
with  German  banks  bearing  such  picturesque 
rates  of  interest  as  35  and  45%  per  cent,  per 
annum,  with  the  Government  revenues  pledged 
for  their  repayment.  More  important  than  this 
was  the  intimation  that  came  to  the  United 
States  that  the  German  minister  had  negotiated 
with  the  Haitian  Government  an  arrangement 
whereby  one  of  the  considerations  for  German 
financial  assistance  was  to  be  the  grant  to  Ger- 
mans of  the  right  to  construct  a  commercial 
coaling  station  at  Mole  St.  Nicholas,  at  the 
northwestern  extremity  of  the  island,  an  im- 
portant stategic  site  commanding  the  Windward 
Passage,  the  highroad  to  Panama.  The  alarm 
felt  in  our  Government  circles  at  this  swoop  of 
the  German  eagle  toward  an  eyrie  in  America, 
where  one  of  the  roads  to  the  canal  would  be 
directly  under  his  eye  and  claws,  may  be  imag- 
ined, and  it  was  doubtless  due  to  energetic  pro- 
tests from  Washington  that  nothing  came  of 
the  plot. 

But  the  end  was  not  yet.    The  bank  and  the 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  131 

loans  gave  the  Germans  an  ideal  lever  for  their 
Haitian  diplomacy,  and  when,  in  1914,  Presi- 
dent Theodore's  skyrocket  financiering  had  in- 
volved his  country  in  economic  chaos  and  the 
gold  in  the  Haitian  bank  had  been  spirited  to 
New  York  in  a  United  States  gunboat  for  safe 
keeping,  the  French  and  German  Governments 
approached  Washington  with  the  proposition 
that  Haiti's  finances  required  regulating  and 
that  their  interests  there  entitled  them  to  par- 
ticipate in  the  work.  The  French  communica- 
tion was  polite,  but  the  sinister  scowl  and  the 
clenched  fist  appeared  unmistakably  in  the  Ger- 
man representation,  the  language  of  which  set 
forth  the  unconcern  of  German  public  opinion 
with  any  American  tenderness  for  a  traditional 
doctrine  and  concluded  with  the  assertion  that 
Germany  "would  not  understand"  any  arrange- 
ment that  excluded  her  from  a  settlement  of 
Haitian  affairs. 

The  United  States,  at  last  thoroughly  aroused, 
replied  to  both  France  and  Germany  that  she 
admitted  no  exceptions  to  her  general  policy  that 
independent  American  nations  were  not  to  be  in- 
terfered with  by  European  governments.  At  this 
juncture  came  the  great  war,  and  Germany's  en- 
ergies were  fully  occupied  elsewhere.  Just  what 
sort  of  reply  our  defiance  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment would  have  brought  us  under  different 
circumstances  is  a  shiver  inducing  speculation 
for  those  of  us  whose  faith  is  not  pinned  to  the 
threadbare  aphorism  that  "America  has  never 
lost  a  war. ' ' 


132  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Meanwhile  Haiti  had  become  a  welter  of  revo- 
lution and  murder,  one  president  after  another 
flitting  disconcertingly  across  the  stage  and  each 
picking  up,  in  his  course,  whatever  cash  hap- 
pened to  be  in  sight.  When  missions  from  the 
United  States  had  failed  to  effect  any  arrange- 
ment concerning  the  finances,  utter  anarchy 
reigned,  French  marines  had  been  landed  at 
Cape  Haitien  to  protect  French  interests,  and 
a  mob  had  invaded  the  French  legation  at  Port- 
au-Prince  to  drag  out  and  assassinate  President 
Guillaume-Sam,  the  United  States  took  forcible 
control  of  the  situation.  She  had  no  alternative. 
Haiti  must  be  shaken  out  and  made  fit  for  re- 
spectable society  by  somebody,  and  unless  we 
were  willing  to  assume  the  unpleasant  duty  our- 
selves we  could  not,  in  common  sense,  go  on 
denying  to  other  interested  parties  the  right  to 
use  the  rod.  Our  marines  accomplished  the  cor- 
rective process  with  a  minimum  of  pain  to  all 
concerned  and,  by  a  treaty  negotiated  in  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  Haiti  was  placed  in  probationary 
leading  strings,  the  collection  of  her  customs 
and  the  disbursement  of  her  revenues  assumed 
by  the  United  States,  and  her  so-called  police 
system  replaced  by  a  native  constabulary  re- 
cruited, drilled  and  officered  by  Americans,  the 
arrangement  to  remain  in  force  for  ten  years 
"and  further  for  another  term  of  ten  years  if, 
for  specific  reasons  presented  by  either  of  the 
high  contracting  parties,  the  purpose  of  this 
treaty  has  not  been  fully  accomplished." 

The  story  of  Haiti  is  the  most  melodramatic 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  133 

chapter,  but  a  thoroughly  characteristic  one,  in 
the  history  of  our  relations  with  the  Caribbean 
countries.  Santo  Domingo,  Haiti's  neighbor, 
has  been  continuously  under  our  wing  since 
1907,  when  alarm  at  the  attitude  of  her  foreign 
creditors  first  drove  us  to  assume  the  post  of 
nursemaid ;  and,  in  consequence  of  recent  lapses 
from  the  path  of  order  and  virtue,  is  now  being 
reclaimed  by  military  government,  backed  by 
the  rifles  of  United  States  marines. 

Of  the  little  republics  of  Central  America, 
Nicaragua  has  enlisted  our  peculiar  interest, 
because  her  territory  contains  the  logical  route 
for  the  second  isthmian  canal  which  some  day 
will  be  built.  Here  also  the  foreign  bogey  has 
appeared,  and  here,  from  1893  to  1910,  its  de- 
signs were  facilitated  by  the  rule  of  the  in- 
famous tyrant-dictator  Zelaya,  a  sort  of  prince 
of  desperadoes,  who  for  seventeen  years  ter- 
rorized, exploited,  robbed,  blackmailed  and  mur- 
dered his  countrymen,  executed  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  kept  neighboring  governments  in 
a  turmoil  of  apprehension  and  ruined  the  coun- 
try by  concessions  to  foreigners,  pledging  her 
resources  for  loans  which  he  and  his  henchmen 
squandered  until,  when  the  blight  of  his  pres- 
ence was  at  length  removed,  Nicaragua  lay  help- 
less to  meet  the  claims  of  the  European  Powers 
which  were  at  her  throat  demanding  immediate 
compliance.  Only  our  intervention  and  our 
promise  that  she  would  meet  her  obligations 
saved  her  and,  at  the  instance  of  her  own  rulers, 
experts  from  the  United  States  undertook  the 


134  THE  WOKLD  PERIL 

rehabilitation  of  her  government  and  finances. 
A  new  revolutionary  outbreak  led  to  the  land- 
ing of  marines  to  keep  the  peace.  Our  finan- 
ciers, with  justifiable  caution,  declined  to  risk 
considerable  sums  in  the  country  without  posi- 
tive assurance  that  no  more  financial  orgies  of 
the  Zelaya  brand  would  be  staged  there;  and, 
to  furnish  them  the  necessary  guarantees  and 
for  the  good  of  all  concerned,  the  United  States 
and  Nicaragua  concluded  a  treaty  in  1915,  by 
which  we  placed  $3,000,000  to  her  credit  in  safe 
banks,  and  received  in  return  a  perpetual  right 
to  build  and  maintain  an  interoceanic  canal  by 
the  Nicaragua  route  and  a  ninety-nine  year,  re- 
newable lease  of  the  Corn  Islands,  guarding  the 
Atlantic  terminus,  and  the  Bay  of  Fonseca,  the 
Pacific  gateway  of  the  proposed  new  "ditch." 

Prospects  of  similar  salutary  tutelage  over 
Honduras  and  Salvador  have  so  far  miscarried, 
but  the  future  may  well  hold  further  responsi- 
bilities for  us  in  Central  America. 

It  must  be  clear  that  the  key  to  our  "im- 
perial" policy,  including  our  salvage  of  ship- 
wrecked American  states  and  our  brandishing 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  faces  of  foreign 
nations,  is  our  concern  to  safeguard,  for  the 
sake  of  our  interests,  territorial,  commercial 
and  strategic,  in  the  canal  and  its  neighborhood, 
the  principal  avenues  of  approach  to  Panama 
and  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  is  a  perfectly 
justifiable  purpose,  at  which  no  fair  minded 
individual  or  nation  can  cavil,  and  which,  in- 
deed, we  would  be   absurdly   shortsighted  to 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  135 

neglect.  The  same  motives  lie  behind  our  latest 
Caribbean  venture,  the  purchase  of  the  Danish 
Islands,  of  which  St.  Thomas  and  St.  John,  with 
the  roadstead  between  them,  constitute  poten- 
tially what  one  expert  has  termed  an  "Amer- 
ican Gibraltar, ' '  the  most  formidable  stronghold 
and  naval  base  in  the  entire  Caribbean.  The 
eternal  presence  of  the  German  cloven  hoof 
appears  in  the  facts  that  German  influence  de- 
feated our  attempts  to  purchase  these  islands 
sixteen  years  ago,  and  that  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  world  war  the  Hamburg- American  (Ger- 
man) steamship  corporation  had  established  at 
St.  Thomas  a  system  of  docks,  coal  depots  and 
other  properties  which  quite  exceeded  the  re- 
quirements of  a  mere  commercial  headquarters. 
Indeed,  an  explanation  of  our  recent  activ- 
ities in  Haiti  cannot  neglect  the  circumstances 
that,  when  the  war  began,  that  republic  was,  to 
employ  the  phrase  of  an  authority, ' '  practically 
a  German  commercial  sphere, ' '  and  that  German 
designs  on  Mole  St.  Nicholas,  a  position  domi- 
nating the  important  Windward  Passage  and 
blanketing  our  naval  station  at  Guantanamo, 
Cuba,  were  well  understood.  Nor,  in  our  in- 
terest in  Santo  Domingo,  could  we  have  ignored 
the  existence  of  Samana  Bay,  on  its  northeast 
coast,  an  inland  sea  twenty-five  miles  long  and 
ten  miles  wide,  flanked  by  high  ridges,  its  mouth 
protected  by  a  coral  reef  broken  by  channels 
from  twelve  to  twenty  fathoms  deep  leading  to 
a  great  deep  water  roadstead  twelve  by  eight 
miles  in  extent,  capable  of  holding  all  the  navies 


136  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  the  world  with  room  to  spare,  flanking  the 
Mona  Passage,  and  second  only  to  the  Danish 
Islands  in  strategic  importance. 

We  cannot  regard  as  least  among  the  advan- 
tages which  the  great  European  war  has  brought 
to  us  our  escape  from  the  normal  consequences 
of  our  improvidence  and  ineptitude  in  the  past 
and  our  success,  through  taking  advantage  of 
Germany's  distractions  elsewhere,  in  breaking 
her  tightening  clutch  upon  the  doorways  of  our 
trade  and  the  natural  defences  of  our  coast. 
Never  were  the  ministrations  of  that  Providence 
which  is  said  to  protect  babies  and  the  United 
States  more  charitably  in  evidence ;  and,  by  its 
salutary  interposition,  backed  by  the  sobering 
and  impelling  lessons  of  the  war  itself,  we  are 
in  a  fair  way  to  repair  our  old  fences,  build  new 
ones  and  secure  the  necessary  preemptions  to 
safeguard  our  national  preserves  against  de- 
signing squatters  from  overseas,  whose  utter 
lack  of  scruples  is  offset  by  an  abnormal  pen- 
chant for  acquisitiveness. 

Our  belated  awakening  to  the  importance  of 
Latin  America  to  our  national  future  appears 
not  only  in  the  spheres  of  politics  and  strategy, 
but  in  that  of  commerce  as  well.  Since  the  war 
began  we  have  devoted  a  really  remarkable 
amount  of  energy  and  intelligence  to  the  pro- 
motion of  our  business  relations  with  her.  For 
years  her  markets  had  been  in  bitter  dispute 
principally  between  England  and  Germany,  with 


THE  TWO  AMEEICAS  137 

the  United  States  a  comparatively  weak  con- 
tender, except  in  the  Caribbean  region,  where 
we  have  had  distinct  interests  and  advantages, 
and,  to  a  less  extent,  in  Brazil,  the  bnlk  of  whose 
coffee  crop  has  come  to  us. 

The  "Open  Sesame"  for  Europe's  business 
with  Latin  America  has  been  her  heavy  invest- 
ment in  Latin  American  projects — in  national 
securities  to  some  extent,  but  particularly  in 
public  utilities  and  private  construction  works 
— railroads,  lighting  and  power  plants,  irriga- 
tion and  mining  projects,  and  the  like.  England 
has  long  been  the  world's  chief  lender.  When 
the  war  broke  out,  her  interests  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica were  reckoned  at  $4,000,000,000,  Germany 
and  France  following  with  about  $1,000,000,000 
each,  and  the  United  States  figuring  insignifi- 
cantly. 

"Trade  follows  the  loan"  has  become  a  com- 
mercial axiom.  The  pouring  of  immense  quan- 
tities of  England's  surplus  wealth  into  South 
America  created  huge  credits  in  her  favor, 
credits  which  South  America,  poorly  supplied 
with  ready  capital,  discharged  by  shipping  raw 
products  to  England — an  arrangement  which 
pleased  and  profited  both  parties.  English 
money  invested  in  construction  projects  went 
in  on  an  understanding  that  the  material  used 
in  the  work  should  come  from  English  factories, 
and  so  an  ever  increasing  demand  for  English 
goods  was  created.  Moreover,  English  subsi- 
dized utilities  advanced  civilization  and  pros- 


138  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

perity,  prosperity  created  additional  wealth, 
and  additional  wealth  meant  more  purchasing 
power  for  the  absorption  of  English  exports. 
The  readiness  of  English  capitalists  to  lend 
to  South  America  established  ties  of  mutual 
interest,  confidence  and  good  will,  which  some- 
one has  called  the  "immovable  foundation  of 
a  commercial  edifice,"  and  which  have  stood 
England  in  good  stead  on  more  than  one  occa- 
sion. It  has  been  said  that  one  of  her  strongest 
assets  in  maintaining  herself  so  well  against 
the  fierce  competition  of  Germany  has  been  the 
feeling  of  regard  and  gratitude  current  among 
South  Americans  to  the  country  whose  sym- 
pathy and  aid  contributed  most  toward  placing 
their  feet  upon  the  ladder  of  progress. 

The  commercial  nations  of  Europe,  thor- 
oughly organized  financially,  with  a  surplus  of 
money  for  investment  (for  which  few  attractive 
opportunities  appeared  in  their  own  highly  de- 
veloped countries),  manufacturing  in  excess  of 
their  needs  and  requiring  raw  products  for  their 
factories  and  food  for  their  people  from  foreign 
sources,  were  ideally  prepared  for  exactly  the 
opportunities  offered  by  South  America.  In  the 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  the  demand 
for  capital  to  develop  our  seemingly  inexhaust- 
ible resources  has  been,  until  recently,  far  in 
excess  of  the  supply  available  for  use.  Further- 
more, most  of  the  products  we  have  had  for 
export,  such  as  grains,  meat  and  the  like,  have 
been  exactly  those  which  the  South  Americans 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  139 

themselves  produce;  in  a  word,  there  has  been 
no  great  natural  incentive  to  exchange  between 
nations  both  with  a  surplus  of  raw  materials 
and  both  with  a  market  for  manufactured  goods. 
And,  in  the  years  just  before  the  war,  when 
certain  of  our  manufactures  had  reached  a  vol- 
ume that  made  exporting  profitable  and  desir- 
able, we  found  the  European  exporters  firmly 
established  among  peoples  naturally  conserva- 
tive in  trade  relations  and  inclined  to  continue 
the  old,  satisfactory  business  connections,  and 
fortified  by  a  financial  organization  so  elaborate 
and  formidable  as  to  discourage  attack. 

The  most  baffling  element  in  the  situation  for 
the  United  States  has  been  that  even  those  South 
American  commodities  in  demand  in  this  coun- 
try (such  as  Brazil's  coffee)  have  not  paid  for 
our  goods  consumed  in  South  America,  but, 
ironically  enough,  for  the  goods  of  our  foreign 
rivals.  In  her  financial  relations  with  Europe, 
South  America  has  regularly  found  herself  on 
the  debit  side  of  the  ledger,  her  obligations  de- 
pending partly  on  imports  of  European  goods, 
but  considerably,  also,  on  interest  due  on  Eu- 
rope's immense  investments  in  her  securities. 
On  the  other  hand,  her  trade  balance  with  the 
United  States  has  been  as  regularly  favorable 
to  her,  with  no  counter  claims  to  offset  it.  In 
other  words,  she  has  constantly  owed  money 
to  England,  for  example,  and  has  had  money 
due  her  from  the  United  States.  Obviously,  she 
has  used  her  credits  to  pay  her  debts,  and  in- 
stead of  spending  the  money  we  have  owed  her 


140  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

in  this  country  for  United  States  goods,  she  has 
handed  it  over  to  England  in  discharge  of  obli- 
gations to  her.  This  triangle  of  trade,  as  one 
writer  has  called  it,  "operates  effectively  to 
siphon  gold  from  this  country,  and  by  this 
method  the  more  we  buy  the  more  we  add  to  the 
selling  power  of  our  competitors. ' ' 

The  greatest  asset  which  European  exporters 
have  had  in  their  battle  for  America's  trade  has 
been  their  banking  system,  and  its  effectiveness 
appears  the  more  by  comparison  with  the  primi- 
tive methods  which  have  obtained  until  recently 
in  this  country.  Of  this  system,  the  keystone 
is  the  bill  of  exchange  on  London.  This  bill, 
drawn,  of  course,  in  pounds  sterling,  has  be- 
come the  currency  of  the  world.  The  ready  de- 
mand for  it  everywhere,  based  on  England's 
supremacy  as  the  centre  of  the  world's  wealth 
and  as  the  greatest  buyer  and  seller,  as  well  as 
the  greatest  lender  of  surplus  capital,  has  made 
it  the  medium  of  international  exchange,  the 
cheapest  and  most  marketable  commercial  paper 
in  existence,  "preferred  to  gold  because  trans- 
ferable with  greater  rapidity,  less  risk  and 
loss."  Thus  a  merchant  in  the  United  States, 
owing  an  Argentine  exporting  house  for  a  ship- 
ment of  goods,  has  liquidated  his  indebtedness 
by  a  bill  on  London  and  has  been  under  the 
necessity  of  paying  tribute  to  English  banks  in 
the  form  of  commissions  and  exchange.  "Mil- 
lions of  bags  of  coffee  imported  into  the  United 
States  annually  pay  a  toll  of  five  to  six  cents 
a  bag  in  commissions  on  drafts." 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  141 

A  constant  difficulty  in  selling  to  South  Amer- 
ican merchants  has  been  their  demand  for  long 
term  credits.  They  have  an  excellent  reputa- 
tion for  conscientiousness  and  reliability,  but 
they  do  business  under  conditions  which  make 
it  impossible  for  them  to  discharge  their  obliga- 
tions with  the  promptness  to  which  merchants 
in  the  United  States  have  been  accustomed. 
Capital  is  not  as  plentiful  in  South  as  in  North 
America.  Many  of  the  customers  are  poor  na- 
tives whose  purchasing  power  is  slight  and  who 
depend  on  the  merchants  to. carry  accounts  for 
them  in  anticipation  of  their  crops,  which  must 
be  harvested  before  they  can  pay.  The  high 
duties  and  freight  charges  on  shipments  to 
South  America  often  compel  importers  to  buy 
goods  in  larger  quantities  than  they  can  dispose 
of  promptly  and  to  carry  them  for  long  periods, 
thus  tying  up  their  money  in  stock  on  hand. 

European  business  has  met  these  conditions 
in  two  ways.  In  the  first  place,  branches  of  the 
big  British  and  German  banks  located  in  the 
principal  South  American  cities,  with  the  rev- 
enues of  the  parent  banks  behind  them,  have 
been  able  to  grant  the  desired  credits  at  lucra- 
tive rates  of  interest  to  local  firms  purchasing 
of  British  and  German  merchants,  whose  stand- 
ing they  have  investigated  and  found  satisfac- 
tory. Until  the  passage  of  the  Federal  Reserve 
act  in  1913,  our  banks  were  not  permitted  to 
establish  foreign  branches,  and  our  exporters 
were  compelled  to  take  the  entire  burden  of 
credit  on  their  own  shoulders. 


142  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Another  handicap  enjoyed  by  Europeans  has 
been  the  use  of  acceptances.  By  this  device,  a 
British  exporter  who  had  sold  goods  in  South 
America  might  draw  upon  his  South  American 
customer  at  any  number  of  days  sight,  forward- 
ing his  draft  with  the  shipping  documents  (bill 
of  lading,  etc.)  to  a  British  branch  bank  in  the 
consignee's  locality.  Upon  acceptance  (i.e.,  en- 
dorsement) of  the  draft  by  the  latter,  who  thus 
bound  himself  to  honor  it  at  maturity,  the  bill 
of  lading  was  delivered  to  him,  enabling  him 
to  secure  the  goods.  The  draft  was  sold  in  the 
market  and,  when  it  matured,  was  paid  by  the 
consignee.  Meanwhile,  the  exporter  had  re- 
ceived his  money  at  once  from  the  central  bank, 
and  everybody  was  happy.  The  enormous  ad- 
vantage possessed  by  a  manufacturer  who  could 
command  such  resources  in  dealing  with  coun- 
tries where  credit  is  king  measures  the  differ- 
ence between  a  British  or  German  merchant  and 
an  American  before  the  Federal  Reserve  act 
legalized  the  discounting  of  acceptances  by 
American  banks. 

In  fact,  until  the  great  war  brought  the  na- 
tions of  the  world  to  our  doors,  gold  bags  in 
hand,  competing  with  one  another  for  the  privi- 
lege of  purchasing  our  wares  at  our  own  prices, 
it  could  hardly  be  said  that  we  had  more  than 
a  superficial  acquaintance  with  the  science  of 
foreign  trade.  Let  business  be  poor  at  home 
and  our  manufacturers  unable  to  dispose  of 
their  products  to  our  own  citizens,  and  a  tem- 
porary and  somewhat  bewildered  plunge  into 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  143 

the  foreign  market  might  be  made  to  tide  over 
the  situation,  but,  with  the  return  of  better 
times,  the  extended  hand  has  usually  been  with- 
drawn, old  connections  resumed  and  the  disap-» 
pointed  new  customer  left  to  exercise  his 
vocabulary  at  the  expense  of  American  busi- 
ness methods  and  to  form  emphatic  resolutions 
for  the  future  with  ''never  again!"  as  their 
major  theme.  True,  our  shipments  abroad  have 
been  far  from  contemptible,  but  hitherto  a  large 
proportion  of  them  has  consisted  of  natural 
products  that  practically  sold  themselves  and 
of  articles  manufactured  by  great  corporations 
having  the  resources  to  create  new  markets. 

While  our  money  was  finding  profitable  em- 
ployment at  home,  Europeans  were  building  up 
gigantic,  intricately  organized  agencies  for  buy- 
ing, selling  and  carrying  the  commodities  in 
which  they  were  dealing,  calculated  to  discour- 
age the  enterprising  American  entrepreneur, 
not  only  by  preoccupation  of  the  territory  and 
by  their  very  vastness,  but  also  because,  under 
their  laws,  they  were  able  to  combine  with  one 
another  for  increased  efficiency  and  power  and 
to  rely  upon  the  active  support  of  great  systems 
of  banks  equipped  with  foreign  branches  and 
of  their  governments  as  well  to  provide  them 
with  every  possible  resource  in  the  struggle  for 
trade  supremacy. 

England,  perennial  reservoir  of  surplus  cap- 
ital and  pioneer  among  manufacturing  nations, 
has  long  been  the  giant  in  the  foreign  field,  but, 
in  the  years  preceding  the  war,  it  was  the  phe- 


144  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

nomenal  rise  of  Germany  that  astonished  the 
world.  Everybody  knows  the  story  of  the  car- 
tels, those  vast  unions  of  manufacturing  inter- 
ests which  have  determined  the  character  of 
German  industrial  life,  forcing  down  the  prices 
of  raw  products  which  they  require  by  playing 
off  rival  producers  against  each  other,  raising 
the  cost  of  their  goods  at  home  at  their  own 
sweet  will,  and  crushing  competition  abroad  by 
selling  at  a  lower  price  in  Buenos  Aires  or  Rio 
de  Janeiro  than  the  buyer  in  Berlin  pays  for 
the  same  article,  protected  from  assault  from 
without  by  high  tariff  walls  and  preferential 
rates  on  railroads,  and  rendering  emulation 
more  hopeless  by  agreements  with  steamship 
lines  regarding  freight  rates,  routes  and  space 
for  cargoes. 

It  is  not  only  that  these  monsters  of  coordi- 
nated efficiency  have  squatted  defiantly  before 
the  golden  fleece  of  American  commerce,  but 
Jason,  in  the  person  of  the  ambitious  competitor 
from  the  United  States,  has  had  no  suitable 
weapon  with  which  to  dislodge  them.  It  was 
torn  from  his  hand  before  he  had  sought  to  use 
it  when,  in  1890,  our  Congress,  responding  to 
the  public  hostility  to  the  great  trusts — similar 
monsters  native  to  our  own  soil,  which  were  be- 
lieved to  be  crushing  freedom  of  competition  in 
American  business — forbade,  by  the  Sherman 
act,  combinations  in  restraint  of  trade  not  only 
among  the  several  States  but  with  foreign  na- 
tions as  well.  Perhaps,  as  has  been  sometimes 
asserted,  the  legislators  who  framed  this  im- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  145 

portant  measure  did  not  intend  it  to  operate  to 
render  American  exporters,  who  refrained  from 
illegal  combinations  at  home,  powerless  to  meet 
their  foreign  rivals  abroad  with  their  own 
weapons;  but  probable  intent  is  hardly  a  de- 
pendable argument  before  a  court  of  law,  the 
plain  wording  of  the  act  has  remained  to  stare 
our  exporters  in  the  face  and  the  potentialities 
of  the  cartels  have  gone  far  toward  reducing 
them  to  a  philosophical  resignation. 

An  American  business  man,  experienced  in 
the  foreign  field,  has  given  convincing  testimony 
to  the  cartels'  efficiency.  There  are  in  Ger- 
many, he  estimates,  thirty  thousand  associations 
of  one  sort  or  another,  dealing  with  foreign 
trade  alone.  These  are  frequently  "subsidiary 
creations  of  great  financial  institutions  which 
dictate  their  general  policies  and  cause  them 
closely  to  conform  to  those  of  the  Government. 
In  turn  the  community  of  interest  of  these  in- 
stitutions greatly  strengthens  the  position  of 
the  industrial  system  of  the  German  Empire 
and  makes  their  constituent  members  most  ef- 
fective factors  in  securing  business  abroad. 
Two  powerful  banking  groups  dominate  and 
direct  the  operations  of  practically  all  large 
corporations,  such  as  steamship  lines,  shipbuild- 
ing plants,  mines  and  steel  works,  arms  and 
ammunition  works,  electrical  manufactories, 
electro-chemical  establishments,  etc.  This  net- 
work of  connections  between  German  financial 
interests  and  German  industries  has  ramifica- 
tions which  extend  throughout  the  world.    So, 


146  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

for  example,  we  find  in  the  chief  cities  of  the 
Argentine  and  Chile  railway,  lighting  and  power 
enterprises,  financed  by  German  banks,  large 
shareholders  in  the  corporations  which  have 
supplied  all  the  materials  of  construction. ' ' 

Not  only  have  we  lacked  the  banking  facilities 
and  cooperative  organization  on  which  our 
rivals  in  trade  have  relied ;  we  have  lacked  also 
American  bottoms  in  which  to  transport  our 
goods.  Our  merchant  marine  was,  from  various 
economic  reasons,  practically  driven  from  the 
seas  in  the  1850s.  Since  then  our  supply  of  ship- 
ping for  foreign  trade  has  been  relatively  nil  and 
we  have  been  compelled  to  rely  largely  on  the 
service  that  European  carriers  have  been  willing 
to  allow  us  for  our  Latin  American  trade.  While 
it  appears  that  this  service  has  been,  on  the 
whole,  adequate  to  the  trade,  and  that  American 
shippers  have  not  been  systematically  mulcted 
in  freight  rates,  as  has  sometimes  been  alleged, 
the  explanation  may  lie  in  the  fact  that,  until 
recently,  American  competition  has  been  too  in- 
significant to  disturb  European  serenity.  Now 
that  it  has  become  a  potent  factor  in  the  field, 
it  is  a  bit  disquieting  to  reflect  that,  when  peace 
is  concluded,  it  may  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  great 
government  subsidized  European  lines  which 
in  the  past  have  controlled  the  foreign  carrying 
business  by  means  of  categorical  agreements 
known  as  "conferences"  in  which  English,  Ger- 
man and  other  companies  have  joined,  dividing 
the  territory  among  themselves,  fixing  rates  of 
transportation,  pooling  their  earnings  and  ad- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  147 

ministering  a  system  of  rebates  to  crush  inter- 
lopers. Under  the  rebate  arrangement,  a  South 
American  exporter  who  signs  and  observes  an 
annual  contract  to  send  all  his  goods  by  the 
conference  line  is  entitled,  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  to  a  rebate  of  ten  per  cent,  on  his  ship- 
ments. What  makes  the  conference  most  for- 
midable to  American  competition  is  the  fact  that 
the  South  American  shipper  must  depend  upon 
it  for  his  shipments  to  Europe  as  well  as  to  the 
United  States  and  realizes  that  a  single  cargo 
forwarded  to  New  York  in  an  American 
freighter  will  deprive  him  of  both  his  European 
and  American  rebates  for  the  year  and  may 
permanently  lose  him  the  use  of  conference  bot- 
toms. Consequently,  to  have  any  chance  of  suc- 
cess in  a  battle  with  the  conference  for  the  South 
American  carrying  trade,  projected  American 
lines  would  be  under  the  necessity  of  maintain- 
ing European  as  well  as  American  connections 
and  routes,  in  the  face  of  rivals  already  firmly 
established,  assured  of  the  support  of  their 
governments  in  the  form  of  subsidies  and  other 
perquisites,  and  of  carrying  into  the  contest  im- 
pedimenta in  the  form  of  higher  cost  of  ships 
built  in  this  country,  unintelligent  restrictions 
placed  on  shipping  by  Congress  and  an  attitude 
toward  our  merchant  marine  on  the  part  of  the 
American  people  which,  for  charity's  sake,  may 
be  described  as  indifference. 

One  could  go  on  indefinitely  multiplying  more 
or  less  familiar  explanations  of  our  failure  in 
the  contest  for  the  South  American  field:  lack 


148  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  cooperation  between  the  Government  and 
business;  the  disinclination  of  our  merchants, 
whose  experience  and  success  have  been  gained 
at  home,  to  take  the  trouble  to  understand  and 
adapt  themselves  to  the  business  methods,  needs 
and  etiquette  of  a  people  whose  conditions  of 
life  and  point  of  view  differ  markedly  from  their 
own ;  American  ignorance  of  the  geography,  his- 
tory and  institutions  of  the  southern  continent ; 
a  fatal  disposition  to  patronize  and  urge  rather 
than  to  fraternize  and  persuade;  a  dearth  of 
high  grade  salesmen  possessing  the  social  adapt- 
ability, culture  and  savoir  faire  so  important  to 
the  Latin,  and  conversant  with  the  languages 
of  the  countries  to  which  they  are  sent;  and, 
finally,  the  absence  of  any  considerable  number 
of  immigrants  from  the  United  States  to  create 
a  demand  for  our  goods.  It  will,  however,  be 
more  profitable  and  stimulating  to  inquire  what 
Uncle  Sam  has  done  to  atone  for  his  past  sins 
of  omission  and  to  measure  up  to  the  superb 
opportunities  for  new  friendships,  new  markets, 
increased  helpfulness  and  enhanced  profits 
which  the  great  war  has  created  for  him. 

On  the  whole,  the  record  is  one  to  make  us 
proud  of  the  breadth  of  view,  efficiency  and 
adaptability  of  our  people.  In  estimating  it,  we 
must  remember  that  economically  the  war  has 
been  the  greatest  disturbance  in  history  and 
that,  excepting  the  belligerents  who  have  been 
actually  overwhelmed  by  the  military  forces  of 
their  enemies,  no  nations  were  more  immedi- 
ately hurt  by  it  than  those  of  South  America. 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  149 

Here  were  partially  developed  and  dependent 
countries  suddenly  deprived  not  only  of  a  large 
part  of  the  manufactured  commodities,  neces- 
saries as  well  as  luxuries,  on  which  they  had 
been  accustomed  to  rely  (Germany  alone  had 
furnished  them  with  about  twenty  per  cent,  of 
their  imports,  and  figures  do  not  begin  to  tell 
the  whole  story,  because  in  many  cheap  and  im- 
portant articles  of  daily  use,  especially  by  the 
poorer  classes,  German  goods  commanded  prac- 
tically the  entire  market),  while  at  the  same 
time  the  European  demand  for  their  natural 
products  decreased  so  greatly  as  to  diminish 
their  purchasing  power  to  the  point  where 
fundamental  readjustments  in  habits  of  life 
were  demanded;  the  ships  on  which  they  had 
depended  for  carrying  their  exports  and  im- 
ports ceased  to  visit  their  harbors;  the  vast 
sums  which  had  come  almost  unsought  from 
Europe  for  investment  in  their  public  and  pri- 
vate enterprises  were  now  absorbed  at  home, 
necessitating  the  suspension  or  abandonment 
of  wealth  producing  development  projects ;  and 
the  resources  of  credit  which  had  been  an  un- 
failing antidote  for  their  lack  of  capital  were 
cut  off  almost  without  warning.  The  whole  con- 
tinent passed  through  a  crisis  which  varied  in 
intensity  in  the  several  countries  in  accordance 
with  the  closeness  of  their  reliance  on  Europe 
and  with  the  soundness  of  their  financial  insti- 
tutions; and  while  the  allied  nations,  notably 
England,  showed  an  admirable  fidelity  to  their 
South  American  connections  and  an  extraordi- 


150  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

nary  ability,  under  the  circumstances,  to  con- 
tinue their  trade  relations  at  something  like 
their  normal  level,  it  was  the  United  States  that 
saved  the  situation. 

The  record  appears  in  a  nutshell  in  the  ac- 
companying table,  the  export  figures  affording 
striking  evidence  of  South  America's  slump  in 
purchasing  capacity  in  the  early  period  of  the 
war  and  her  subsequent  recovery  as  she  ad- 
justed herself  to  the  new  conditions. 

Trade  of  the  United  States. 
Imports. 
Country  1913  1914  1915  1916 

Argentina.  $  25,576,000  $  56,274,000  $  94,678,000  $116,293,000 


Bolivia. . . 

398 

172 

33,000 

209,000 

Brazil .... 

100,948,000 

95,001,000 

120,099,000 

132,067,000 

Chile 

29,554,000 

24,239,000 

37,284,000 

82,124,000 

Colombia. . 

15,714,000 

17,548,000 

19,820,000 

25,645,000 

Ecuador. . 

3,453,000 

3,356,000 

5,417,000 

7,976,000 

Guiana,  B. 

98,000 

223,000 

266,000 

1,065,000 

Guiana,  D. 

813,000 

1,035,000 

624,000 

1,075,000 

Guiana,  F. 

32,000 

47,000 

34,000 

Paraguay . 

67,000 

61,000 

29,000 

51,000 

10,825,000 

11,270,000 

15,804,000 

31,083,000 

Uruguay. . 

1,861,000 

9,597,000 

13,889,000 

16,277,000 

Venezuela. 

9,309,000 

10,917,000 
$229,520,000 

14,292,000 

13,711,000 

Total. . . 

$198,259,000 

$322,282,000 

$427,610,000 

Exports. 

1913 

1914 

1915 

1916 

Argentina.  $  54,980,000 

$27,128,000 

$  52,841,000 

$  76,874,000 

Bolivia. . . 

960,000 

806,000 

964,000 

1,888,000 

Brazil .... 

39,901,000 

23,276,000 

33,953,000 

47,679,000 

Chile 

16,617,000 

13,628,000 

17,816,000 

33,383,000 

Colombia. . 

7,647,000 

5,784,000 

9,004,000 

14,287,000 

Ecuador. . 

2,882,000 

2,504,000 

3,368,000 

5,005,000 

Guiana,  B. 

1,630,000 

1,813,000 

1,908,000 

2,544,000 

Guiana,  D. 

732,000 

655,000 

587,000 

861,000 

Guiana,  F. 

319,000 

282,000 

535,000 

493,000 

Paraguay . 

215,000 

83,000 

53,000 

86,000 

Peru 

7,609,000 

5,876,000 

7,917,000 

13,986,000 

Uruguay. . 

7,617,000 

4,153,000 

7,889,000 

11,851,000 

Venezuela. 

5,462,000 

5,024,000 

7,295,000 
$144,129,000 

11,337,000 

Total... 

$146,515,000 

$91,013,000 

$220,288,000 

THE  TWO  AMERICAS  151 

Figures  are  usually  dry  reading,  but  these  are 
not  without  romance,  and  when  one  considers 
the  chaos  produced  in  South  America  by  the 
war,  they  take  on  an  added  glamor.  Complete 
statistics  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30, 
1917,  are  not  yet  available,  but  those  for  the  first 
nine  months  are  inspiring  testimony  that  our 
campaign  gains  in  momentum  as  Latin  America 
recovers  her  equilibrium.  Between  July  1, 
1916,  and  March  31,  1917,  we  exchanged  with 
her  $1,070,000,000  in  commodities  (U.  S.  exports, 
$420,000,000;  imports,  $650,000,000),  as  com- 
pared with  $798,000,000  (exports,  $294,000,000; 
imports,  $504,000,000)  for  the  same  period  in 
1916  and  $554,000,000  in  1914,  the  last  year  of 
peace.  An  expert  estimates  that,  if  the  last 
three  months  of  the  recent  fiscal  year  hold  their 
normal  relation  to  the  others,  our  Latin  Amer- 
ican trade  will  aggregate  $1,500,000,000,  or 
nearly  three  times  what  it  was  in  the  year  be- 
fore the  war.  Most  of  this  increase  means  new 
business  with  South  America,  to  which  we  sup- 
plied thirty-three  per  cent,  of  her  imports  in 
1916  as  compared  with  fifteen  per  cent,  before 
the  war.  Percentages  are  far  more  significant 
than  aggregates  in  dollars,  for,  of  course,  soar- 
ing war  prices  account  for  a  good  part  of  the 
increase  in  the  latter. 

What,  now,  of  the  time  when  the  war  shall 
be  over?  Shall  we  be  able  to  retain  the  enviable 
position  into  which  the  embarrassments  of 
Europe  have  thrust  us,  shall  we  hold  and  im- 
prove our  advantages  as  growing  Latin  Amer- 


152  THE  WOBLD  PERIL 

ica's  business  associate,  customer  and  backer 
and  establish  permanently  the  foundations  of 
Pan-American  economic  solidarity  and  self-suf- 
ficiency, or  will  our  rivals,  entering  the  field  of 
their  former  victories  with  greater  determina- 
tion than  ever,  succeed  in  ignominiously  expel- 
ling us? 

Certainly  there  is  no  lack  of  indications  that 
we  are  not  to  maintain  our  ground  without  a 
struggle.  Experts  have  pointed  out  that,  since 
the  war  began,  England  has  made  greater 
strides  in  industrial  efficiency  than  in  fifteen  or 
twenty-five  years  previously;  that,  as  regards 
her  South  American  trade,  despite  the  tremen- 
dous demands  on  her  wealth  and  her  productive 
agencies,  the  diversion  of  her  ships  from  their 
accustomed  uses  and  the  menace  of  the  sub- 
marines, she  has  now  been  able  to  bring  her 
exports  close  to  ante-bellum  figures;  and  that, 
when  peace  is  declared,  far  from  abdicating  her 
sovereignty  over  the  world's  trade,  she  will  ap- 
pear in  the  lists  rearmed,  rejuvenated  and  more 
formidable  than  ever. 

Germany's  attitude  finds  characteristic  ex- 
pression in  a  recent  pamphlet  by  Dr.  Paul  Gast 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which  is  of  peculiar  interest 
as  indicating  how  slowly  Teutonic  obsessions 
yield  to  the  logic  of  events: 

"It  is  in  our  interest  to  further  this  anti- 
Yankee  spirit  [in  South  America],  for  under 
no  circumstances  can  we  tolerate  a  political  pre- 
dominance of  the  United  States  in  this  virgin 
economic  soil.  .  .  .  Even  this  war,  and  our  justi- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  153 

fled  hatred  of  the  Entente  Powers,  must  not 
blind  us  to  the  fact  that  Germany's  greatest 
danger  in  South  America,  so  indispensable  for 
our  economic  future,  is  not  symbolized  by  the 
Union  Jack,  but  by  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  .  .  . 
Happily,  the  commercial  beverage  offered  to  the 
South  Americans  by  the  Yankee  does  not  agree 
with  their  stomachs.  It  is  not  only  the  bitter 
Panama  and  Mexico  after-taste  which  spoiled 
the  digestion.  The  Yankee's  prices  are  high, 
he  insists  on  cash  on  delivery,  and,  what  is  of 
still  more  importance,  he  cannot  adapt  himself, 
as  we  Germans  do,  to  the  idiosyncrasies  of  the 
foreign  customer.  If  Uncle  Sam  really  wants 
to  dislodge  us  from  our  solid  positions  there,  he 
will  have  to  use  persistent  trench  warfare  in- 
stead of  old  time  cavalry  attacks;  not  weeks 
and  months,  but  decades  are  necessary  to  smash 
to  pieces  our  cemented  industrial  dugouts.  .  .  . 
We  wish  to  impress  upon  the  world  at  large, 
and  the  United  States  in  particular,  that  Ger- 
many, this  world  Power,  with  its  dense  popula- 
tion, its  eagerness  for  work,  its  financial 
strength,  carries  on  this  bloody  war  unflinch- 
ingly, because  it  is  borne  on  by  the  inspiring 
knowledge  that  it  is  its  duty  to  create  for  its 
future  generations  a  free  field  for  a  world  em- 
bracing activity,  and  that,  consequently,  it  can- 
not suffer  it  that  the  countries  of  Latin  America, 
one-seventh  of  the  earth's  surface,  with  their 
natural  treasures  and  progressive  population, 
be  closed  to  the  influence  of  the  German  spirit, 
of  German  labor.    We  insist  upon  fair  play  in 


154  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

the  South  American  field,  not  for  nebulous  pur- 
poses, but  for  the  sake  of  our  own  well  under- 
stood future." 

A  French  writer  tells  of  such  recent  develop- 
ments as  the  formation  of  a  "Hispano-Germanic 
Society"  to  facilitate  relations  between  German 
and  Spanish  speaking  peoples,  of  an  "Economic 
Committee"  and  of  various  other  societies  to 
resume  and  develop  German-American  social 
and  business  connections,  and  the  energetic  use 
of  the  press  in  German  interests.  Moreover, 
the  disconcerting  activity  of  Japan  in  develop- 
ing new  ship  lines  and  in  greatly  increasing  her 
emigration  to  South  America  introduces  an 
added  complication  into  an  already  perplexing 
problem. 

But,  whatever  the  final  outcome,  it  is  safe  to 
predict  that  the  United  States  will  never  again 
be  relegated  to  the  position  in  South  American 
trade  which  she  occupied  three  years  ago,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  our  business  men  and 
our  Government  have  not  been  content  merely 
to  picnic  upon  the  new  ground,  but  have  pro- 
ceeded to  fortify  themselves  so  effectively  that 
much  of  it,  at  least,  is  bound  to  remain  perma- 
nently in  their  possession.  In  fact,  it  is  not  fair 
to  them  to  intimate  that  they  waited  until  the 
upheaval  in  Europe  did  their  foundation  work 
for  them,  for,  before  that  event,  an  intelligent 
beginning  had  been  made.  Still,  one  needs  only 
mention  that  the  American  Manufacturers ' 
Export  Association  and  the  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce  of  the   United   States,   our  nationwide 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  155 

conferences  of  business  interests,  devoted  to 
the  study  of  problems  of  trade  and  the  educa- 
tion of  Congress  and  the  country  to  its  needs, 
are  but  some  six  years  old ;  that  the  Department 
of  Commerce  at  Washington,  our  governmental 
auxiliary  to  private  enterprise,  first  appeared 
as  a  separate  executive  bureau  in  1913 ;  and  that 
the  National  Foreign  Trade  Council,  a  com- 
mittee of  our  ablest  business  men  pledged  to 
the  promotion  of  "greater  national  prosperity 
through  greater  foreign  trade,"  and  particu- 
larly of  the  welfare  of  the  small  manufacturer, 
antedates  the  war  by  only  three  months,  to  sug- 
gest how  lately  American  business  has  suffi- 
ciently appreciated  the  importance  of  coopera- 
tive effort  to  take  the  trouble  to  practice  it. 
Local  enterprise  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with 
the  larger  organizations,  and  the  early  months 
of  the  war  were  characterized  by  the  formation 
or  rejuvenation  of  merchants'  and  manufactur- 
ers' organizations  and  of  "get  together"  meas- 
ures of  every  description,  with  Latin  America 
for  their  field  of  operation.  One  of  our  big 
express  companies,  sending  representatives  to 
South  America  to  study  opportunities  for  its 
own  business,  offered  the  services  of  these  ex- 
perts to  investigate  openings  for  its  patrons, 
and  promptly  received  seven  hundred  letters 
bespeaking  the  proffered  aid. 

Of  all  the  harbingers  of  happier  days  for 
inter-American  trade,  none  has  brought  more 
satisfaction  to  our  exporters  than  two  sections 
in  the  Federal  Reserve  act,  the  first  authorizing 


156  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

national  banking  institutions  with  a  capital  of 
$1,000,000  or  more  to  establish  branch  banks 
abroad,  the  other  permitting  branch  banks, 
under  certain  restrictions,  to  discount  accept- 
ances based  on  the  importation  or  exportation 
of  goods.  In  signing  this  bill,  the  President 
swept  away  with  a  stroke  of  his  pen  some  of 
the  most  formidable  obstructions  that  have 
seemed  completely  to  block  the  path  of  our  com- 
merce. It  is  enough  to  distinguish  the  act  that 
it  destroys,  once  for  all,  the  absolute  sway  in 
international  trade  of  the  bill  on  London,  and 
with  it  the  tribute  exacted  from  us  by  English 
financiers.  Henceforth,  branches  of  powerful 
United  States  banks  located  in  Latin  America 
can  sell  drafts  on  their  head  institutions  in  dol- 
lars instead  of  in  pounds  sterling,  and  since 
these  will  save  the  extra  interest  and  commis- 
sions charged  on  foreign  bills,  they  will  be 
cheapest  for  American  business.  The  bill  on 
London  is  firmly  intrenched  in  the  world 's  mar- 
kets and  there  is  no  expectation  of  ousting  it, 
but  there  is  every  indication  that,  with  the  ap- 
pearance of  our  banks  in  foreign  fields  and  the 
expansion  of  our  trading  relations,  dollar  ex- 
change will  supplant  sterling  exchange  in  inter- 
American  transactions.  Moreover,  in  times  of 
stress  like  the  present,  when  sterling  exchange 
is  disorganized,  the  dollar  may  well  provide  the 
ballast  to  keep  the  ship  of  world  finance  on  an 
even  keel. 

That  the  promotion  of  dollar  exchange  will 
be  but  one  of  the  many  advantages  we  may  ex- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  157 

peot  from  our  branch  banks  in  Latin  America 
is  manifest  from  an  interesting  statement  by 
Mr.  James  H.  Perkins,  Vice-President  of  the 
National  City  Bank  of  New  York  (the  first 
American  bank  to  take  advantage  of  the  new 
opportunities  for  profit  and  patriotic  service 
created  by  the  Federal  Reserve  act,  and  now 
maintaining  branches  in  Buenos  Aires,  Monte- 
video, Bahia,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Santos,  Sao  Paulo, 
Valparaiso  and  Havana),  in  an  article  in  the 
World's  Work.  He  speaks  thus  of  the  activ- 
ities of  his  institution: 

"The  bank  will  furnish  the  facilities  which 
are  generally  supplied  by  branch  banks  every- 
where; that  is,  they  will  accept  deposits,  issue 
letters  of  credit,  handle  collections  and  deal  in 
exchange.  The  operations  of  the  branches  will 
create  a  market  for  the  American  dollar  with 
the  result  that  gradually  direct  exchange  will 
become  a  fact  between  South  America  and  the 
United  States.  Under  the  Federal  Reserve  Act, 
national  banks  may  make  acceptance  of  long 
time  bills  growing  out  of  foreign  commercial 
transactions.  This  provision  creates  an  oppor- 
tunity for  an  American  bill  to  be  developed 
similar  to  the  best  known  financial  instrument, 
the  London  bill,  which  is  now  the  chief  medium 
in  the  world's  commerce.  The  'bill'  is  now  a 
'sterling'  instrument.  It  will  be  possible  under 
the  new  order  to  draw  an  increasing  number  of 
such  bills  in  dollars  instead  of  pounds,  and  the 
world  market  for  the  dollar  should  be  enlarged 
to  a  point  where  it  will  take  a  prominent  place 


158  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

in  international  exchange.  Direct  transfers  by 
cable  of  funds  from  the  branch  to  the  parent 
bank,  or  from  the  parent  bank  to  any  bank  in 
the  United  States  and  vice  versa,  will  become 
possible  with  the  minimum  of  expense.  Grad- 
ually a  broad  discount  market  for  American 
bills  will  be  developed  and  will  undoubtedly  go 
a  long  way  toward  encouraging  the  use  of  the 
draft  on  New  York  instead  of  on  London  in 
settlement  of  international  transactions. 

' '  The  gathering  of  credit  information  will  be 
one  of  the  most  important  functions  of  the  bank. 
As  rapidly  as  possible  the  branches  will  collect 
reliable  credit  information  concerning  South 
American  business  and  will  at  the  same  time 
be  in  a  position  to  give  the  South  American  busi- 
ness people  correct  credit  information  about  the 
people  with  whom  they  have  transactions  in  the 
United  States.  .  .  . 

' '  There  will  be  attached  to  each  branch  one  or 
more  commercial  representatives,  who  in  a 
broad  sense  may  be  said  to  be  the  personal  rep- 
resentatives of  American  business  interests. 
These  men  will  study  trade  conditions  in  the 
country  to  which  they  are  assigned  and  will 
form  cooperative  relations  with  the  foreign 
business  men  who  are  interested  in  the  com- 
merce of  this  country.  They  will  thus  be  in  a 
position  to  act  as  intermediaries  and  will  be 
able  to  assist  the  representatives  of  American 
business  interests  who  visit  South  America. 
They  will  look  for  trade  opportunities  and  when 
such  opportunities  arise  will  communicate  with 


THE  TWO  AMEEICAS  159 

the  foreign  trade  department  of  the  bank,  which 
will  be  in  a  position  to  indicate  these  oppor- 
tunities to  the  interested  business  organizations 
here.  They  will,  furthermore,  be  in  a  position 
to  make  investigation  of  the  possibilities  for 
particular  articles  in  the  market,  and,  when  an 
exhaustive  investigation  along  some  technical 
line  is  required,  to  employ  a  technical  repre- 
sentative who  will  be  competent  and  reliable. 
Many  firms  have  already  asked  that  preliminary 
investigations  of  this  kind  be  made,  and  in  nu- 
merous instances  requests  have  been  made  that 
the  representatives  purchase  various  articles  in 
the  original  package  to  be  sent  to  the  American 
manufacturer  so  that  he  may  not  only  ascertain 
the  character  and  quality  of  the  article  but  the 
way  the  article  is  prepared  for  market,  packed, 
labelled,  etc.  The  commercial  representative 
will  also  be  able  to  give  information  regarding 
refused  shipments,  custom  house  delays,  etc., 
and  in  other  ways  will  be  of  assistance  in 
smoothing  out  difficulties  that  are  encountered 
by  the  exporter.' ' 

The  National  City  Bank  also  maintains  a  val- 
uable library  of  trade  statistics,  government  re- 
ports and  general  literature  useful  to  exporters, 
issues  frequent  summaries  of  the  latest  news 
from  the  South  American  field,  publishes  and 
distributes  gratis  an  excellent  monthly  maga- 
zine, The  Americas,  and,  in  cooperation  with 
leading  educational  institutions,  is  preparing 
selected  young  men  by  a  thorough  and  sys- 
tematic business  education  for  positions  in  its 
foreign  departments. 


160  THE  WOELD  PEEIL 

Entirely  aside  from  mere  considerations  of 
dollars  and  cents,  one  would  search  far  to  find 
a  business  organization  administered  with  loftier 
imagination,  greater  constructive  ability  and  a 
more  profound  conception  of  public  service  than 
this.  Other  American  banking  and  mercantile 
houses  have  followed  the  shining  example,  and 
with  encouraging  success,  although  it  was  well 
understood  at  the  start  that  big  returns  from 
South  America  could  not  be  expected  immedi- 
ately and  that  establishments  there  were  in  the 
nature  of  bread  cast  upon  the  waters.  They  are 
a  new  generation  of  American  pioneers,  opening 
new  regions  for  fresh  achievements  of  Amer- 
ican genius.  Business  follows  them  into  the 
channels  they  have  explored,  and  its  triumphs 
will  constitute  their  reward  and  their  monu- 
ment. 

Among  the  most  important  services  to  be  ren- 
dered by  our  banks  and  business  establishments 
in  South  America  will  be  that  of  opening  the 
door  for  the  investment  of  our  capital  in  those 
countries.  Here,  again,  the  war  has  provided 
the  stimulus.  Not  only  has  the  usual  supply  of 
European  money  been  cut  off  from  them,  not 
only  have  the  governmental  and  private  projects 
necessary  to  their  progress  been  brought  to  a 
halt,  not  only  have  they  turned  to  us  for  help 
in  their  distress,  but  the  warring  nations  them- 
selves, straining  their  resources  to  finance  their 
monster  war  establishments  and  to  discharge 
the  heavy  trade  balance  constantly  mounting  up 
against  them  through  their  purchases  of  our 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  161 

manufactures  and  foodstuffs,  first  dumped  their 
holdings  of  our  own  stock  and  bonds  back  upon 
us  and,  after  we  absorbed  these,  have  followed 
them  with  South  American  securities.  Thus 
Europe  herself  is  thrusting  us  into  her  place  as 
guarantor  of  South  America's  prosperity,  and 
it  has  only  remained  for  us  to  adapt  ourselves 
to  our  new  role. 

That  we  have  not  been  entirely  averse  to  doing 
so  is  suggested  by  a  recent  estimate  that,  by 
the  end  of  July,  1916,  our  investments  in  South 
America  alone  had  risen  from  the  very  few 
millions  ventured  before  the  war  to  between 
$750,000,000  and  $1,000,000,000,  compared  with 
British  interests  totalling  something  less  than 
$4,000,000,000.  This  sum,  a  surprising  showing 
for  a  newcomer  in  the  field,  is  made  up  partly 
of  stocks  and  bonds  turned  over  to  us  by  Europe, 
partly  of  our  own  direct  loans  to  governments 
and  new  purchases  of  securities  and  partly  of 
actual  property  holdings  by  American  interests, 
many  of  them  acquired  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  such,  for  example,  as  the  $3,500,000 
packing  plant  opened  by  Armour  and  Company 
at  La  Plata,  Argentina,  in  1915. 

An  outstanding  milestone  of  progress  is  the 
American  International  Corporation  of  New 
York,  a  1915  creation,  capitalized  at  $50,000,000, 
numbering  among  its  stockholders  many  of  our 
foremost  manufacturers  and  dedicated  to  the 
promotion  of  our  Latin  American  commercial 
relations.  This  remarkable  organization  not 
only  labors  for  the  development  of  inter- Amer- 


162  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

ican  trade,  but  locates  and  investigates  oppor- 
tunities for  new  investments  and  new  business 
and  construction  enterprises  in  the  southern 
countries.  In  connection  with  this  latter  phase 
of  its  activity,  it  maintains  an  expert  engineer- 
ing department  to  look  into  promising  building 
and  development  projects  and  to  advise  inter- 
ested American  companies  regarding  them. 
While  its  primary  object  is  to  assist  American 
business  in  Latin  America  rather  than  to  seek 
advantages  for  itself,  it  is  prepared,  on  occa- 
sion, to  act  directly  and  to  seize  opportunities 
that  might  otherwise  redound  to  the  advantage 
of  our  rivals.  For  example,  it  purchased  the 
fleet  of  the  Pacific  Mail  Company  to  save  our 
west  coat  carrying  trade  from  complete  absorp- 
tion by  Japan.  Recently  it  was  reported  to  have 
taken  the  important  contract  for  the  extension 
of  the  port  of  Buenos  Aires. 

Our  Government,  responding,  doubtless,  to  the 
inspiriting  activity  of  private  enterprises,  has 
ranged  itself  by  their  side  in  the  battle.  With- 
out attempting  to  detail  the  official  agencies  now 
at  the  disposal  of  American  business,  one  may 
mention  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  and  Domestic 
Commerce  of  the  Department  of  Commerce,  with 
its  special  Latin  American  division;  the  Daily 
Consular  and  Trade  Reports,  providing  ex- 
porters with  the  latest  intelligences  from  abroad ; 
and  an  efficient  system,  developed  by  Secretary 
Redfield,  of  regular  commercial  attaches  to  col- 
lect data  and  furnish  advice,  special  agents  to 
travel  wherever  needed  to  study  local  condi- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  163 

tions,  and  offices  in  our  principal  cities,  manned 
by  trained  experts,  to  disseminate  information 
to  interested  parties — all  this  in  addition  to  our 
increasingly  capable  consular  service.  Indeed, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  executive  branch  of  our 
Government  is  employing  every  means  in  its 
power,  under  our  present  laws,  to  give  Amer- 
ican business  the  sort  of  support  which  it  has 
always  had  to  do  without  and  which  its  Euro- 
pean competitors  have  counted  on  as  a  matter 
of  course. 

The  men  who  have  shown  themselves  so  apt 
to  seize  the  chances  which  the  great  war  af- 
forded our  country  have  been  no  less  fertile  in 
constructive  suggestions  for  meeting  the  assault 
upon  our  newly  established  positions  which 
Europe  is  sure  to  make  when  she  is  again  free 
to  do  so.  If,  for  example,  our  commercial  re- 
sources are  not  coordinated  to  match  the  col- 
lective efficiency  of  the  great  European  business 
combinations  such  as  the  German  cartels,  the 
fault  is  not  with  them,  for  the  Webb  bill,  de- 
signed to  facilitate  that  very  result  by  legalizing 
associations  ''entered  into  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  engaging  in  export  trade  and  actually  en- 
gaged solely  in  such  export  trade"  and  agree- 
ments made  by  them,  provided  neither  the 
association  nor  the  agreement  operates  "in  re- 
straint of  trade  within  the  United  States"  or 
"in  restraint  of  the  export  trade  of  any  domes- 
tic competitor,"  is  before  Congress,  projected 
and  indorsed  by  commercial  conventions  and 
organizations  throughout  the  country.      Some 


164  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

opposition  to  it  has  developed,  principally  from 
the  fear  that  powerful  cooperative  instrumen- 
talities, fostered  under  its  cloak,  will  find  a  way 
to  attack  and  stifle  competitors  at  home  and 
bring  back,  in  a  new  guise,  all  the  old  evils  of 
the  trusts  from  which  the  Sherman  act  was  de- 
signed to  emancipate  us ;  but  its  sponsors  point 
to  the  powers  of  our  Federal  Trade  Commission 
as  entirely  adequate  to  detect  such  tendencies 
and  invoke  the  law  against  them. 

The  Webb  bill  does  not,  of  course,  invest  our 
trade  with  the  whole  arsenal  of  weapons  pos- 
sessed by  the  cartels,  but  it  does  at  least  go  as 
far  toward  giving  American  enterprise  a  fight- 
ing chance  as  our  democratic  instincts  will  tol- 
erate, while  at  the  same  time  safeguarding  the 
welfare  of  the  home  consumer,  which  the  Ger- 
man system  has  conspicuously  failed  to  do. 

For  an  American  merchant  marine,  also,  much 
has  been  done.  The  enforced  withdrawal  of 
European  bottoms  from  the  world's  trade 
turned  our  shipyards  into  hives  of  industry. 
The  menace  of  Germany's  submarine  campaign 
to  our  own  security  and  the  future  of  democracy 
brought  us  into  the  war  and  focussed  our  ener- 
gies, governmental  and  private,  upon  the  build- 
ing of  ships.  Congress  passed  laws  removing 
some  of  the  most  obvious  impediments  to  the 
registry  of  ships  under  our  flag  and  created  our 
already  rather  painfully  notorious  Shipping 
Board,  which,  now  that  it  has  been  pared  and 
patted  into  harmony,  may  be  expected  to  give  us 
a  great  fleet  of  steel  or  wooden  vessels  or  both, 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  165 

which  will  be  available,  so  far  as  they  survive 
the  war,  to  support  our  prestige  on  the  seas. 
By  an  ironical  perversion  of  German  dreams, 
her  vast  overseas  commerce  has  ceased  to  be 
and  many  of  her  mightiest  "sea  leviathans" 
have  gone  to  swell  the  resources  of  her  enemies. 
Sic  transit  gloria  maris. 

Experts  say  that  the  time  honored  belief  that 
American  ships  cannot  be  built  to  compete  with 
Europe  on  account  of  the  excessive  cost  of  con- 
struction in  this  country  has  become  a  mere 
bugaboo.  Already  we  are  able  to  produce  the 
necessary  materials,  such  as  ship  plates  and 
shapes,  more  cheaply  than  Europe,  and  the  high 
wages  paid  to  American  labor,  though  a  severe 
handicap,  may  be  offset,  it  is  contended,  by  the 
same  system  of  standardization  (i.e.,  specializa- 
tion by  each  shipyard  in  particular  sizes  and 
types  of  ships)  which  our  manufacturers  have 
applied  with  such  success  to  making  automo- 
biles. A  more  serious  problem  is  the  cost  of 
operation,  embarrassed  as  it  is  by  existing  laws, 
notably  those  secured  by  "friends  of  labor" 
which  prevent  the  employment  of  cheap  alien 
seamen  on  our  ships.  If  Congress  and — what 
is  more  important — the  people  can  be  induced 
to  turn  their  attention  to  a  thorough  study  of 
the  value  and  needs  of  our  merchant  marine, 
there  is  hope  for  the  future. 

With  such  encouragements  may  we  not  be- 
lieve that  our  commerce  with  Latin  America, 
despite  the  competition  of  Europe,  will  not  suf- 
fer too   severely  from  the  coming   of  peace? 


166  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

What  economic  conditions  will  then  appertain 
it  is  impossible  to  predict  with  certainty.  Eu- 
rope's immediate  demands  for  our  help  in  her 
upbuilding  will,  of  course,  prove!  irresistibly 
tempting  to  our  capital.  But  the  war  has  al- 
ready accustomed  us  to  enormous  extension  of 
credits  and  enormous  production,  and  we  should 
now  be  in  a  position  to  satisfy  Europe's  re- 
quirements without  sacrificing  our  promising 
relations  with  our  new  business  friends  to  the 
southward.  True,  our  transactions  with  them 
now  appear  insignificant  by  comparison  with 
our  sales  and  loans  to  the  warring  nations,  but, 
in  normal  times,  Europe  will  not  need  our  manu- 
factured goods  or  our  money,  while  Latin  Amer- 
ica will  continue  increasingly  to  demand  both. 
Europe  is  destined  to  be  our  rival  economically, 
Latin  America  our  auxiliary.  Our  great  sur- 
plus of  natural  products,  which  has  constituted 
the  bulk  of  our  exports,  will  constantly  diminish 
as  our  population  increases,  until  our  multiply- 
ing factories  will  take  up  our  supply  of  raw 
materials  and  our  workers  will  consume  our 
foods ;  while  South  America,  unsuited,  generally 
speaking,  to  the  development  of  manufactures, 
is  the  world's  unexploited  treasure  trove  of 
natural  resources.  Both  as  sellers  of  finished 
commodities  and  as  buyers  of  raw  products, 
Europe  and  the  United  States  will  be  competi- 
tors and  Latin  America  will  be  a  principal 
battlefield.  Is  it  rash  to  postulate  that,  in  lay- 
ing now  the  foundations  of  American  economic 
interdependence,  the  United  States  is  creating 
the  surest  guarantees  for  her  future? 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  167 

It  is  not,  however,  to  mere  considerations  of 
politics  and  trade  that  we  must  look  for  light 
upon  the  future  of  inter-American  relations. 
However  strained  and  artificial  may  have  been 
the  motives  that  have  determined  the  alliances 
of  monarchs  in  the  past,  nations  in  the  new 
world  movement  of  democracy  will  come  more 
and  more  to  base  their  friendships  upon  com- 
mon impulses,  common  sympathies,  common  be- 
liefs and  common  ideals,  upon  mutual  trust  and 
confidence  and  esteem.  Whether  or  not  we  move 
toward  "that  far  off,  divine  event,"  "the  Par- 
liament of  man,  the  Federation  of  the  world," 
no  student  of  the  progress  of  humanity  can 
escape  the  conclusion  that  it  is  to  the  peoples 
that  the  coming  ages  are  to  belong.  It  is  upon 
what  the  peoples  of  the  two  Americas  think  of 
each  other,  not  upon  doctrines  and  made  to  order 
projects  of  amity,  that  their  history  will  depend. 

That  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  toward  our  southern  neighbors 
are  those  of  hearty  good  will  admits  of  no  argu- 
ment. If  when  in  the  early  years  of  their  in- 
dependence they  turned  to  us  with  naive  en- 
thusiasm as  their  guide  and  mentor  we  lost  our 
unique  opportunity  to  win  permanently  their 
confidence  and  affection,  our  failure  was  due 
rather  to  faulty  understanding  than  to  defects 
of  the  heart.  Failing  to  comprehend  how  dan- 
gerous to  them  was  the  compliment  they  had 
paid  us  in  copying  our  intricate  system  of  gov- 
ernment, which  nothing  in  their  previous  experi- 
ence qualified  them  to  administer,  and  ignorant, 


168  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

or  at  least  unappreciative,  of  the  geographical, 
racial,  social  and  economic  obstacles  which  hin- 
dered their  progress,  our  highly  developed 
Anglo-Saxon  sense  of  order  and  efficiency  was 
outraged  from  the  beginning  by  their  apparent 
instability  and  hopeless  futility  in  their  political 
life;  and,  our  own  domestic  problems  claiming 
our  whole  attention,  we  turned  from  them  with 
a  pitying  and  helpless  shake  of  our  heads  and, 
for  some  generations,  seemed  willing  to  return 
to  them  only  when  our  selfish  interests  impelled 
us  and,  while  continuing  to  wish  them  well  and 
to  pray  for  their  salvation,  were  far  too  dis- 
posed to  assume  a  rasping  superiority  that  in- 
terpreted their  interests  in  the  light  of  our  own. 
Our  Monroe  Doctrine,  while  in  practice  it 
proved  to  be  a  protection  to  the  weak  Latin 
republics,  was  enunciated  principally  in  our  own 
selfish  interest,  its  capricious  application  has 
been  sufficient  evidence  that  it  has  continued 
to  be  so  interpreted,  and  its  intangibility  and 
elastic  adaptability  to  every  exigency  has  earned 
it  the  suspicion  which  must  naturally  attach  to 
any  force  at  once  so  great  and  so  mysterious. 
Devoting  our  energies  and  our  wealth  to  our 
own  advancement,  withholding  from  the  Latin 
Americans  the  sympathy  and  encouragement, 
moral  and  material,  which  as  sister  democ- 
racies they  felt  they  had  some  reason  to  expect, 
we  occasionally  showed  our  consciousness  of 
their  existence  by  growling  over  them  when 
Europe  seemed  to  cast  an  envious  eye  in  their 
direction,  or  by  administering  a  correcting  slap 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  169 

or  a  sharp  word  when  they  trod  ever  so  lightly 
upon  our  toes.  Worst  of  all,  when  many  of  them 
had  successfully  emerged  from  their  period  of 
trial,  had  set  their  feet  on  the  road  to  national 
stability  and  had  developed  a  just  pride  in  their 
achievements  and  prospects,  we  persisted  pro- 
vincially  in  lumping  them  all  together  in  our 
thought  as  a  sort  of  simmering  stew  inseparably 
compounded  of  brawls  and  bankruptcy.  Read- 
ing the  absurd  and  amazing  references  to  them 
in  the  public  prints  and  in  the  debates  in  Con- 
gress, one  wonders  whether  there  may  not  have 
been  some  worthy  citizens  to  whose  mind  they 
belonged  in  the  category  to  which  Justice  Taney 
relegated  Dred  Scott,  possessed  of  "no  rights 
which  a  white  man  is  bound  to  respect." 

The  last  twenty  years — called  with  some  out- 
ward show  of  reason,  but  with  little  real  appre- 
ciation of  their  spirit,  the  imperialistic  era  of 
the  United  States — have  been  remarkable  for 
the  change  they  have  wrought  in  our  knowledge 
of  and  interest  in  world  affairs.  With  this  new 
knowledge  and  interest  has  come  understanding 
of  Latin  America,  her  spirit  and  aspirations, 
and  a  conception  of  Pan-American  sympathy 
and  service. 

Unfortunately  for  us,  our  past  sins  of  com- 
mission and  omission  now  arise  to  plague  us. 
We  find  too  often  that  Latin  Americans  neither 
like  nor  trust  us,  and  that  we  are  under  the 
painful  necessity  of  proving  to  their  satisfaction 
that  our  innocent  appearing  exterior  is  not  a 
false  covering  hiding  the  wolf  beneath.    ' '  Span- 


170  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

ish  America  shows  neither  a  surpassing  inclina- 
tion of  friendship,  nor  an  unlimited  confidence ' ' 
in  the  United  States,  says  Professor  Oliveira 
Lima  of  Brazil.  "The  Cuban  war  was  started 
with  an  injustice  to  Spain ;  it  led  to  the  annexa- 
tion of  Porto  Rico.  The  negotiations  with  Pan- 
ama, which  Senhor  Roosevelt  can  explain  much 
better  than  I,  have  only  served  to  increase  our 
apprehensions,  which  are  that  the  results  of 
American  imperialism  may  be  just  as  impar- 
tially destructive  as  those  of  European  im- 
perialism. .  .  .  Pan-Americanism  to  us  seems 
a  mockery  and  impossible  of  realization.  There 
is  no  racial,  linguistic,  traditional  or  religious 
community  between  'Anglo-Saxon  America'  (or 
shall  we  say,  with  Bryce,  'Teutonic  America'?) 
and  Latin  America.  .  .  .  True,  we  have  some- 
times interests  and  sentiments  in  common, 
which,  properly  agitated  and  played  upon,  may 
bring  excellent  results.  '  Pan-  Americanism ' 
continues  to  represent  the  ideal  of  a  single 
union,  and  as  most  of  the  various  'isms'  is  con- 
tinually exhibited  for  the  'grand  effect'  on  the 
people — its  actual  influence  being  somewhat  less 
than  that  of  a  substantial,  solid,  silver  dollar." 
Even  more  outspoken  is  Senor  F.  Garcia-Cal- 
deron  of  Peru.  "To  save  themselves  from 
Yankee  imperialism,"  he  declares,  "the  Amer- 
ican democracies  would  almost  accept  a  German 
alliance,  or  the  aid  of  Japanese  arms;  every- 
where the  Americans  of  the  North  are  feared. 
In  the  Antilles  and  in  Central  America  hostility 
against  the  Anglo-Saxon  invaders  assumes  the 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  171 

character  of  a  Latin  crusade."  "The  opening 
of  the  Panama  Canal,"  remarks  a  Colombian 
journalist,  "will  mark  the  date  which  our  grand- 
children will  remember — perhaps  with  sorrow — 
when  they  shall  see  each  of  the  states  of  Latin 
America  represented  by  a  little  twinkle  on  the 
Stars  and  Stripes."  A  Mexican  sociologist 
suggests  that  a  conquest  of  the  American  tropics 
by  the  United  States  would  supply  her  with  the 
cereals  which  she  needs  in  increasing  quantities. 

"  Anti- Yanqui "  clubs  abound  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica. The  press  pays  reiterated  homage  to  North 
American  ' '  pigs ' '  and  ' '  dollar  diplomacy, ' '  and 
its  notices  of  North  American  happenings  too 
often  consist  of  harrowing  catalogues  of  lynch- 
ings,  murders,  divorces,  graft,  pork  barrel  poli- 
tics and  other  public  and  private  obliquities, 
conveying  the  impression  that  of  such  is  Anglo- 
Saxon  democracy.  Cartoonists  exhaust  their 
ingenuity  in  maligning  and  deriding  the  United 
States,  a  favorite  device  being  some  variation 
of  the  theme  of  the  Yankee  fisherman,  his  line 
labelled ' '  intervention, ' '  angling  with  gratifying 
success  in  the  troubled  sea  of  revolution. 

Latin  Americans  never  tire  of  quoting,  with 
comments,  Secretary  Olney's  famous  interpre- 
tation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Venezuela 
affair  of  1895:  "Today  the  United  States  is 
practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  and  its 
fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines 
its  interposition."  "Away,  then,  with  this 
benevolent  Monroe  Doctrine!"  exclaims  one. 
"It  is  very  far  from  a  doctrine  by  which  all 


172  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

interests  may  be  protected,  or  may  be  held 
equally  sacred  in  all  the  countries  it  concerns. 
Instead  of  that,  it  is  a  doctrine  of  absorption, 
and  annihilates  the  interests  of  the  parties  af- 
fected. .  .  .  The  Doctrine  of  Monroe  is  the  shield 
and  buckler  of  United  States  aggression;  it  is 
a  sword  suspended  by  a  hair  over  the  Latin 
continent. ' '  Instances  in  our  history  of  callous- 
ness, of  unscrupulous  ambition  and  of  disregard 
of  the  rights  of  weaker  states  are  paraded  un- 
wearyingly,  and  too  many  Latin  American  re- 
publics harbor  memories  of  indignities  sustained 
at  our  hands.  What,  it  is  inquired,  has  the  senti- 
mental, spontaneous,  generous  Latin  in  common 
with  the  shrewd,  calculating,  cold  blooded,  dollar 
worshipping  Yankee? 

Fortunately  there  is  a  brighter  side  to  the 
picture ;  fortunately  there  have  been,  north  and 
south  of  the  canal,  philanthropists  of  sympathy 
and  vision,  believers  in  the  essential  brotherli- 
ness  and  benevolence  of  humanity,  who,  instead 
of  scouring  the  past  and  the  present  for  incen- 
tives to  inter-American  distrust  and  ill  will, 
have  devoted  themselves  to  introducing  the 
Americas  to  each  other,  on  Charles  Lamb's 
principle  that  one  will  not  hate  a  man  he  knows 
well,  and  to  preaching  the  gospel  of  confidence 
and  cooperation. 

Of  late  years  these  efforts  have  become  gen- 
eral and  more  efficiently  coordinated.  Many  of 
them  are  familiar  to  every  citizen  at  all  con- 
versant with  current  happenings.  The  Pan- 
American  Union,  expressing  its  object  in  its 


THE  TWO  AMEEICAS  173 

name,  maintained  by  the  twenty-one  American 
republics  in  its  palace  in  Washington,  labors 
constantly  for  better  acquaintance  and  comity 
between  the  Americas.  Visits  of  distinguished 
citizens — statesmen,  scientists  and  financiers — 
are  exchanged.  The  year  1915  was  signalized 
by  the  assembling  of  a  Pan-American  Financial 
Congress  at  Washington,  presided  over  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  of  the  United  States, 
to  study  financial  questions  of  inter- American 
significance ;  and  this  body  created  a  permanent 
"International  High  Commission,"  with  a  sub- 
committee in  each  American  country,  to  canvass 
such  subjects  as  uniformity  of  maritime  laws, 
arbitration  of  commercial  disputes,  wireless 
communications  and  a  postal  congress.  Since 
1908,  Pan-American  scientific  congresses  of  in- 
creasingly distinguished  membership  have  as- 
sembled from  time  to  time  to  listen  to  papers 
and  to  formulate  policies  on  such  widely  diver- 
gent topics  as  anthropology,  astronomy,  con- 
servation of  natural  resources,  agriculture, 
irrigation,  forestry,  education,  engineering,  in- 
ternational law,  public  law,  jurisprudence,  min- 
ing and  metallurgy,  economic  geology,  applied 
chemistry,  public  health  and  medical  science, 
transportation,  commerce,  finance  and  taxation. 
Eminent  scholars  have  passed  from  continent 
to  continent,  giving  courses  on  the  history  and 
economics  of  their  countries  in  leading  univer- 
sities. Free  scholarships  have  brought  about 
the  interchange  of  students.  Periodicals  are 
devoted  to  acquainting  the  American  peoples 


174  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

with  each  other 's  point  of  view.  The  daily  press 
is  awaking  to  its  responsibilities  in  the  cam- 
paign of  education,  witness  the  establishment 
of  a  reciprocal  news  service  between  our  United 
Press  and  La  Nacion  of  Argentina  in  1916. 

It  is  not,  however,  from  sporadic  protesta- 
tions of  amity  by  individuals  or  states  that  the 
Pan-American  rapprochement,  of  which  we  are 
beginning  to  appreciate  the  value  and  the  need, 
can  come.  Unions  of  the  hearts  of  peoples,  as 
distinct  from  the  time  serving,  self  seeking 
leagues  of  governments,  predicate  confidence, 
and  confidence  is  born  of  deeds,  not  of  words, 
and  of  deeds  reflecting  an  inward  spirit  of  char- 
ity, so  consistent  in  its  operation  as  not  to  de- 
generate into  hypocrisy  when  self-interest  is 
concerned.  Latin  Americans  cannot  be  too 
much  blamed  if  they  have  regarded  incidents 
like  the  Mexican  War  and  the  acquisition  of 
the  Canal  Zone  as  more  solid  evidences  of  the 
true  meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  than  the 
platitudes  of  our  public  men  at  Pan-American 
banquets.  If  our  physical  proportions  were 
those  of  the  sparrow  and  Latin  America's  those 
of  the  hawk,  and  if  in  the  past  we  had  seen 
the  sharpness  of  the  big  bird's  talons  demon- 
strated at  the  expense  of  other  sparrows  no 
larger  than  ourselves,  we  should  have  some  dif- 
ficulty in  watching  his  flight  in  our  direction  with 
unruffled  equanimity. 

Happily  for  us,  not  all  the  weight  in  the  scales 
is  against  us.  The  compelling  motive  behind 
our  war  with  Spain  was  sympathy  for  suffering 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  175 

peoples ;  our  unexpected  withdrawal  from  Cuba 
gained  credit  for  our  plighted  word ;  our  refusal 
to  traffic  in  the  recent  misfortunes  of  Mexico 
has  won  us  friends  (for  whatever  mistakes  our 
Administration  may  have  made  there,  it  has 
shown  a  conception  of  the  moral  obligation  to 
forbearance  resting  on  a  strong  Power  in  its 
relations  with  a  weak  one,  and  an  appreciation 
of  the  relative  importance  of  a  letter  of  the  law 
insistence  on  the  personal  and  property  rights 
of  our  citizen  adventurers  in  Mexico  on  the  one 
hand  and  an  interminably  exploited  nation's 
struggles  for  more  endurable  conditions  of  life 
on  the  other) ;  and  our  prompt  acceptance  of 
the  proffered  mediation  of  the  ABC  Powers 
in  our  Mexican  imbroglio  and  our  invitation  to 
six  Latin  American  states,  including  one  from 
Central  America,  to  join  us  in  determining 
which  of  the  contending  factions  in  Mexico  was 
worthy  of  recognition  have  accomplished  more 
than  rivers  of  rhetoric  to  make  Pan- American- 
ism a  reality.  High  minded  men  have  found  in 
this  novel  disposition  of  the  United  States  to 
admit  her  neighbors  to  her  counsels  on  Amer- 
ican questions  the  key  to  a  real  and  permanent 
entente  cordiale. 

One  fact  stands  clearly  forward  for  the  guid- 
ance of  those  who  are  working  toward  that  end. 
Pan- Americanism  must  be  based  on  cooperation, 
not  on  tutelage.  Many  of  the  Latin  American 
states  have  outgrown  all  need  of  leading  strings 
and  are  ready  to  meet  us,  if  at  all,  as  equal  sov- 
ereignties.    If   any  one   sentiment  peculiarly 


176  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

characterizes  Latin  Americans  it  is  a  lofty  pride 
in  their  racial  and  national  traditions,  a  keen 
sense  of  the  meaning  of  democracy  and  of  the 
dignity  of  independence.    This  is  as  true  of  the 
backward  and  turbulent  little  republics  of  Cen- 
tral America  as  of  Argentina  or  Chile  or  Brazil. 
Someone  has  said  with  truth  that  they  all  prefer 
governing  themselves,  no  matter  how  badly,  to 
being  governed  by  us,  no  matter  how  well.    Our 
intercourse  with  them  abounds  in  evidences  that 
this  is  so.    Only  the  other  day  the  legislature 
of  Porto  Rico,  in  thanking  us  for  the  gift  of 
citizenship  in  the  United  States,  concluded  its 
address  with  the  pertinent  suggestion  that  we 
logically  complete  the  good  work  by  conferring 
on  them  the  boon  of  independence.     A  nation 
that  has  been  brought  up  from  infancy  on  the 
principle  that  ' '  governments  derive  their  just 
powers   from   the   consent   of   the   governed" 
should  not  find  as  much  difficulty  as  we  have 
sometimes  done  in  comprehending  this  state  of 
mind.    One  senses  a  disquieting  analogy  between 
the  air  of  condescending  superiority  with  which 
we  have  too  often  offended  our  Latin  friends 
and  the  Teutonic  conception  of  a  world  civiliz- 
ing "Kultur." 

The  new  watchword  of  cooperation  finds  ex- 
pression in  the  recent  utterances  of  many  emi- 
nent North  and  South  Americans,  and  in  its 
name  those  of  our  neighbors  who  have  given  us 
their  confidence  are  interpreting  our  principles 
to  their  countrymen. 

Particularly  interesting  is  the  Latin  discus- 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  177 

sion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for,  as  conducted 
in  the  new  spirit  of  constructive  rather  than 
destructive  criticism,  it  has  helped  us  to  clarify 
our  own  somewhat  befogged  conception  of  this 
ancient  instrument,  to  recognize  the  accretions 
which  have  impaired  its  usefulness  and  to  re- 
shape it  as  a  vehicle  for  progressive  Pan- 
Americanism. 

Briefly,  the  Latin  American  formula  for  a 
purified,  rejuvenated  Monroe  Doctrine  may  be 
summarized  in  the  phrase,  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence, both  political  and  economic,  for  all 
the  American  states.  It  embodies,  asserts 
Senor  Alejandro  Alvarez  of  Chile,  "the  aspira- 
tions, not  merely  of  the  United  States,  but  of 
America  as  a  whole,  and  has  nothing  in  common 
with  that  policy  of  imperialism  and  hegemony 
.  .  .  confined  to  the  United  States  alone.  ...  In 
truth,  the  Americans  of  the  North  apparently 
desire  to  assume,  in  certain  quarters  of  the 
American  continent,  a  patronage,  a  directorship, 
nay,  a  positive  control,  analogous  to  that  recog- 
nized in  Europe,  especially  regarding  Oriental 
affairs,  as  appertaining  to  the  Concert  of  the 
Powers.  .  .  .  Though  it  was  framed  by  a  Presi- 
dent of  the  North  American  Republic,  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  none  the  less  corresponded  to  a 
principle  and  a  necessity  which  were  common 
to  both  Americas.  .  .  .  The  Latin  States  regard 
every  attack  upon  the  freedom  of  a  sister  re- 
public as  an  attempt  upon  their  own."  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  "is  in  fact  a  formula  of  inde- 
pendence," says  Senor  Luis  M.  Drago.     "It 


178  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

creates  no  obligations  and  no  responsibilities 
between  the  nations  of  America,  but  simply  calls 
upon  all  of  them,  with  their  own  means  and 
without  foreign  aid,  to  exclude  from  within  their 
respective  frontiers  the  jurisdiction  of  Euro- 
pean Powers.  Proclaimed  by  the  United  States 
in  the  interest  of  their  own  peace  and  security, 
the  other  republics  of  the  continent  have  in  their 
turn  proceeded  to  adopt  it  with  an  eye  alone  to 
their  own  individual  welfare  and  internal  tran- 
quillity. This  moral  consort  of  intentions  and 
tendencies  constitutes  in  itself  alone  a  great 
force  without  need  of  treaties  or  formal  alli- 
ances or  definite  obligations.  Thus  understood, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  in  the  end  is  nothing 
more  than  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple to  maintain  their  liberty,  assures  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  states  of  that  continent  in 
respect  to  one  another  as  well  as  in  relation  to 
the  Powers  of  Europe."  "In  principle,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  essential  article  in  the 
public  code  of  the  new  world,"  is  the  opinion 
of  Dr.  Garcia-Calderon.  "It  is  only  the  brutal 
expression  of  the  doctrine,  the  cynical  imperial- 
ism which  is  deduced  from  it,  which  becomes 
dangerous  to  the  moral  unity  of  the  continent. 
The  wisest  statesmen  have  no  thought  of  di- 
vorcing this  doctrine  from  the  future  history 
of  America,  even  when  they  criticize  its  excesses 
most  severely."  While  the  imperialistic  ambi- 
tions of  the  United  States  have  sacrificed  the 
integrity  of  the  Caribbean  countries  "toward 
South  America  its  intervention  deserves  only 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  179 

respect.  The  purely  selfish  interest  of  the 
United  States  evidently  lay  in  the  acceptance 
of  war  and  anarchy,  in  accordance  with  the 
classical  formula  'Divide  and  rule';  yet  the 
United  States  has  kept  the  peace.  From  Pan- 
ama to  the  La  Plata  it  is  working  for  the  union 
of  the  peoples  and  for  civilization.  Here,  then, 
is  an  aspect  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  of  perpetual 
usefulness :  the  struggle  against  the  wars  which 
threaten  to  ruin  the  New  World,  still  poor  and 
thinly  populated — intervention  with  the  olive 
branch.  In  stimulating  the  union  of  South 
American  republics,  the  United  States  is  at  the 
same  time  protecting  its  own  commercial  inter- 
ests, menaced  by  this  perpetual  turmoil.  If  its 
action  were  to  halt  there,  if  it  renounced  all 
territorial  acquisition  and  set  its  face  against 
all  interference  with  the  internal  affairs  of  every 
state,  the  doctrine  so  often  condemned  would 
seem  born  anew  and  no  one  would  dare  to  criti- 
cize its  efficacy." 

No  point  in  the  Latin  American  conception 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  finds  more  emphatic  ex- 
pression than  that  of  its  utter  incompatibility 
with  any  spirit  of  imperialism  or  further  exten- 
sion of  its  territories  by  the  United  States.  The 
discomfort  of  the  sparrow  in  the  presence  of 
the  hawk  constantly  appears.  The  imperialistic 
disposition  on  our  part  has  been  the  chief 
ground  of  friction  in  the  past,  and,  unless  we 
abandon  it,  will  continue  to  be  so.  As  Senor  A. 
de  Manos- Albas  puts  it :  * '  The  means  to  accom- 
plish unity  of  sentiment  and  to  dispel  the  mis- 


180  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

givings  between  the  United  States  and  the  Latin 
American  republics  is  not  far  to  seek.  It  is  only 
required  to  amplify  the  Monroe  declaration  to 
the  full  extent  of  its  logical  development.  .  .  . 
If  the  United  States  should  declare  that  the  era 
of  conquest  on  the  American  continent  has  been 
closed  to  all  and  forever,  beginning  with  them- 
selves, the  brooding  storm  of  distrust  will  dis- 
appear from  the  Latin  American  mind,  and  an 
international  cordiality  of  incalculable  possi- 
bilities will  ensue,  not  only  for  the  welfare  of 
the  American  nations,  but  universally  for  the 
cause  of  freedom  and  democracy." 

In  so  far  as  the  utterances  of  our  public  men 
best  qualified  to  voice  the  nation's  will  can  re- 
assure our  friends  to  the  southward,  they  have 
little  cause  for  complaint,  for  the  official  pro- 
nouncements of  this  country's  policy  conform 
almost  verbatim  to  the  formula  of  the  Latin 
writers.  As  long  ago  as  1906  Elihu  Root  de- 
clared to  a  South  American  audience :  ''We  do 
not  wish  to  win  victories,  we  desire  no  territory 
but  our  own,  nor  a  sovereignty  more  extensive 
than  that  which  we  desire  to  retain  over  our- 
selves. We  consider  that  the  independence  and 
the  equal  rights  of  the  smallest  and  weakest 
members  of  the  family  of  nations  deserve  as 
much  respect  as  those  of  the  great  empires.  We 
pretend  to  no  right,  privilege  or  power  that  we 
do  not  freely  concede  to  each  one  of  the  Amer- 
ican republics."  In  the  same  spirit,  ex-Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  said  at  Montevideo :  ' '  The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  in  no  sense  a  doctrine  of  one 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  181 

sided  advantage.  ...  It  should  be  invoked  by 
our  nations  in  a  spirit  of  mutual  respect,  and 
on  a  footing  of  complete  equality  of  both  right 
and  obligation.  Therefore,  as  soon  as  any  coun- 
try of  the  New  World  stands  on  a  sufficiently 
high  footing  of  orderly  liberty  and  achieved  suc- 
cess, of  self-respecting  strength,  it  becomes  a 
guarantor  of  the  doctrine  on  a  footing  of  com- 
plete equality,  ...  so  that,"  as  regards  such 
countries,  "all  that  the  United  States  has  to 
do  is  to  stand  ready,  as  one  of  the  great  brother- 
hood of  American  nations,  to  join  with  them  in 
upholding  the  doctrine,  should  they  at  any  time 
desire,  in  the  interest  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, that  we  should  do  so." 

A  notable  address  by  Secretary  of  State  Lan- 
sing before  the  Pan-American  Scientific  Con- 
gress at  Washington  in  1915  contained  these 
words :  "  I  speak  only  for  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  but  in  doing  so  I  am  sure  that  I 
express  sentiments  which  will  find  an  echo  in 
every  republic  represented  here  when  I  say  that 
the  might  of  this  country  will  never  be  exercised 
in  a  spirit  of  greed  to  wrest  from  a  neighboring 
state  its  territory  or  possessions.  The  ambi- 
tions of  this  republic  do  not  lie  in  the  path  of 
conquest,  but  in  the  paths  of  peace  and  justice. 
Whenever  and  wherever  we  can  we  will  stretch 
forth  a  hand  to  those  who  need  help.  If  the 
sovereignty  of  a  sister  republic  is  menaced  from 
overseas,  the  power  of  the  United  States  and, 
I  hope  and  believe,  the  united  power  of  the 
American  republics  will  constitute  a  bulwark 


182  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

which  will  protect  the  independence  and  integ- 
rity of  their  neighbors  from  unjust  invasion  or 
aggression.  The  American  family  of  nations 
might  well  take  for  its  motto  that  of  Dumas 's 
famous  musketeers,  'One  for  all;  all  for  one.' 
If  I  have  correctly  interpreted  Pan- American- 
ism from  the  standpoint  of  the  relation  of  our 
Government  with  those  beyond  the  seas,  it  is 
in  entire  harmony  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  national  policy  of  the 
United  States ;  Pan- Americanism  is  an  interna- 
tional policy  of  the  Americas." 

As  to  the  practical  shape  which  this  ideal  of 
Pan-American  cooperation  is  to  take,  there  are 
difficulties.  The  dream  of  a  tribunal,  in  which 
all  the  nations  of  the  two  continents,  varying 
extremely  in  size,  civilization  and  responsibility, 
shall  be  equally  represented,  invested  with  full 
power  to  hear  and  determine  inter-American 
controversies,  is  now  quite  generally  recognized 
to  be  chimerical.  The  United  States,  with  a 
population  greater  than  that  of  all  Latin  Amer- 
ica together  and  excelling  even  more  in  wealth 
than  in  mere  numbers,  would  hardly  care  to 
submit  its  vital  interests,  in  a  controversy  with 
a  Latin  state,  to  the  arbitrament  of  a  body  com- 
pletely Latin  in  its  make  up,  which,  however 
disposed  it  might  be  to  do  justice,  could  not 
possibly  free  itself  entirely  from  racial  and  tra- 
ditional prejudices;  nor  would  an  organization 
based  on  population  or  wealth  be  any  more  ac- 
ceptable to  Latin  America.  Questions  of  the 
weight  to  be  given  each  state  in  determining  a 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  183 

policy  or  in  imposing  an  assessment  would  raise 
the  same  difficulties.  Professor  Albert  Bushnell 
Hart  suggests  the  analogy  of  the  ' '  New  England 
Confederation"  of  our  colonial  days,  which  went 
to  pieces  because  Massachusetts  surpassed  all 
her  associates  combined  in  population  and  re- 
sources. 

A  more  natural  and  workable  plan  seems  to 
be  a  general  acceptance  of  the  principle  that, 
in  complications  of  inter-American  significance, 
no  single  state  shall  act  impulsively  on  its  own 
judgment  and  interest  alone,  but  shall  welcome 
the  counsel  and,  if  feasible,  the  cooperation  of 
such  of  its  neighbors  as  may  be  best  fitted  to 
render  such  service.  There  need  be  no  obliga- 
tion to  accept  the  advice  given;  but  the  very 
bringing  together  of  eminent  men  with  differing 
points  of  view,  the  interchange  of  opinion  and 
argument,  and  the  moral  necessity  of  squaring 
a  contemplated  policy  with  enlightened  prin- 
ciples of  Pan-Americanism  are  bound  to  raise 
the  issue  above  the  realms  of  mere  partisanship, 
to  free  it  from  ignorance  and  provincialism,  and 
to  eliminate  misunderstandings. 

The  possibilities  of  an  arrangement  of  this 
sort  were  demonstrated  by  the  ABC  media- 
tion conference  at  Niagara  Falls  in  1914,  where 
diplomats  from  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  met 
with  representatives  of  Mexico  and  the  United 
States  in  an  effort  to  compose  their  difficulties, 
and  in  the  joint  deliberations  of  the  next  year 
which  resulted  in  the  recognition  of  Carranza. 
The   actual  accomplishments  of  these  confer- 


184  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

ences  were  inconsiderable  by  comparison  with 
the  contribution  they  made  to  the  cause  of  inter- 
American  comity.  If,  as  one  writer  holds,  what 
was  done  by  them  cannot  be  undone,  if  a  prece- 
dent has  been  created  for  the  right  of  the  Latin 
republics  to  be  heard  on  American  questions, 
the  United  States,  face  to  face  with  the  future 
necessity  of  dealing  with  nations  of  constantly 
augmenting  self -consciousness  and  strength  and 
of  recognizing  eventually  a  ' '  balance  of  power ' ' 
in  America,  may  well  be  congratulated  for 
adapting  itself  so  readily  to  an  inevitable  situa- 
tion. The  same  writer  goes  on  to  say:  "The 
Western  Hemisphere  has,  at  last,  been  swept 
into  the  realm  where  interests  dominate  in  the 
government  of  states,  and  this  pitiable  but  Dra- 
conian principle  of  collective  human  develop- 
ment, when  human  nature  is  organized  nationally 
in  societies,  is  now  about  to  operate  as  a  dis- 
turbing and  corrosive  element  on  that  purer 
American  idealism  which  the  people  and  most 
of  the  political  leaders  in  both  of  the  American 
continents  had  blindly  supposed  would  always 
distinguish  their  happier  world  from  the  old  one 
of  the  wicked  kings."  To  which  it  may  be  re- 
plied that  if  actualities  rather  than  "Draconian 
principles"  had  occupied  the  minds  of  Amer- 
icans since  the  days  when  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
saw  the  light,  we  should  perhaps  be  farther 
than  we  are  at  present  on  the  road  to  an  under- 
standing of  one  another's  national  ambitions 
and  to  an  adjustment  of  them  to  some  practical 
live  and  let  live  arrangement.    The  sooner  we 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  185 

recognize  the  inevitability  of  the  "  principle  of 
nationalities"  and  base  our  international  rela- 
tions upon  it,  the  better  for  all  concerned. 

Another  step  in  the  right  direction  was  Mr. 
Bryan's  treaties  insuring  at  least  a  year  of  in- 
vestigation and  inquiry  into  the  merits  of  dis- 
putes before  resort  to  force  by  the  signatory 
Powers.  "The  high  contracting  parties  agree 
that  all  disputes  between  them,  of  every  nature 
whatsoever,  which  diplomacy  shall  fail  to  ad- 
just, shall  be  submitted  for  investigation  and 
report  to  an  International  Commission  .  .  .  and 
they  agree  not  to  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities 
during  such  investigation  and  report."  The 
parties  to  the  dispute  are  in  no  sense  bound  by 
the  commission's  findings,  but  the  cooling  of 
hot  blood,  a  full  knowledge  of  the  facts  in  the 
case  and  the  moral  force  of  a  just  decision  will 
be  sufficient  to  save  many  an  international 
friendship. 

Practical  Pan- Americanism,  then,  should  mean 
not  the  formation  of  a  formal  league,  binding 
together  in  unnatural  union  peoples  widely  di- 
vergent in  race,  culture  and  feeling,  but  rather 
a  spontaneous  and  candid  association  of  Amer- 
ican states  which,  while  recognizing  the  inevita- 
ble and  salutary  principle  of  nationalities,  shall 
bring  their  combined  intelligence  and  resources 
to  the  solution  of  American  problems. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  the  United  States, 
the  cause  of  practical  Pan- Americanism  would 
be  greatly  subserved  by  a  process  of  amalgama- 
tion in  Latin  America  which  would  substitute 


186  THE  WORLD  PEEIL 

for  large  numbers  of  restless  and  all  but  help- 
less small  states  a  few  large  ones,  possessing 
sufficient  population,  territory  and  wealth  to  af- 
ford some  assurance  of  eventually  becoming 
strong  and  self-reliant  Powers.  A  union  of  the 
Central  American  republics,  for  example,  would 
be  an  unmixed  blessing  to  us,  relieving  us  of 
responsibilities  which  bring  us  little  compensa- 
tion, cause  us  no  end  of  worry  and  lay  us  open 
to  persistent  offensive  imputations;  and  some 
of  the  smaller  states  of  South  America  would 
derive  obvious  advantages  from  merging  them- 
selves with  their  larger  neighbors.  But  the 
Latin  seems  to  cherish  a  sentimental  affection 
for  old  boundaries  which  North  American  demo- 
crats must  respect,  if  they  cannot  approve. 

Most  Latin  Americans  are  ready  to  acquit  us 
of  any  sinister  designs  south  of  the  countries 
bordering  on  the  Caribbean.  It  is  the  develop- 
ment of  our  system  of  defence  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  with  its  necessary  ramifications  in  the 
form  of  naval  stations  and  protectorates,  that 
has  aroused  their  fears.  Our  fault,  in  their  eyes, 
lies  not  in  taking  precaution  for  our  safety  nor 
in  anticipating  the  designs  of  European  nations 
in  American  waters — for  in  these  respects  their 
interests  are  identical  with  our  own — but  in  act- 
ing in  an  unneighborly  and  often  mysterious 
isolation  which  too  often  has  left  them  in  the 
dark  as  to  our  intentions,  and  which  has  in- 
volved infringements  upon  the  liberties  of  peo- 
ples whose  needs  we  have  incompletely  under- 
stood. 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  187 

Here,  as  elsewhere,  it  is  the  principle  of  co- 
operation that  can  meet  the  difficulty.  Certainly, 
after  the  precedent  of  the  Niagara  Falls  con- 
ference, we  can  have  no  notion  of  interfering 
in  South  American  affairs  without  consulting 
and  acting  with  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile,  and 
probably  with  other  Latin  American  Powers, 
and  even  in  the  Caribbean,  where  our  supremacy 
is  now  well  established,  it  is  inconceivable  that 
a  people  committed  to  the  principles  of  democ- 
racy will  go  on  forever  ruling  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  Dominicans,  Haitians,  Nicaraguans, 
Cubans  or  even  Porto  Eicans  against  their  will. 
We  cannot  arrogate  exclusively  to  ourselves  a 
sovereignty  whose  sole  sanction  is  our  own  be- 
lief in  the  infallibility  of  our  judgment  in  order- 
ing the  lives  of  others,  and  it  is  a  fair  question 
whether  a  divine  commission  to  regulate  the 
Americas  is  possessed  by  a  state  which  can  re- 
gard a  trust,  like  that  we  assumed  in  stricken 
Santo  Domingo,  as  an  opportunity  to  create 
sinecures  for  "deserving  Democrats."  Prob- 
lems which  concern  all  America  must  be  dealt 
with  by  the  common  action  of  at  least  the  strong 
American  states. 

To  the  ideal  of  American  solidarity  the  war 
in  Europe  has  contributed  fresh  impulses.  The 
original  appeal  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  Latin 
Americans  lay  in  its  championship  of  democracy 
in  the  New  World,  and  this  feature  alone  has 
seemed  to  them  to  justify  its  existence  and  to 
constitute  its  value.  Viewing  the  European 
cataclysm,  the  soulless  designs  of  monarchs,  the 


188  THE  WOELD  PERIL 

contempt  for  treaties,  the  worship  and  triumph 
of  force,  the  crushing  of  the  weak,  and,  as  the 
one  bright  ray  in  the  gloom,  the  spectacle  of 
peoples  emancipated  by  blood  from  agelong 
tyrannies,  they  have  felt,  in  the  words  of  one 
of  their  statesmen,  that  "the  world's  salvation 
is  here  in  America,  through  the  influence  of  a 
democracy  that  means  peace  and  justice,  and 
one  that  we  must  stand  by  and  defend. ' ' 

It  is  not  entirely  from  selfish  motives  that 
sympathy  for  the  cause  of  the  Allies  has  spread 
throughout  Latin  America  and  that  state  after 
state  has  quarrelled  with  Germany  and  voiced 
its  protest  against  her  crass  disregard  of  others ' 
rights.  A  clearer  understanding  of  the  sacred- 
ness  of  the  rights  of  men  and  of  nations  has 
come  to  all  Americans  alike.  It  has,  may  we 
not  say,  drawn  the  world's  democracies  closer 
together,  not  only  in  economic  interdependence, 
but  in  sympathy  and  pride  1  To  the  Latin  Amer- 
icans must  have  occurred  the  question:  How 
would  their  cherished  independence  have  fared, 
had  not  Monroe 's  warning  to  autocrats  fortified 
them  in  the  days  of  their  weakness  against  the 
fate  of  Serbia  and  Belgium,  or  had  the  heart- 
less and  cynical  Prussian  been  substituted  in 
their  history  for  the  rough  and  blundering,  but 
withal  not  unkindly,  democratic  Yankee  uncle, 
who,  possessing  the  power  to  coerce  and  exploit 
them,  has,  on  the  whole,  been  content  to  let 
them  live  their  own  lives  in  their  own  way,  pro- 
vided they  kept  the  peace  and  left  Europe  no 
excuse  for  meddling  uncomfortably  close  to  his 


THE  TWO  AMERICAS  189 

own  door?  Whether  or  not  such  feelings  have 
played  their  part,  the  war  must  serve  to  draw 
closer  the  spiritual  as  well  as  the  material  bonds 
uniting  the  American  states,  for  a  conception 
of  responsibility  to  the  cause  of  democracy, 
whose  spirit  is  human  equality,  must  inspire  the 
ideal  of  comradeship  which  has  come  increas- 
ingly to  distinguish  inter- American  relations.2 

2  Among  the  many  aids  in  the  preparation  of  this  chapter, 
special  mention  should  be  made  of  Jones's  "Caribbean  In- 
terests of  the  United  States,"  Filsinger's  "Exporting  to  Latin 
America,"  the  proceedings  of  the  National  Foreign  Trade 
Conventions,  the  articles  in  the  "Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,"  and  those  by  Mr. 
George  Marvin  in  the  World's  Work.  The  author  is  grateful 
for  statistical  and  other  data  kindly  furnished  by  the  Bureau 
of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Commerce,  the  Pan-American  Union, 
and  Mr.  O.  P.  Austin,  statistician  of  the  National  City  Bank 
of  New  York. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  WORLD  PERIL  AND  AMERICAN 
INTERESTS  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Mason  W.  Tyler 

The  present  conflict  has  been  rightly  called 
a  world  war.  Into  it  have  been  drawn  Europe, 
Africa,  Asia,  the  islands  of  the  Pacific,  and  the 
Americas.  And  the  causes  and  results,  as  well 
as  the  war  itself,  will  probably  be  found  world- 
wide in  their  scope.  But  the  United  States  is 
not  at  least  equally  interested  in  every  phase 
of  this  struggle.  The  majority  of  Americans 
would  probably  agree  that  our  interest  in  the 
solution  of  the  African  problem — to  take  one 
instance — is  decidedly  secondary  to  that  of 
other  Powers  such  as  England  and  France. 
Provided  that  justice  is  done,  that  the  balance 
of  power  is  not  endangered,  that  any  trade  we 
may  have  is  not  unduly  interfered  with,  we  may 
leave  this  problem  for  others  to  settle.  But 
there  are  regions  in  which  the  United  States 
has  long  been  interested,  and  of  these  perhaps 
the  most  important,  outside  of  South  America, 
is  the  problem  of  the  Far  East.  It  was  our 
fleet,  under  Commodore  Perry,  which  opened 
Japan  to  the  world;  we  took  a  leading  share  in 
the  opening  of  China.  The  Open  Door  in  China 
is  an  American  policy,  formulated  by  an  Amer- 

190 


THE  FAR  EAST  191 

ican  Secretary  of  State  and  sustained  by  Amer- 
ican diplomacy.  If  the  war  is  likely  to  affect 
this  part  of  the  world  such  effects  cannot  fail 
to  be  of  interest  and  of  vital  importance  to  the 
United  States  and  deserving  of  our  most  care- 
ful study. 

To  write  a  history  of  the  problem  of  the  Far 
East  would  require  a  volume  in  itself.  But  it 
would  appear  that  there  are  three  questions 
whose  answers  would,  probably,  go  far  to  clear 
up  the  situation  as  it  exists  and  to  bring  out 
such  changes  as  may  occur.  First  of  all:  what 
is  the  origin  of  the  present  situation  and  how 
far  is  it  the  result  of  the  present  war?  Sec- 
ondly: what  are  the  aims  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Far  East  and  how  far  are  they  threatened 
by  the  present  situation?  Thirdly:  is  there  any 
possible  solution  to  be  found  for  such  difficulties 
as  have  arisen  or  are  apt  to  arise  in  the  future? 
Such  a  treatment  can  only  cover  certain  phases 
of  the  problem;  it  is  by  no  means  a  complete 
study,  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  it  may  help 
Americans  to  see  our  part  in  the  problem  more 
clearly. 

To  explain  the  present  situation  one  must  go 
back  to  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  in  1906.  Be- 
fore that  date  the  greatest  danger  in  the  Far 
East  lay  in  the  policy  and  aggressions  of  the 
Russian  Empire.  Backed  by  Germany,  who 
seems  to  have  felt  that  this  policy  kept  Russia 
involved  in  the  Far  East  and  therefore  unable 
to  influence  the  European  balance,  Russia 
had  pushed  down  through  Manchuria  and  was 


192  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

laying  plans  which  seemed  to  aim  at  an  ultimate 
protectorate  over  north  China.  Against  this 
policy  the  other  Powers  vitally  interested,  Eng- 
land, Japan  and  the  United  States,  had  been 
acting  in  concert.  The  two  former  had  formed  a 
defensive  alliance,  and  the  United  States,  seem- 
ingly unwilling  to  take  any  definite  steps,  con- 
fined herself  to  diplomatic  representations.  But 
the  defeat  of  Russia  changed  absolutely  the  sit- 
uation. The  war  left  Japan  the  predominant 
Power  in  Corea  and  Manchuria  and  besides 
this  in  the  moral  position  of  being  the  Power 
to  whom,  because  of  her  strength  and  achieve- 
ments, the  whole  Far  East  looked  for  guidance. 
The  result  of  later  events  on  this  moral  position 
will  be  noted  afterward. 

The  history  of  the  next  eight  years,  1906  to 
1914,  illustrates  how  hopeless  it  is  to  attempt 
to  isolate  the  Far  East  from  European  events. 
Russia 's  Far  Eastern  policy  had  left  her  almost 
without  influence  in  Europe,  and  Germany  and 
Austria  had  been  able  to  pursue  their  Balkan 
plans  in  comparative  peace.  But  after  1906  and 
more  clearly  after  1908  Russian  policy,  under 
the  leadership  of  the  Pan-Slavs,  began  to  pivot 
back  to  Europe  and  to  take  a  constantly  in- 
creasing interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  Balkans 
and  the  Near  East.  But  just  as  her  Far  East- 
ern policy  had  forced  a  sacrifice  of  her  Euro- 
pean policy,  so  this  new  European  policy  forced 
her  to  moderate  and  sacrifice  her  interests  in 
the  Far  East.  As  a  result,  in  1908,  she  liqui- 
dated— to  use  the  phrase  of  her  then  Foreign 


THE  FAR  EAST  193 

Minister  M.  Isvolski — her  interests  in  the  Far 
East  and  two  years  later  signed  an  alliance  with 
Japan  out  of  which  the  latter  drew  most  of  the 
practical  advantages  and  which  left  her  to  fol- 
low her  own  plans  in  the  Far  East  secure 
against  Russian  hostility  and  with  even  the 
possibility  of  Russian  aid.  In  the  same  way 
as  European  affairs  withdrew  from  the  Far 
East  one  of  the  great  moderating  influences 
against  Japan,  Russia;  so  it  followed  the  same 
course  with  another,  England.  In  1906  England 
was  still  vitally  interested  in  the  Far  East,  but 
as  the  German  danger  progressed  it  was  neces- 
sary more  and  more  to  orientate  her  policy  from 
European  considerations  and  to  leave  the  west- 
ern Pacific  more  and  more  to  itself.  The  de- 
fence against  a  possible  German  attack  forced 
England  to  concentrate  her  strength  in  the 
North  Sea  and  to  leave  the  defence  of  her 
Asiatic  interests  to  her  ally,  Japan,  and  to  pay 
for  that  defence  by  allowing  that  ally  a  more 
or  less  free  hand  to  carry  out  her  policy.  As 
a  result  Japan  in  1914  had  secured  an  almost 
free  hand  for  her  dealings  in  eastern  Asia. 

And  she  had  made  good  use  of  her  oppor- 
tunities. Between  1906  and  1910  Japan  had  an- 
nexed Corea,  a  process  which  was  marked  by 
repeated  breaches  of  faith  on  the  part  of  the 
Japanese  Government.  During  the  same  period 
and  in  the  next  four  years  she  had  pushed  her 
control  in  southern  Manchuria  to  the  detriment 
of  treaty  rights  and  in  defiance  of  the  principle 
of  the  Open  Door.     And  yet  it  ought  to  be 


194  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

brought  out  in  defence  of  Japanese  policy  dur- 
ing this  period  that  Japan  is  almost  vitally 
dependent  on  Corea  and  Manchuria  for  her  food 
supplies  and  raw  products.  To  allow  these  dis- 
tricts to  fall  into  the  hands  of  another  Power 
would  be  almost  suicidal,  and  the  Japanese  ef- 
forts to  chain  them  so  thoroughly  that  they 
cannot  so  escape  have  at  least  this  justification. 
But  the  breaches  of  treaty  right,  the  broken 
promises,  the  attempt  to  monopolize  all  trade 
in  Japanese  hands  leave  an  unpleasant  impres- 
sion on  almost  all  outsiders  who  study  the 
Japanese  policy  of  those  years. 

The  outbreak  of  the  European  war  in  1914 
was  of  no  small  aid  to  Japan  in  her  aims.  In 
the  first  place  it  completed  the  withdrawal  of 
England  and  Russia  referred  to  above ;  and,  in 
addition,  it  forced  these  Powers  to  call  on  Japan 
to  defend  their  interests  in  eastern  Asia,  for 
which  defence  Japan  could  be  enabled  to  de- 
mand payment  in  the  shape  of  a  free  hand  in 
China.  Again  the  Japanese  Government  pre- 
pared to  make  every  use  of  its  favorable  posi- 
tion. Soon  after  the  outbreak  of  the  European 
war  it  decided  to  use  the  opportunity  to 
expel  from  the  Far  East  one  of  the  European 
Powers,  Germany.  Germany  had  been  one  of 
the  sharers  in  European  imperialism  in  China, 
where  she  had  possessed  since  1898  the  port  of 
Kiao-Chow  and  extensive  mining  rights  in  the 
Shantung  peninsula  behind  it.  As  an  imperial- 
istic Power  her  policy  in  China  had  been  much 
like  that  of  the  others,  not  much  either  better 


THE  FAR  EAST  195 

or  worse.  But,  to  her,  the  Far  East  had  always 
been  a  secondary  interest,  inferior  to  her  in- 
terests in  the  Balkans  and  Turkey;  useful  as 
a  pawn  in  the  game  of  world  policy  more  than 
as  a  field  for  direct  German  influence.  In  the 
Far  East  she  seems  to  have,  in  the  main,  fol- 
lowed the  policy  of  Bismarck  who  always  strove 
to  lure  presumably  hostile  Powers  into  colonial 
expansion  either  in  order  that  they  might  quar- 
rel over  the  spoils  or  in  order  that  they  might 
dissipate  their  energies  in  distant  adventures 
and  leave  other  spheres  of  interest,  more  vital 
to  Germany,  free  for  the  aims  of  the  latter  to 
be  attained.  Kiao-Chow  was  an  outpost  of  em- 
pire, a  germ  of  future  empire  perhaps,  but  for 
the  time  being  merely  an  outpost,  which  Ger- 
many would  probably  have  sacrificed  to  attain 
her  more  immediate  and  more  vital  aims.  But 
when  Japan  demanded  the  withdrawal  of  the 
garrison  and  the  surrender  of  the  colony,  Ger- 
man honor  demanded  that  the  post  should  be 
held  to  the  end.  The  German  garrison  made 
a  gallant  defence  of  its  lonely  little  stronghold 
and  only  capitulated  to  overwhelming  force. 

The  capture  of  Kiao-Chow  marks  the  begin- 
ning of  the  present  stage  of  Japan's  march  to 
empire.  It  was  of  the  greatest  value  to  Japan 
in  that  it  gave  her  a  claim  on  the  gratitude  of 
the  Allies  who  might  moderate  her  future  pol- 
icy and  at  the  same  time  a  claim  on  the  gratitude 
of  China,  in  whose  interests  she  claimed — in 
somewhat  equivocal  language — the  expedition 
had  taken  place.    And  it  was  to  China  that  she 


196  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

turned  for  payment  for  the  service,  real  or 
pretended,  that  she  had  done,  and  in  this  claim 
for  payment  threw  off  the  mask  with  which  her 
imperialism  had,  thus  far,  been  covered.  For 
her  actions  in  Corea  and  Manchuria  Japan 
seems  to  have  had  at  least  the  shadow  of  an 
excuse,  but  her  demands,  now  made  on  China, 
were  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  bullying  of 
a  weak  Power  by  a  stronger.  They  may  be 
divided  into  two  classes,  first  the  class  of  de- 
mands which  aimed  at  economic  control  and 
economic  exploitation  of  China  by  Japan,  sec- 
ond a  class  of  demands — the  so-called  Group 
V — which  would  have  given  to  Japan  a  political 
control  in  China  as  well.  If  China  had  accepted 
the  entire  series  of  demands  made  on  her  she 
would  have  been  placed,  to  a  certain  extent, 
under  the  tutelage  and  protection  of  Japan. 
But  China  resisted.  And  during  the  delay  which 
this  resistance  brought  about  it  was  shown  that 
Japan's  position  of  predominance,  relative 
though  it  might  be,  was  not  absolute.  For  not 
only  the  United  States,  but  also,  after  some 
delay,  England  interfered  to  urge  the  Japanese 
Government  to  modify  and  soften  the  claims  it 
was  making.  Probably  Japan  saw  it  had  gone 
too  far,  at  least  for  the  present.  And  so  the 
political  part  of  her  demands  was  quietly  al- 
lowed to  drop,  while  the  economic  part  was 
pressed  with  a  flourish  of  an  ultimatum.  To 
this  China  yielded  and  the  question  was,  for  the 
time  being,  closed. 

Japan,  however,  made  no  small  gains  in  ex- 


THE  FAR  EAST  197 

tending  its  power  and  influence  in  the  Chinese 
Republic.  She  had  forced  China  to  recognize 
her  predominant  position  in  Manchuria,  secured 
an  extension  of  the  lease  of  Port  Arthur  and 
the  Manchurian  Railways  to  99  years,  and  full 
rights  to  establish  in  that  region  any  Japanese 
enterprise.  In  Shantung  she  not  only  secured 
all  the  economic  rights  hitherto  held  by  Ger- 
many, but  also  greatly  extended  them,  including 
the  right  to  build,  under  Japanese  control,  the 
new  railway  opening  up  the  northern  part  of 
the  peninsula.  She  secured  the  right  to  control 
and  almost  monopolize  the  great  coal  and  iron 
fields  in  the  Yangtze  valley.  Finally  she  se- 
cured at  least  a  prior  right  to  the  development 
of  Fu-Kien  province  in  southern  China.  Taken 
all  together,  these  concessions  constitute  the 
commencement,  at  least,  of  an  economic  monop- 
oly for  Japan  in  China.  Shantung  and  the  coal 
and  iron  fields  of  the  Yangtze  valley  are,  to- 
gether, the  great  mineral  fields  of  China  as  at 
present  developed,  and  both  of  these  have  now 
passed  under  the  control  of  Japan.  The  effect 
of  such  a  state  of  affairs  on  the  economic  posi- 
tion of  the  other  nations  in  China  is  reasonably 
obvious. 

Such,  then,  is  the  present  situation.  The  war 
in  Europe  has  forced  the  attention  of  England 
and  Russia  away  from  the  Far  East  and  has 
left  their  partner,  Japan,  predominant  there. 
The  latter  has  used  this  predominance,  as  all 
imperialistic  Powers  are  apt  to  do,  with  no  little 
ruthlessness  to  attain  their  ends.    But  it  has  not 


198  THE  WOKLD  PERIL 

been  all  pure  gain.  Her  ally,  England,  has  been 
forced  by  the  latest  events  to  take  a  position 
opposed  to  her,  and  the  probabilities  are  that 
the  old  alliance  and  friendship  of  the  years  be- 
fore the  war  will  not  be  renewed.  Moreover 
in  1906  Japan  was  in  a  strong  position  of  moral 
leadership  in  eastern  Asia:  the  other  nations 
looked  to  her  for  training  and  guidance  in  their 
development.  It  would  now  appear  that  much 
of  this  has  been  lost.  The  treatment  of  Corea, 
the  policy  pursued  in  Manchuria,  the  demands 
on  China  have  cost  Japan  in  moral  prestige. 
In  the  years  immediately  following  1906  many 
young  Chinese  students  went  to  Japan  for  their 
training.  But  the  stream  soon  turned  to  other 
quarters,  notably  to  America,  and  many  of  those 
who  had  gone  to  Japanese  training  schools  came 
home  in  disgust.  Every  indication  from  China 
seems  to  show  that  Japan  is  now  regarded  there, 
not  as  the  helpful  guide,  but  as  a  danger — a 
Power  to  be  feared.  Indeed  it  would  appear 
that  much  of  the  dread  and  dislike  with  which 
Eussian  policy  was  regarded  in  the  years  be- 
fore the  Russo-Japanese  war  has  now  turned 
toward  Japan.  Will  Japan  see  this,  and  modify 
her  course  accordingly,  or  will  she  continue  her 
imperialistic  projects?  That  question  the  fu- 
ture alone  can  answer. 

Thus  far  I  have  treated  the  problem  of  the 
Far  East  in  its  Asiatic  aspects  merely,  and 
without  any  consideration  of  the  American  in- 
terests involved  and  the  effect  it  may  have  on 
us.    But  the  United  States,  as  was  said  at  the 


THE  FAR  EAST  199 

beginning  of  this  article,  has  a  very  vital  in- 
terest in  this  problem  and  cannot  be  left  un- 
moved by  any  changes  that  occur  in  it.  What 
then  are  our  interests  in  the  Far  East?  In 
the  first  place  we  have  a  very  strong  interest 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of  China. 
For  the  last  dozen  years,  and  particularly  since 
the  establishment  of  the  Chinese  Republic,  that 
Power  has  looked  to  us  for  support  and  guidance 
in  its  attempt  to  become  a  living  and  up-to-date 
member  of  the  world  group  of  Powers.  From 
America  they  have  chosen  many  of  their  ad- 
visers, and  to  America  they  have  sent  many  of 
their  future  leaders  to  gain  the  benefit  of  Amer- 
ican training.  To  abandon  China  under  such 
circumstances  would  be  almost  the  betrayal  of 
a  trust.  Thus  we  must  oppose  the  attempts  of 
Japan  or  any  other  Power  to  secure  such  posi- 
tion or  influence  in  China  as  will  retard  or  warp 
the  development  of  the  Chinese  Republic  into 
a  first  class  independent  Power.  In  the  second 
place  we  have  an  old  and  well  established  trade 
with  China  which  ought  to  be  defended  by  every 
means  consonant  with  justice.  To  this  end,  and 
in  order  to  prevent  the  constant  trade  bicker- 
ings so  dangerous  to  the  peace  of  the  Far  East, 
we  have  originated  and  urged  the  policy  known 
as  the  "Open  Door." 

The  history  of  this  policy,  at  least  in  its  later 
developments,  is  rather  sad  reading  for  Amer- 
icans. For  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  of  late 
it  has  lost  and  is  steadily  losing  much  of  its 
power.    For  this  loss  circumstances,  such  as  the 


200  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

withdrawal  from  the  Far  East  of  our  co-de- 
fender of  this  policy,  Great  Britain,  are  cer- 
tainly partly  responsible.  But  at  least  a  share 
of  the  blame  for  its  relative  failure  must  fall  on 
us  for  lack  of  firmness  in  its  enforcement  against 
those  Powers  whose  policy  was  opposed  to  it. 
It  is  probably  true  that  a  majority  of  American 
citizens  would  not  have  approved  of  going  to 
war  for  its  maintenance,  but  that  fact  does  not 
entirely  excuse  the  seeming  diplomatic  supine- 
ness  with  which  we  have  allowed  its  infraction 
or  the  blindness  with  which  we,  at  least  on  one 
occasion,  "  cried  out  peace  where  there  was  no 
peace."  If  we  are  to  make  this  policy  felt  in 
the  Far  East  we  must  be  prepared  to  exercise 
more  strength,  at  least  diplomatically,  in  secur- 
ing its  enforcement. 

The  policy  of  the  "Open  Door"  as  originally 
laid  down  by  Secretary  Hay  in  1899  seems  to 
have  comprised  merely  the  establishment  of 
equal  opportunity  for  the  nationals  of  all 
Powers  within  the  already  established  ' '  spheres 
of  influence"  —  areas  which  certain  Powers 
had  staked  out  for  economic  exploitation  by 
members  of  their  own  nation.  But  it  would 
appear  that  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  Hay 
note  went  yet  further,  that  it  marked  the  desire 
of  the  United  States  not  only  to  limit  the  use 
of  these  " spheres  of  influence,"  but  also  to  pre- 
vent their  erection  in  the  future.  This  extension 
of  the  original  policy  seems  more  clearly 
brought  out  in  the  note  of  Secretary  Hay  to  the 
Russian  Government  dated  February  1,  1902, 


THE  FAR  EAST  201 

in  which  he  protests  against  the  erection  of  an 
exclusive  Russian  sphere  of  influence  in  Man- 
churia and  styles  it  a  violation  of  the  principle 
of  the  ' '  Open  Door. ' '  But  it  is  somewhat  doubt- 
ful if  the  United  States  can  balk  the  granting 
of  concessions  to  various  national  groups,  or 
if  it  would  be  wise  to  do  so  if  she  could.  China 
is  in  great  need  of  development,  and  absolutely 
lacking  in  the  capital  required  for  it.  And  yet  it 
is  doubtful  if,  under  present  circumstances,  cap- 
ital would  care  to  venture  into  Chinese  develop- 
ment unless  associated  in  national  groups  more 
or  less  under  the  supervision  of  their  govern- 
ments who  would  protect  them  in  local  disturb- 
ances or  in  difficulties  with  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment. But  we  have,  in  this,  at  least  the  germ 
of  a  "sphere  of  influence."  As  things  now 
stand,  we  are  face  to  face  with  a  dilemma: 
either  to  retard  the  development  of  China,  or 
else  to  allow  the  erection  of  what  may  easily 
become  "spheres  of  influence"  and  break  up 
the  Chinese  Republic.  But  might  not  a  way  be 
devised  which  will  avoid  both  difficulties? 

The  root  of  the  difficulty  appears  to  be  in  the 
nature  of  the  power  that  protects  the  capitalist 
in  his  work  of  development.  It  seems  to  be  in 
the  fact  that  this  protection  is  left  to  the  in- 
dividual governments,  some  of  whom  are  im- 
perialistic and  anxious  to  extend  in  every  pos- 
sible way  the  interests  of  their  nationals;  and 
is  not  in  the  hands  of  an  international  group 
in  which  the  more  moderate  Powers  can  restrain 
the  more  imperialistic.    But  of  late  years  a  new 


202  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

principle  appears  to  have  been  introduced,  that 
of  concerted  action.  It  took  the  form  of  an  in- 
ternational —  or  nearly  international  —  loan. 
Originally  loans  were  made  by  individual 
Powers,  but  between  1911  and  1913  a  proposi- 
tion was  brought  forward  for  concerted  action 
in  this  field :  the  so-called  Six  Power  Loan.  In 
this  financial  groups  from  the  six  Powers 
most  interested  in  China — England,  Germany, 
France,  Russia,  Japan  and  the  United  States — 
joined  to  furnish  money  to  the  Chinese  Republic 
in  return  for  a  certain  amount  of  supervision 
over  China's  economic  development.  This  su- 
pervision, probably,  went  too  far  and  consti- 
tuted, in  a  measure,  a  weakening  of  China's 
sovereignty,  and  for  that  reason,  as  well  as  be- 
cause of  a  fear  that  it  would  involve  us  in 
Oriental  complications,  the  support  of  the 
United  States  was  withdrawn  by  President 
Wilson  soon  after  his  inauguration  in  1913. 

But,  while  the  Six  Power  Loan,  as  a  specific 
measure,  may  have  been  open  to  grave  objec- 
tions, it  would  appear  that  the  principle  of 
concerted  action  in  the  field  of  the  economic 
development  of  China  has  distinct  advantages. 
For  it  would  insure  to  China  a  steady  supply 
of  foreign  capital  for  its  development,  and  at 
the  same  time  would  vest  the  control  and  pro- 
tection of  this  capital  in  an  international  body, 
in  which  the  more  moderate  Powers  could  re- 
strain the  others.  Some  sort  of  control  over 
China  seems  necessary,  at  least  until  the  new 
government  is  able  to  gain  a  firmer  grip  on  the 


THE  FAR  EAST  203 

situation.  And  the  temporary  nature  of  such 
control  could  be  secured  in  the  agreements,  and 
the  ultimate  return  of  the  concessions  to  Chinese 
control  could  be  made  certain — as  seems  to  have 
been  already  done — by  agreement  for  their  re- 
purchase at  the  end  of  a  term  of  years.  And 
at  any  rate  such  an  international  tutelage  would 
seem  to  be  an  advance  over  the  present  anarchy 
and  scramble  for  concessions. 

The  present  situation  in  the  Far  East,  if  the 
analysis  given  here  be  correct,  is  the  result  of 
the  withdrawal  of  the  moderating  Powers  in 
order  to  concentrate  their  attention  on  the  Euro- 
pean war,  leaving  Japan  practically  mistress 
of  the  scene.  To  this  must  be  added  the  dis- 
inclination of  the  United  States  to  take  a  strong 
policy  in  eastern  Asia,  nor  is  there  any  prob- 
ability that  this  policy,  whether  right  or  wrong 
in  the  past,  will  be  changed  now  that  we  have 
entered  the  European  struggle.  Japan  can  ex- 
pect, in  all  probability,  to  be  able  to  enjoy  her 
supremacy  until  the  day  when  peace  returns 
and  the  Powers  are  able  to  turn  their  attention 
again  to  these  regions.  We  may  then  be  able, 
in  all  probability,  to  count  on  England  and,  if 
we  play  our  cards  well,  on  the  Russian  Republic 
in  our  attempts  to  maintain  the  integrity  of 
China  and  equal  trade  opportunities  for  all.  To 
refuse  to  join  with  them  or  to  refuse  to  take 
such  steps  as  may  be  necessary  to  make  this 
entente  a  strong  factor  in  the  Far  East  would 
appear  to  be  the  height  of  unwisdom.  Alone 
we  can  do  but  little,  with  the  aid  of  other  Powers 


204  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  like  mind  with  ourselves  much  may  be  ac- 
complished. 

And  what  is  to  be  our  policy  toward  Japan? 
There  would  appear  to  be  three  courses  open 
to  us :  to  oppose  her,  to  come  to  terms  with  her, 
or  to  withdraw  from  the  affairs  of  the  Far 
East.  Japan  is  such  a  factor  in  the  situation 
that  for  us  to  attempt  any  policy  in  eastern 
Asia  without  dealing  with  her  appears  little 
short  of  impossible.  But  we  can  withdraw,  leave 
China  to  her  fate,  accept  such  a  share  in  trade  as 
the  others  will  leave  to  us  and  confine  our  atten- 
tion to  South  America  or  other  quarters  of  the 
world.  Such  a  policy  would  undoubtedly  be  one 
of  inglorious  safety,  for  Japan  is  not  likely  to 
attack  us  on  account  of  the  immigration  ques- 
tion alone.  But  do  the  people  of  the  United 
States  wish  to  follow  this  inglorious  policy? 
Are  we  prepared  to  give  up  the  position  we 
have  gained  in  the  Far  East?  Are  we  ready 
to  abandon  China  to  its  fate?  It  is  very  doubt- 
ful if  a  majority  of  American  citizens  would 
agree  to  this  proposition,  and  until  they  do  it  is 
idle  to  waste  time  in  its  discussion.  As  a  nation 
we  intend  to  have  a  Far  Eastern  policy,  and, 
by  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  our  policy  must 
deal  with  that  of  Japan. 

Shall  we  oppose  the  Japanese  policy?  Cer- 
tainly the  policy  of  that  Power  is  in  many  ways 
opposed  to  ours  in  China.  But  to  answer  fully 
the  question,  we  must  ask  ourselves  another: 
how  far  do  we  intend  to  carry  this  opposition? 
If  Japan  refuses  to  yield  to  our  wishes  are  we 


THE  FAR  EAST  205 

prepared  to  go  to  war  in  order  to  secure  their 
recognition?  To  employ  half  measures,  to 
threaten  and  oppose  and  then  to  yield  when 
it  comes  to  the  fundamental  point  would  gain 
us  no  advantage  and  would  prove  to  the  whole 
world  our  weakness  as  a  world  Power.  But 
are  the  American  people  willing  to  go  to  war 
with  Japan  over  the  Far  East?  Only,  it  would 
appear,  if  the  question  was  a  vital  one,  and  if 
every  method  of  conciliation  had  been  tried  and 
failed.  And  what  is  the  advantage  of  adopting 
a  policy  of  uncompromising  hostility  to  Japan 
if  the  American  people  are  to  repudiate  it  in 
the  end?  That  they  would  back  up  a  firmer 
policy  is  probable,  that  they  would  accept  war 
if  Japan  obstinately  opposed  us  on  a  vital  point 
is  reasonably  sure,  but  they  will  ask  for  assur- 
ance that  everything  within  reason  and  honor 
has  been  done  to  conciliate  a  proud  and  sensi- 
tive nation. 

Then  there  is  another  reason  which  should 
urge  Americans  to  go  slow  in  their  hostility  to 
Japan.  At  present  Japan  is  in  the  position  of 
reconsidering  her  alliances.  Her  old  leagues 
with  Eussia  and  England  are  losing  their  value 
to  her,  that  with  Russia  on  account  of  the  weak- 
ness of  the  present  Government  and  its  probable 
concentration  of  attention,  in  the  years  imme- 
diately following  the  war,  on  internal  questions ; 
that  with  England  seems  to  have  outlived  its 
usefulness  to  both  Powers,  and  ominous  rents 
are  appearing  in  its  fabric.  Whither  shall  Ja- 
pan turn?    Why  not  to  Germany?    For  her  such 


206  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

an  alliance  would  have  many  advantages.  The 
Far  East  seems  to  be  a  secondary  interest  for 
Germany,  in  so  far  as  colonial  expansion  is  con- 
cerned, and  she  would  gladly  make  concessions 
to  Japan  in  this  region  in  return  for  her  sup- 
port there  and  elsewhere  against  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.  In  addition  she  might 
ask  for  the  Philippines — remember  the  events 
of  1898 — but  Japan  might  be  willing  to  allow 
Germany  a  foothold  there.  Her  interests  are 
predominantly  on  the  mainland  in  China,  and 
the  Philippines  in  German  hands  might  prove 
a  useful  counter  weight,  in  Japan's  eyes,  to  the 
English  colonies  in  Australia  and  New  Zealand. 
So  long  as  she  is  left  undisturbed  in  China,  it 
is  not  to  Japan's  disadvantage  that  others 
should  quarrel  in  the  other  parts  of  the  Pacific 
and  leave  her  free  to  pursue  her  own  plans  or 
to  mediate  between  them. 

The  Zimmermann  note  is  a  sufficient  indication 
that  this  alliance  would  be  welcomed  by  Ger- 
many. But  for  further  illustration  of  this  note 
and  of  the  policy  which  underlies  it  the  words 
of  Von  Reventlow — written  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  war  and  therefore  free  from 
any  of  the  prejudices  of  the  present  situation — 
would  seem  worthy  of  quotation  and  of  careful 
pondering  by  Americans :  ' '  Japan  and  the  Ger- 
man Empire  are  from  their  geographical  posi- 
tion, from  their  relations  and  interests  pecu- 
liarly fitted  to  work  together  in  close  alliance. 
Should  firm  and  well  regulated  connections  be 
formed  between  the  two  Powers,  it  would  result, 


THE  FAR  EAST  207 

sooner  or  later,  in  a  decided  relief  to  Germany 
in  the  North  Sea,  and  a  strengthening  of  its 
position  toward  Europe,  toward  East  Asia  and, 
last  but  not  least,  toward  the  United  States. 
Japan  would  make  yet  greater  gains  in  its  free- 
dom from  the  present  English  patronage,  fur- 
ther in  its  differences  with  the  United  States. ' ' 
That  a  victorious  Germany  would  plan  such  an 
alliance  is  only  too  probable,  and  connects,  in 
a  way,  the  work  of  our  soldiers  in  Europe  with 
the  defence  of  our  interests  in  the  distant  Far 
East. 

Should  such  an  alliance  take  form  the  only 
course  for  the  United  States  would  appear  to 
be  an  immediate  alliance  with  the  British  Em- 
pire— equally  threatened  in  the  Far  East — and 
an  immediate  strengthening  of  our  Pacific  fleet 
to  such  a  force  as  would  enable  it  to  cope 
easily  with  the  Japanese  navy  unaided.  Bare 
considerations  of  safety  would  demand  such  a 
course.  But  it  is  not  at  all  sure  that  Japan, 
despite  certain  obvious  advantages,  would  wish 
to  pursue  such  a  policy.  It  would  involve  a 
complete  change  in  her  system  of  foreign  pol- 
icy, and,  unless  the  advantages  are  certain,  such 
a  complete  diplomatic  change  of  front  is  seldom 
wise.  Moreover  it  is  not  at  all  sure  that  the 
present  disinterestedness  of  Germany  in  the  Far 
East  will  continue.  He  who  sups  with  the  Devil 
must  use  a  long  spoon,  and  it  is  doubtful  if 
Japan  would  gain  by  the  supplanting  of  two 
moderate  Powers  such  as  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States  by  a  Power  like  Germany  in 


208  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

whom  the  appetite  for  imperialism  is  still  un- 
whetted.  And  especially  is  it  unlikely  if  the 
United  States  can  find  a  course  on  which  it 
can  agree  with  Japan  and  conciliate  their  some- 
what contending  interests.  Can  such  an  agree- 
ment be  found? 

The  sources  of  difference  with  Japan  seem  to 
be  two,  one  the  question  of  immigration,  the 
other  the  question  of  the  Far  East.  With  re- 
gard to  the  first  difference  the  difficulty  of  ad- 
justment does  not  seem  to  be  insuperable.  In  the 
first  place  it  would  appear,  if  the  " Memoirs" 
of  Hyashi  are  to  be  trusted,  that  the  question 
of  Japanese  immigration  constituted  for  Japan 
merely  a  pawn  which  she  could  use  in  her  dif- 
ferences with  the  United  States  in  the  Far  East. 
But  it  seems  to  have  been  magnified  by  the 
methods  taken  in  this  country  to  restrict  such 
immigration,  or  to  prevent  those  already  here 
from  gaining  any  foothold  in  the  country.  If 
you  have  a  difference  with  a  nation,  said  a  sage 
diplomat,  you  should  be  careful  to  be  scrupu- 
lously courteous  in  small  things.  This  advice 
we  appear  to  have  neglected.  Some  of  our  State 
legislation  cannot  but  have  been  insulting  to  a 
nation  as  proud  and  sensitive  as  are  the  Japan- 
ese. And  even  if,  to  official  Japan,  this  question 
is  not  of  vital  importance  compared  with  others, 
with  popular  Japan — and  popular  Japan  is  not 
without  power — this  question  is  a  real  stumbling 
block  to  reconciliation.  Let  us  hope  that  our 
western  legislatures  will  take  all  due  care  in 
handling  this  difference,  especially  while  Japan 


THE  FAR  EAST  209 

is  loyally  observing  her  gentleman's  agreement 
to  restrain  immigration.  And  at  present  this 
seems  to  be  the  case.  Furthermore,  in  future 
discussion  of  the  question,  for  it  is  sure  to  come 
up  again  sooner  or  later,  let  us  endeavor,  so  far 
as  possible,  to  avoid  anything  wounding  to 
Japan's  pride.  That  Americans  and  Japanese 
do  not  get  along  well  together  on  the  Pacific 
coast  does  not  mean  that  they  are  in  any  way 
inferior  to  us,  but  merely  that  they  are  differ- 
ent. Moreover  the  problem  seems,  at  bottom, 
mainly  an  economic  one  which  time  may  settle. 
But  at  the  present  moment,  when  Japan  needs 
her  sons  elsewhere  and  is  willing  to  discourage 
immigration,  it  will  do  us  no  good  to  raise  the 
question  unnecessarily.    Let  sleeping  dogs  lie. 

The  second  difference  demands  more  imme- 
diate attention  and  is,  in  itself,  probably  more 
difficult  in  solution.  Is  there  any  way  in  which 
the  interests  of  Japan  and  the  United  States 
may  be  reconciled  in  the  Far  East?  Perhaps 
a  possible  solution  might  lie  along  this  line :  The 
expansionist  movement  in  Japan  follows  two 
directions,  one  to  Corea,  Manchuria  and  inner 
Mongolia,  the  other  toward  China  proper.  With 
the  first  we  have  much  less  objection  than  to 
the  second.  Japan  has  a  real  economic  need 
for  Corea  and  Manchuria,  they  furnish  a  large 
amount  of  her  foodstuffs  and  in  return  take  a 
goodly  share  of  Japan's  manufactures.  For 
their  possession  Japan  has  fought  two  wars  and 
spent  countless  blood  and  treasure.  Moreover 
Manchuria  is  only  in  the  widest  sense  of  the 


210  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

term  part  of  China,  an  outlying  district,  almost 
a  protectorate,  not  an  integral  part  of  the  Re- 
public, nor  has  Japan  ever  refused  to  recognize 
Chinese  sovereignty  there.  Corea  was  once  an 
independent  kingdom  and  is  now  an  integral 
part  of  the  Japanese  Empire.  However  much 
we  may  dislike  the  methods  by  which  it  was 
annexed  it  is  doubtful  if  anything  can  be  done 
now  to  change  its  status  short  of  war  with 
Japan.  England  and  Russia,  our  potential 
allies  in  our  Far  Eastern  policy,  have  bowed 
to  accomplished  facts  and  recognized  Japan's 
predominant  interest  in  Manchuria  and  her  an- 
nexation of  Corea.  Our  course  has  been  a 
rather  ambiguous  one,  marked  by  the  ill  fated 
attempt  of  Secretary  Knox  to  neutralize  the 
Manchurian  railways  in  1910. 

If  we  should  recognize  Japan's  position  in 
Corea  and  Manchuria,  agree  to  put  no  obstacles 
in  her  path  there,  what  would  we  lose  ?  We  still 
possess  some  trade  in  these  regions,  part — 
which  would  probably  remain — in  goods  in 
which  Japanese  competition  is  either  non- 
existent or  weak ;  the  remaining  interests  might 
be  granted  a  term  of  years  to  move  elsewhere. 
Then  we  would,  in  a  way,  have  compromised 
our  position  toward  the  Open  Door  and  toward 
the  integrity  of  China.  But  is  it  wise  to  try  to 
remedy  our  mistakes  of  yesterday  by  vigorous 
and  continued  protests  against  actions  commit- 
ted long  since?  Nor  is  the  real  integrity  of 
China  threatened.  If  the  Chinese  Republic  be- 
comes, as  we  hope,  a  strong  Power,  Japan  can 


THE  FAR  EAST  211 

no  more  hold  Manchuria  against  her  than  Eng- 
land could  hold  Belgium  against  the  German 
Empire,  if  Belgium  wished  to  join  Germany. 
Japan's  only  salvation  in  that  day  will  be  her 
friendship  for  England,  Russia  and  the  United 
States  and  the  support  of  the  people  of  Man- 
churia, won  by  years  of  good  government.  And 
if  she  follows  this  policy  we  ought  to  be  content. 
And  what  can  we  gain  in  return  for  these  con- 
cessions? We  can  ask  of  Japan  to  join  with 
England,  Russia  and  ourselves  in  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  China  and  equal  trade  oppor- 
tunity for  all.  We  might  ask  them  to  join  with 
us  to  form  at  least  the  nucleus  of  an  interna- 
tional organization  to  supervise  the  economic 
development  of  China.  Such  a  union  of  effort 
would  preserve  the  fundamental  principles  in 
the  policy  of  both  Japan  and  the  United  States. 
For  Japan  it  would  mean  undisturbed  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  Manchuria  and  Corea,  and 
the  opportunity  to  win,  in  China,  all  the  trade 
that  fair  competitive  measures  would  allow.  It 
might  mean  a  defeat  for  the  more  imperialistic 
sections  of  the  Japanese  people,  but  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  their  policy,  carrying  with  it  the  aliena- 
tion of  Russia,  England,  the  United  States  and 
China,  is,  in  the  long  run,  the  wise  one  for  the 
Japanese  Empire.  For  us  it  would  mean  the 
preservation  of  the  integrity  of  China  proper 
and  of  the  "Open  Door."  Indirectly  we  would 
gain  by  the  development  of  Corea  and  Man- 
churia, for  Japan  has  a  large  trade  with  us  and 
we  could  gain  by  her  prosperity. 


212  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

Such  in  its  general  outline  is  a  possible  plan 
by  which  Japan  and  the  United  States  may  be 
reconciled.  It  is  only  put  forward  as  a  possible 
plan  and  without  any  attempt  to  give  more 
than  the  most  general  outline,  for  to  do  other- 
wise, in  this  changing  world  situation,  would 
be  not  only  useless  but  probably  unwise.  But 
may  not  the  hope  be  expressed  that,  in  some 
way  or  other,  this  favorable  opportunity  can  be 
grasped  and  the  present  alliance  between  Japan 
and  the  United  States  against  the  German  dan- 
ger be  extended  into  an  agreement  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  eastern  Asia  and  to  the  United  States 
and  Japan  themselves? 

It  may  seem  a  far  field  from  the  present  world 
danger  of  German  arms  to  the  Far  East  with 
its  seemingly  separate  problems,  its  peculiar 
animosities  and  alliances.  And  yet,  in  an  in- 
direct way,  it  would  seem  that  this  situation  is 
a  result  of  the  German  attempt  at  world  rule. 
The  German  danger  has  withdrawn  first  Rus- 
sia, then  England  and  lastly  the  United  States 
from  the  Far  East  and  forced  them  to  concen- 
trate their  attention  in  Europe.  And  Japan  has 
been  left  predominant  and  unchecked  in  eastern 
Asia.  The  German  peril  is  as  great  in  these  dis- 
placements it  effects  in  the  world  situation  as 
in  its  more  direct  results  in  Europe  and  the  Near 
East.  And  these  effects,  with  their  vital  im- 
portance to  us,  deserve  the  serious  consideration 
of  all  American  citizens. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  WORLD  PERIL  AND  WORLD  PEACE 

The  War  For  International  Freedom 

Philip  Marshall  Brown 
introduction 

The  United  States  from  August,  1914,  till 
April,  1917,  experimented  with  every  possible 
brand  of  neutrality  to  find  itself  in  the  end  re- 
luctantly, though  inexorably,  drawn  into  the 
great  conflict.  First  we  tried  the  anaemic 
variety  of  neutrality,  the  paralysis  of  moral 
and  intellectual  powers.  Then  we  more  or  less 
unconsciously  assumed  the  impossible  role  of 
the  benevolent  neutral,  hoping  for  the  success 
of  the  Entente  Allies.  And  finally  we  resorted 
to  the  dubious  expedient  of  armed,  malevolent 
neutrality. 

We  were  afforded  all  possible  opportunities 
and  leisure  to  study  the  whole  situation  in  or- 
der to  ascertain  our  precise  obligations  toward 
the  struggle.  We  did  not  enter  the  war  blindly 
under  any  illusions.  We  have  voted  vast  cred- 
its. We  have  our  naval  and  military  forces 
actually  in  Europe.  Breaking  with  all  our  tra- 
ditions and  prejudices,  we  have  resorted  to  con- 
scription to  raise  an  enormous  army  to  send 

213 


214  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

across  the  seas.  We  believe  ourselves  prepared 
to  make  the  frightful  sacrifices  demanded  as 
the  price  of  victory. 

In  spite  of  all  this,  the  American  people,  with 
no  implied  disloyalty  but  with  a  spirit  of  honest 
inquiry,  are  asking  the  reason  for  all  this  sacri- 
fice. They  are  insistently  demanding  that  we 
should  define  clearly  the  final  goal,  the  exact 
aims  of  the  war.  On  every  side  is  heard  the 
question:   "What  are  we  fighting  for?" 

President  Wilson  as  the  official  spokesman 
and  the  rightful  leader  of  the  nation  in  foreign 
affairs  has  repeatedly  tried  to  state  the  aims 
of  the  United  States  in  entering  the  war.  In 
his  memorable  message  to  Congress  on  April  2 
he  said: 

"The  present  German  warfare  against  com- 
merce is  a  warfare  against  mankind.  It  is  a 
war  against  all  nations.  .  .  .  The  challenge  is 
to  all  mankind.  .  .  . 

"Our  motive  will  not  be  revenge  or  the  vic- 
torious assertion  of  the  physical  might  of  the 
nation,  but  only  the  vindication  of  right,  of 
human  right,  of  which  we  are  only  a  single 
champion. 

' '  Our  object  ...  is  to  vindicate  the  principles 
of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life  of  the  world 
against  selfish  and  autocratic  power  and  to  set 
up  amongst  the  really  free  and  self-governed 
peoples  of  the  world  such  a  concert  of  purpose 
and  of  action  as  will  henceforth  insure  the  ob- 
servance of  those  principles. 


WORLD  PEACE  215 

"Neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or  desirable 
where  the  peace  of  the  world  is  involved  and 
the  freedom  of  its  peoples,  and  the  menace  to 
that  peace  and  freedom  lies  in  the  existence  of 
autocratic  governments  backed  by  organized 
force  which  is  controlled  wholly  by  their  will, 
not  by  the  will  of  their  people.  We  have  seen 
the  last  of  neutrality  in  such  circumstances. 

"We  are  glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with 
no  veil  of  false  pretence  about  them,  to  fight 
thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world  and 
for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples,  the  German 
people  included :  for  the  rights  of  nations  great 
and  small  and  the  privilege  of  men  everywhere 
to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience. 
The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy. 
Its  peace  must  be  planted  upon  the  trusted 
foundations  of  political  liberty. 

"It  will  be  all  the  easier  for  us  to  conduct 
ourselves  as  belligerents  in  a  high  spirit  of 
right  and  fairness  because  we  act  without  ani- 
mus, not  in  enmity  toward  a  people  or  with 
the  desire  to  bring  any  injury  or  disadvantage 
upon  them,  but  only  in  armed  opposition  to  an 
irresponsible  government  which  has  thrown 
aside  all  considerations  of  humanity  and  of 
right  and  is  running  amuck." 

No  argument  is  needed  to  demonstrate  that 
we  are  grappling  with  an  international  outlaw 
who  "is  running  amuck."  President  Wilson 
spoke  for  the  whole  country  when,  in  reply  to 
the  insolent  command  of  Germany  to  remain 


216  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

cravenly  at  home,  he  answered :  ' '  There  is  one 
choice  we  cannot  make,  we  are  incapable  of 
making :  we  will  not  choose  the  path  of  submis- 
sion and  suffer  the  most  sacred  rights  of  our 
nation  and  our  people  to  be  ignored  or  violated. 
The  wrongs  against  which  we  now  array  our- 
selves are  not  common  wrongs;  they  reach  out 
to  the  very  roots  of  human  life."  (Message  of 
April  2.) 

There  can  be  no  equivocation,  no  uncertainty, 
no  doubt  concerning  this  immediate  reason  for 
entering  the  war,  nor  any  failure  to  concentrate 
every  energy  on  its  successful  prosecution.  The 
world  must  be  rid  of  this  assassin  of  the  sea, 
this  red  handed  apostle  of  Schrecklichkeit,  this 
international  outlaw,  this  government  that 
" knows  no  law"  except  the  law  of  its  own  brutal 
necessity.  There  can  be  no  argument  on  this 
point.  We  know  full  well  what  we  are  fighting 
against!  But  are  we  clear  what  we  are  fighting 
for?  This  is  the  legitimate  question.  After  the 
outlaw  is  defeated,  after  he  is  rendered  harm- 
less, what  then?  What  are  the  larger  aims  of 
this  war?  Are  we  fighting  for  the  restoration 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  for  the  freedom 
of  Poland  and  Bohemia,  or  are  we  fighting  for 
something  that  is  equally  vital  to  ourselves  as 
well  as  to  Europe? 

To  this  demand  for  a  definition  of  the  objects 
of  this  war  President  Wilson  has  replied :  ' '  The 
world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy. ' '  This 
conception  of  our  role  as  a  responsible  member 
of  the  great  family  of  nations  is  lofty  and  vast. 


WORLD  PEACE  217 

One  may  recognize  its  profound  truth  but  feel 
incapable  of  denning  with  any  precision  its 
practical  application.  We  are  bound  therefore 
to  make  certain  that  this  battle  cry,  this  inspir- 
ing announcement  of  our  great  purpose  in  enter- 
ing the  war  should  not  remain  a  vain  and 
magniloquent  phrase.  To  be  of  value  it  must 
mean  something  simple  and  vital  for  every 
American.  We  must  reduce  it  to  intelligible 
and  practical  terms.  This  may  be  best  done,  it 
seems  to  me,  first  by  defining  our  goal,  and  sec- 
ondly by  defining  the  methods  by  which  we  may 
attain  it. 

What  then  do  we  mean  by  this  fight ' '  to  make 
the  world  safe  for  democracy"?  What  is  the 
vital  significance  of  this  struggle  for  interna- 
tional freedom?  First  of  all  we  need  to  recall 
certain  larger  aspects  of  the  eternal  fight  for 
freedom  for  which  mankind  has  shed  rivers  of 
blood. 

There  is  an  inspiring  significance  in  the  fact 
that  on  the  walls  of  Washington's  old  home  at 
Mount  Vernon  hangs  the  rusty  key  of  the  Bas- 
tile,  that  bloody  citadel  of  "the  divine  rights  of 
kings  to  rule  badly."  It  was  splendidly  fit- 
ting that  Lafayette  should  have  brought  this 
eloquent  trophy  of  the  battle  for  freedom  in 
France  to  his  old  comrade  in  the  battle  for 
freedom  in  America. 

We  must  remind  ourselves  that  Washington 
and  Lafayette  did  not  fight  merely  against  a 
crazy  king  or  on  account  of  an  ancient  enmity 
between  France  and  England.    Their  fight  was 


218  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

essentially  a  fight  in  behalf  of  the  rights  of 
democracy  in  England  and  France,  as  well  as 
in  America.  Trevelyan,  the  British  historian, 
reminds  us  that  many  of  his  countrymen  ' '  could 
not  forget  that  their  opponents  were  English- 
men, with  a  deeper  grievance  even  than  their 
own  against  the  same  set  of  perverse  and  un- 
wise rulers,  speaking  the  very  same  mother 
tongue,  professing  the  same  religion  and  own- 
ing the  same  great  history  and  the  same  glorious 
literature  as  themselves.  The  Americans  justi- 
fied their  political  action  by  precedents  derived 
from  the  Long  Parliament  and  the  Revolution 
of  1688."  ("  George  the  Third  and  Charles 
Fox,"  Vol.  II,  p.  199.) 

Louis  XVI,  in  aiding  the  American  Revolu- 
tion against  the  hereditary  enemy  of  France, 
was  permitted  by  the  irony  of  fate  to  make  his 
own  contribution  to  the  cause  of  freedom  which 
later  was  to  involve  his  own  throne  and  life. 
The  French  Revolution,  like  the  American  Revo- 
lution, was  not  merely  an  uprising  against  a 
" perverse"  and  "unwise"  ruler.  With  all  its 
demoralization  and  excesses,  as  with  its  modern 
counterpart  in  Russia,  it  was  the  expression  of 
a  universal  force,  the  dynamic,  explosive,  de- 
structive and  constructive  power  of  democracy 
throughout  the  world.  It  bore  terrible  testi- 
mony to  the  truth  that  it  is  never  safe  to  oppose 
the  divine  right  of  democracy  to  rule,  whether 
wisely  or  badly. 

Another  epochal  event  in  the  great  struggle 
for  freedom  was  the  promulgation  of  the  Mon- 


WORLD  PEACE  219 

roe  Doctrine  to  the  effect  that  Europe  should 
never  be  permitted  to  interfere  with  the  devel- 
opment of  the  free  democratic  nations  of  this 
western  hemisphere.  It  was  a  bold  direct 
answer  to  the  threat  of  the  Holy  Alliance  to 
fight  democracy  wherever  it  might  show  its 
head.  It  is  of  striking  and  peculiar  interest 
at  this  time  to  recall  the  avowed  purpose  of 
the  Alliance  as  revealed  in  the  first  article  of 
the  secret  Treaty  of  Verona  signed  November 
22,  1822: 

"The  high  contracting  Powers  being  con- 
vinced that  the  system  of  representative  gov- 
ernment is  equally  as  incompatible  with  the 
monarchical  principles  as  the  maxim  of  the  sov- 
ereignty of  the  people  with  the  divine  right, 
engage  mutually,  in  the  most  solemn  manner, 
to  use  all  their  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  sys- 
tem of  representative  governments,  in  whatever 
country  it  may  exist  in  Europe,  and  to  prevent 
its  being  introduced  in  those  countries  where 
it  is  not  yet  known." 

It  is  difficult  fully  to  appreciate  the  magnifi- 
cent service  rendered  to  the  cause  of  freedom 
by  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
We  should  remind  ourselves  that  the  nations 
of  this  hemisphere  were  left  free  to  determine 
their  own  destinies,  and  that  they  have  been 
spared  the  unhappy  struggles  and  the  criminal 
operations  of  the  policy  of  balance  of  power 
which  has  wrought  such  disaster  in  Europe. 
This  is  why  President  Wilson  has  proposed 
"that  the  nations  should  with  one  accord  adopt 


220  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

the  doctrine  of  President  Monroe  as  the  doc- 
trine of  the  world:  that  no  nation  should  seek 
to  extend  its  policy  over  any  other  nation  or 
people,  but  that  every  people  should  be  left 
free  to  determine  its  own  policy,  its  own  way 
of  development,  unhindered,  unthreatened,  un- 
afraid, the  little  along  with  the  great  and  the 
powerful."    (Message,  January  22,  1917.) 

This  is  the  answer  of  America  to  the  unholy 
alliance  of  Germany,  Austria-Hungary  and 
Turkey,  whose  purpose  to  crush  the  rights  of 
other  nations  and  control  their  destinies  has 
been  clearly  revealed. 

It  is  well  to  recall  the  great  revolutionary 
struggle  in  behalf  of  democracy  that  swept 
Europe  in  1848.  We  must  not  forget  how  Hun- 
gary, with  the  enthusiastic  sympathy  of  the 
American  people,  fought  in  vain  for  liberty; 
how  she  was  finally  crushed  by  the  combined 
forces  of  Austria  and  Russia,  and  how  today, 
alas,  this  very  Hungary  tyrannizes  over  her 
own  subject  nationalities,  the  Croats  and  the 
Rumanians.  We  should  recall  the  disdain  with 
which  Frederick  William  IV  of  Prussia  declined 
a  crown  at  the  hands  of  the  people  in  1849.  We 
should  not  forget  how  popular  demands  for  the 
right  of  democracy  to  rule  were  cynically  met 
by  the  Prussian  Constitution  of  1850  which 
still  constitutes  today  the  bulwark  of  the 
Hohenzollerns.  While  other  countries  in  Europe 
were  steadily  winning  their  constitutional  free- 
dom, Germany  and  Austria,  with  their  present 
ally  Turkey,  were  able  to  stand  firm  in  the  de- 


WORLD  PEACE  221 

fence  of  autocracy  and  reaction.  The  war  of 
1870,  though  it  brought  humiliation  and  disaster 
to  France,  also  brought  about  the  firm  estab- 
lishment of  the  Republic  which  Bismarck  had 
cynically  encouraged  because  he  believed  it 
would  mean  a  weaker  neighbor.  Germany,  on 
the  other  hand,  because  of  its  material  triumphs 
became  more  submissive  than  before  to  the  ar- 
rogant domination  of  Prussian  militarism. 

The  failure  of  the  fight  for  freedom  in  Ger- 
many needs  no  demonstration.  The  present 
archaic,  feudalistic  government  stands  out  as 
an  ugly  crude  fact.  The  system  which  permits 
Prussia  to  dominate  Germany,  which  permits 
a  militaristic  minority  to  control  Prussia,  which 
leaves  to  the  King-Emperor  the  right  to  veto 
any  initiative  even  in  respect  to  changes  in  the 
constitution  has  been  amply  condemned  by 
Germans  themselves.  Rohrbach,  in  "German 
World  Policies,"  which  the  translator,  Von 
Mach,  asserts  to  have  "probably  inspired  more 
Germans  than  any  other  book  published  since 
1871,"  alluding  to  the  recommendation  of  a 
Chinese  commission  that  China  should  adopt 
the  Prussian  form  of  government,  remarks : 

"Theoretically  many  things  may  be  said  in 
favor  of  such  a  system  for  a  community  like 
China;  actually,  however,  a  reform  which  was 
intended  to  advance  freedom  could  not  have 
been  proclaimed  more  inauspiciously  even  in 
China  than  by  basing  it  on  a  system  which 
everywhere  else  in  the  world  was  regarded  as 
reactionary.  .  .  . 


222  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

"If  the  leading  classes  in  Germany  show  that 
they  wish  to  continue  conditions  which  are  not 
conservative  in  a  moderate  sense  of  the  word, 
but  reactionary  and  politically  immoral,  it  is 
they  and  not  the  press  of  the  opposition  which 
are  responsible  for  the  damaged  reputation  and 
influence  of  our  national  idea  abroad,    (p.  218) 

"Since  even  Bismarck  in  his  masterful  way 
adopted  at  home  the  principle  of  freedom  for 
the  sake  of  the  respect  which  it  would  win  for 
the  Empire  abroad,  we  might  well  learn  how 
wise  and  useful  it  would  be  if  we  permitted  a 
new  spirit  to  transform  our  national  life  today 
in  a  way  which  would  strengthen  us  at  home 
and  be  unfailingly  effective  abroad."    (p.  219) 

The  movement  now  going  on  in  Germany  in 
behalf  of  political  reform,  if  favored  at  all  by 
the  Government,  would  undoubtedly  be  favored 
principally  for  the  cynical  purpose  of  "the  re- 
spect which  it  would  win  for  the  Empire 
abroad"!  We  must  be  on  our  guard  against 
a  revolution  made  to  order  in  Germany! 

There  are  those  who  argue  that  it  is  nobody's 
concern  what  kind  of  government  the  Germans 
may  live  under,  if  they  are  contented.  This 
would  be  true  in  the  main  were  it  not  for  the 
unhappy  fact  that  the  autocratic  rule  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  enables  Prussian  militarism  to 
threaten  the  freedom  of  other  peoples  than  the 
Germans  themselves.  As  long  as  this  system 
prevails,  the  peace  and  happiness  of  Europe, 
and — as  we  now  see — the  peace  and  happiness 
of  the  whole  world  are  constantly  in  danger. 


WORLD  PEACE  223 

The  proofs  of  this  fact  are  to  be  found,  first 
of  all,  in  the  public  utterances  of  the  Kaiser 
and  of  the  leading  representative  men  of  Ger- 
many. The  sacred  mission  of  German  Kultur 
to  civilize  and  dominate  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  been  repeatedly  proclaimed  in  no  uncertain 
terms.  Rohrbach  has  fervently  expressed  this 
creed  as  follows: 

"We  start  very  consciously  with  the  convic- 
tion that  we  have  been  placed  in  the  arena  of 
the  world  in  order  to  work  out  moral  perfection, 
not  only  for  ourselves,  but  for  all  mankind. 
("German  World  Policies,"  p.  4.) 

".  .  .  Rome  had  to  be  the  mistress  of  the 
world  before  she  could  determine  the  political 
and  legal  thoughts  of  future  generations. 

"It  is  not  necessary  to  claim  for  the  German 
idea  that  it  will  exist  like  the  Roman  either  as 
the  mistress  of  the  world  or  not  at  all,  but  it 
is  right  to  say  that  it  will  exist  only  as  the  co- 
mistress  of  the  culture  of  the  world,  or  it  will 
not  exist  at  all.    (p.  5) 

"...  Germany's  fate  is  England.  .  .  .  The 
man  who  has  studied  the  progress  of  the  world 
during  the  last  hundred  years,  and  who  knows 
something  of  the  world  today  from  his  own  ob- 
servation, knows  that  there  is  only  one  impor- 
tant national-political  question:  'Is  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  type  destined  to  gain  the  sole  dominion 
in  those  parts  of  the  world  where  things  are 
still  in  the  process  of  development,  or  will  there 
be  sufficient  scope  also  for  the  German  idea  to 
take  part  in  the  shaping  of  the  culture  of  the 
world  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean?'  "   (p.  8) 


224  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

The  naive  significance  of  this  argument  is 
surely  extraordinary.  No  word  whatever  con- 
cerning the  role  of  Slavic,  Latin,  Dutch  and 
other  national  " cultures"  in  the  development 
of  civilization!  Not  at  all!  We  have  here  the 
proposition  and  the  challenge  that  England  and 
the  United  States  must  share  with  Germany 
the  domination  of  the  world!  This  western 
hemisphere  "where  things  are  still  in  the  pro- 
cess of  development"  must  be  opened  up  to 
German  Kultur!  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  in 
other  words,  must  definitely  be  abandoned! 

These  ideas  are  not  the  ideas  of  irresponsible, 
isolated  individuals.  They  are  the  ideas  of  the 
statesmen,  publicists,  teachers  and  leaders  of 
opinion  in  Germany.  They  are  merely  the  echo 
of  the  extraordinary  utterances  of  the  Kaiser 
whose  fundamental  creed  is  that  he  is  responsi- 
ble only  to  God.  He  is  credibly  reported  to 
have  said: 

"It  is  to  the  empire  of  the  world  that  the 
German  genius  aspires. 

' '  God  has  called  us  to  civilize  the  world :  we 
are  the  missionaries  of  human  progress. 

"The  German  people  will  be  the  block  of 
granite  on  which  our  Lord  will  be  able  to  ele- 
vate and  achieve  the  civilization  of  the  world. ' ' 
(Quoted  by  Gibbons  in  "The  New  Map  of 
Europe,"  p.  31.) 

But  the  proofs  of  the  German  menace  to  the 
world  rest  not  merely  on  bombastic  words,  on 
chauvinistic  schemes.  The  diplomacy  of  Ger- 
many for  the  last  seventeen  years  has  repeat- 


WORLD  PEACE  225 

edly  revealed  the  crude  reality  of  her  ambitions. 
It  is  sufficient  to  recall  the  famous  telegram  of 
encouragement  from  the  Kaiser  to  President 
Kruger,  the  blusterings  of  Germany  at  Tangiers 
in  1905,  again  at  Agadir  in  1911,  the  loud  rat- 
tling of  the  sabre  during  the  Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina crisis  of  1908-1909  that  ended  in  the 
humiliation  of  both  Russia  and  Serbia,  the  ar- 
dent support  of  Austria  against  Serbia  in  1914 
and  the  insolent  ultimatum  to  Russia  which 
provoked  war  when  Austria  had  already  agreed 
to  a  peaceful  discussion  of  the  whole  Serbian 
question. 

The  foreign  policy  of  Germany  during  this 
period  was  marked  by  two  characteristics :  the 
attempt  to  achieve  her  ends  by  a  parade  of 
force;  and  to  embarrass  her  rivals  by  sowing 
dissensions  or  encouraging  disaffection.  Mili- 
tarism could  well  afford  to  be  content  for  a 
while,  if  it  could  achieve  its  ends  without  actual 
war.  This  was  an  indirect  Prussian  method 
of  controlling  the  destinies  of  other  nations. 

Fishing  in  troubled  waters  which  they  them- 
selves have  helped  to  trouble  is  an  art  long 
cultivated  by  Prussian  diplomacy.  The  Irish 
disaffection  was  welcomed  and  abetted  with 
great  joy.  A  demoralized  autocratic  Russia  in 
the  hands  of  a  disreputable  German  clique  was 
far  more  to  be  desired  than  a  free  democratic 
state  affording  the  Russians  the  chance  to  de- 
velop a  strong  spirit  of  nationalism.  We  in 
America  would  do  well  to  remember  the  em- 
barrassment   caused   Admiral   Dewey   by    the 


226  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

menacing  presence  of  a  German  fleet  in  Manila 
Bay  in  1898.  We  should  never  forget  German 
intrigues  against  the  very  sovereignty  of  the 
United  States  within  our  borders,  and  in  par- 
ticular the  sardonic  attempt  to  embroil  Mexico 
and  Japan  against  us.  German  ambitions  and 
machinations,  as  this  war  is  rapidly  unfolding, 
have  known  no  limit.  The  history  of  their  dev- 
ilish plots  is  long  and  hideous.  There  can  be 
no  reasonable  doubt  of  their  insensate  ambition 
to  dominate  the  world. 

In  sum,  it  was  not  the  international  bad  man- 
ners— the  Schneidigkeit — of  Germany  which 
isolated  her  and  drew  her  neighbors  into  a  de- 
fensive entente.  It  was  the  "shining  armor" 
that  rendered  friendly  relations  impossible.  It 
was  the  furor  Teutonicus,  the  revealed  purpose 
to  impose  German  Kultur  on  the  rest  of  the 
world,  that  warned  Europe  to  prepare  for  the 
war  long  determined  in  principle  in  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  It  was  not  the  assassination  of  the 
Archduke  that  caused  the  Great  War.  We  now 
know  through  the  revelations  of  Giolitti  to  the 
Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies  that  the  war  was 
planned  for  1913. 

In  view  of  all  these  well  established  facts,  it 
cannot  be  the  undertaking  of  the  Entente  Allies 
merely  to  frustrate  these  Prussian  ambitions. 
Neither  is  it  the  object  of  the  United  States 
to  fight  merely  to  avenge  certain  injured  rights 
It  is  possible  that  a  "peace  without  victory 
resulting  in  an  effort  to  restore  as  far  as  pos- 
sible the  status  quo  ante  would  serve  our  im- 


>  > 


WORLD  PEACE  227 

mediate  ends.  It  would  not,  however,  make  the 
world  safe  for  democracy.  The  sacrifices  of 
the  gigantic  struggle  for  freedom  would  have 
been  largely  in  vain.  The  right  of  free  peoples 
to  determine  their  own  destinies  without  dicta- 
tion from  without  can  only  be  achieved  by  the 
triumph  of  democracy  within  Germany  itself. 
The  world  cannot  be  free,  there  can  be  no  true 
system  of  international  law,  so  long  as  Germans 
remain  enslaved  and  permit  themselves  to  be 
the  powerful  agents  of  Prussian  despotism. 
There  can  be  no  real  international  freedom 
where  so  powerful  a  nation  places  itself  above 
restraint,  whether  from  within  or  without. 

Since  the  moment  Germany  pleaded  its  own 
military  necessity  as  the  excuse  for  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgium,  she  has  constituted  herself  a 
self-confessed  outlaw.  We  were  slow  to  realize 
our  duty  against  this  hostis  humani  generis. 
We  long  tolerated  inhuman  violations  of  our 
rights  on  the  high  seas,  and  even  endured 
ugly  intrigues  and  crimes  in  our  very  midst. 
The  truth  was  hard  to  believe.  Such  villainous 
acts  and  projects  were  entirely  foreign  to  our 
way  of  thinking,  to  our  understanding  of  the 
obligations  of  one  state  toward  another.  But 
at  last  we  saw  the  German  menace  in  all  its 
terror.  We  saw  not  merely  our  own  interests 
imperilled:  we  saw  the  enemy  of  freedom 
reaching  out  to  throttle  the  world.  We  shook 
ourselves  from  our  drugged  state  of  callous  in- 
difference and  crude  provincialism.  We  saw 
the  splendid  vision  of  our  duty  as  a  member 


228  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

of  the  great  family  of  nations.  We  came  to 
realize  that  international  peace  and  order  were 
at  the  mercy  of  the  greatest  outlaw  the  world 
has  ever  seen.  Though  tragically  late,  we  are 
now  trying  to  do  our  duty  as  good  international 
citizens.  We  are  ready  to  pay  a  fearful  price 
for  the  preservation  of  freedom,  the  freedom 
of  nations  to  determine  their  own  destinies,  the 
supreme  stage  in  the  ancient  struggle,  the  most 
heroic,  the  most  horrible  of  all  the  conflicts  for 
the  sacred  cause. 

It  ought  to  be  sufficient,  perhaps,  merely  to 
realize  the  simple  fact  that  we  are  fighting 
against  an  outlaw.  The  immediate  task  is  ob- 
viously stupendous.  It  demands  all  our  powers, 
all  our  loyal  devotion.  'We  cannot  prudently 
ignore,  however,  the  question  which  is  heard 
on  all  sides :  "How  can  the  world  be  made  safe 
for  democracy?"  What  are  the  guarantees  of 
freedom?  This  is  not  mere  speculation:  it  is 
a  very  practical  problem.  It  is  our  solemn  duty 
to  make  certain  that  all  this  horror  and  heroism 
shall  not  have  been  in  vain. 


I 

First  of  all,  it  should  be  obvious  that  the  out- 
law must  be  defeated.  He  must  not  merely  be 
checked:  he  must  be  overwhelmingly  beaten. 
The  immediate  problem  is  purely  of  a  military 
character.  What  shall  be  done  with  the  outlaw 
after  he  is  beaten  or  captured  is  of  second- 
ary importance.    We  have  been  all-too-slow  to 


WORLD  PEACE  229 

realize  the  immense  menace  from  Germany  on 
land  and  sea.  While  we  have  leisurely  made 
plans  and  indulged  in  futile  discussions,  the 
Entente  Allies  have  suffered  terrific  losses  that 
have  greatly  weakened  their  powers  of  resist- 
ance. Our  help  may  arrive  too  late.  The  ques- 
tionings, the  obstacles  placed  by  pacifists  and 
others  have  had  a  criminal  result  in  withholding 
urgently  needed  aid  from  those  engaged  in  a 
life  and  death  struggle  with  a  marvellously  pre- 
pared and  extremely  powerful  outlaw.  The 
fight  for  freedom  cannot  be  won  by  words  or  by 
academic  discussions  concerning  terms  of  peace. 
It  is  essentially  a  military  problem. 

II 

We  must  next  remember  that  we  are  wres- 
tling, not  with  flesh  and  blood,  with  guns,  Zep- 
pelins and  submarines,  but  with  a  false  ideal. 
We  are  wrestling  with  a  grossly  materialistic 
conception  of  human  relations;  with  a  pagan 
idea  of  legal  rights  and  obligations  that  recog- 
nizes no  other  necessities  than  those  of  Ger- 
many. We  are  fighting  against  a  feudalistic 
theory  of  the  state  that  threatens  the  freedom 
of  all  other  peoples.  We  are  battling  to  arouse 
the  German  people  from  their  degradation  as 
Prussian  vassals.  We  are  fighting  their  own 
battle  for  freedom  as  did  the  men  of  '76  in 
their  fight  for  British  freedom.  As  President 
Wilson  has  said:  ".  .  .  we  act  without  animus, 
not  in  enmity  toward  a  people  or  with  the  desire 
to  bring  any  injury  or  disadvantage  upon  them, 


230  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

but  only  in  armed  opposition  to  an  irresponsible 
government."    (Message,  April  2,  1917.) 

All  that  is  admirable,  inspiring  and  endeared 
to  the  rest  of  the  world  in  Teutonic  civilization 
is  in  no  way  threatened.  On  the  contrary,  we 
are  fighting  for  the  best  traditions  of  Germany 
against  the  Prussian  foe  that  has  dragged  them 
in  the  mire.  We  are  fighting  to  restore  to  Ger- 
many the  bulwark  of  democracy — the  town 
meeting,  which  originally  came  out  of  her  free 
forests  centuries  ago. 

This  is  a  holy  cause  for  which  German- Amer- 
icans and  all  true  friends  of  Germany  may  loy- 
ally, though  with  natural  feelings  of  sadness, 
shed  their  blood.  The  battles  of  the  North  and 
the  South  over  the  freedom  of  the  slaves  ar- 
rayed brothers  against  each  other.  Defeated 
and  victorious  alike  can  now  truthfully  say  that 
the  end  attained  was  worth  the  sacrifice.  May 
we  not  hope  that  the  influence  and  aid  of  Ger- 
man-Americans in  this  supreme  struggle  for 
freedom  will  prove  of  inestimable  value  in 
arousing  all  Germans  to  the  sense  of  the  need 
of  overthrowing  Prussian  despotism? 

This  truth  must  be  constantly  emphasized: 
that  the  world  will  not  be  made  safe  for  democ- 
racy merely  by  the  defeat  of  the  outlaw.  Inter- 
national law  and  order  may  not  be  preserved  in 
any  other  way  than  by  his  complete  subjection. 
This  can  only  be  accomplished  by  a  sweeping 
political  revolution  in  Germany  which  shall 
have  for  its  fundamental  principle  the  right  of 
free  peoples  to  govern  themselves. 


WORLD  PEACE  231 

III 

With  the  outlaw  banished  and  Prussian  abso- 
lutism overthrown  there  still  remains  the  prob- 
lem of  protecting  international  society  from 
future  violence.  The  spirit  animating  the  sol- 
diers of  all  the  contending  armies  should  be: 
' '  Never  again ! ' '  The  horrors  of  this  war  have 
made  men  solemnly  resolve  to  take  whatever 
steps  may  be  necessary  to  render  other  great 
wars  impossible.  This  has  well  been  termed 
1 '  a  war  against  war. ' ' 

The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  world  organiza- 
tion for  the  preservation  of  order  are  obviously 
immense  and,  possibly,  insuperable,  at  this  stage 
of  civilization.  First  of  all,  as  we  have  seen, 
Germany  must  be  defeated,  and  a  revolution  in 
German  thought  must  be  brought  about.  Be- 
fore nations  can  unite  in  any  common  under- 
taking, they  must  learn  to  think  fundamentally 
alike.  They  must  share  similar  conceptions  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  justice  and  injustice.  They 
must  agree  on  basic  rights.  They  must  agree 
on  the  laws  that  shall  protect  such  rights.  They 
must  agree  on  the  proper  agency  for  the  inter- 
pretation of  these  laws.  They  must  agree  on 
the  nature  of  the  penalties  for  their  infraction. 
They  must  agree  on  the  nature  and  the  powers 
of  the  executive  charged  with  the  maintenance 
of  international  rights  and  order,  as  well  as  for 
the  punishment  of  wrongdoers. 

To  state  these  difficulties  should  serve  to  re- 
mind us  that  the  evolution  of  society  does  not 
permit  great  sweeping  reforms  in  a  day.    Im- 


232  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

mense  patience  as  well  as  wisdom  is  demanded. 
We  are  bound  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of 
vital  differences  among  nations  concerning 
fundamental  conceptions  of  rights  and  obliga- 
tions. We  are  compelled  to  confess  that  inter- 
national law  has  hardly  begun  to  define  national 
interests  and  rights  with  any  precision  or 
authority.  In  some  instances — Poland,  Serbia, 
Bohemia,  for  example — the  basic  right  of  exist- 
ence, even,  has  not  yet  been  determined. 

We  must  admit  that  a  court  presupposes  law : 
that  the  proper  function  of  a  court  is  to  inter- 
pret, not  to  legislate.  We  must  recognize  that 
it  is  inherently  unjust  and  abhorrent  to  attempt 
to  coerce  before  you  have  defined  one's  rights, 
and  have  prescribed  the  proper  way  of  protect- 
ing rights.  Moreover,  the  freedom  of  independ- 
ent democracies  throughout  the  world  demands 
that  they  shall  participate  voluntarily  in  the 
formulation  and  in  the  protection  of  interna- 
tional rights.  The  spectre  of  absolute  sover- 
eignty in  any  form,  whether  within  the  state 
or  between  states,  must  be  forever  banished. 
There  must  be  no  attempt,  whether  by  councils, 
leagues,  international  police  or  any  other  in- 
strumentalities, to  coerce  free  democracies 
through  any  "Great  Leviathan."  We  should 
keep  ever  in  mind  the  vast  distinction  between 
the  town  meeting  and  the  international  com- 
munity: between  municipal  law  and  interna- 
tional law.  Kant  was  right  when  he  observed 
in  his  essay  on  ' '  Perpetual  Peace ' '  that :  * '  This 
juristic  state  must  arise  from  some  sort  of  com- 


WORLD  PEACE  233 

pact.  This  compact  must  not  be  based,  how- 
ever, on  compulsory  laws  like  that  lying  at  the 
basis  of  the  state:  it  must  rather  be  that  of  a 
permanent  free  association." 

Bearing  in  mind  these  great  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  world  organization,  we  cannot  fail  to 
recognize  that  the  problem  is  deserving  of  the 
most  earnest  consideration.  President  Wilson 
has  repeatedly  spoken  of  a  "league  for  peace," 
of  "a  covenant  of  cooperative  peace,"  of  "a 
concert  of  free  peoples,"  of  "a  partnership  of 
democratic  nations,"  of  "a  league  of  honor," 
of  "a  partnership  of  opinion,"  phrases  which 
suggest  something  of  the  vagueness,  the  intri- 
cate nature  of  the  proposition. 

This  proposition  of  international  cooperation 
for  the  preservation  of  world  peace  has  taken 
practical  form  in  the  definite  recommendations 
of  "The  League  to  Enforce  Peace"  organized 
under  the  presidency  of  ex-President  Taft,  and 
guardedly  approved  in  principle  by  some  of  the 
leading  statesmen  of  England,  France,  Ger- 
many and  other  countries,  as  well  as  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson  himself. 

These  recommendations,  in  brief,  are  as  fol- 
lows: (1)  All  justiciable  questions  not  settled 
by  negotiation  shall  be  submitted  to  a  judicial 
tribunal  for  hearing  and  judgment.  (2)  Non- 
justiciable questions  "shall  be  submitted  to  a 
council  of  conciliation  for  hearing,  considera- 
tion and  recommendation. "  (3)  Economic  and 
military  pressure  shall  be  employed  against  any 
member  of  the  League  "that  goes  to  war,  or 


234  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

commits  acts  of  hostility,  against  another  of 
the  signatories  before  any  question  arising  shall 
be  submitted  as  provided  in  the  foregoing." 
(4)  Conferences  shall  be  held  from  time  to  time 
"to  formulate  and  codify  rules  of  international 
law,  which  .  .  .  shall  thereafter  govern  in  the 
decisions  of  the  judicial  tribunal." 

Of  these  recommendations  the  last,  which 
constitutes  a  recognition  of  the  lack  of  inter- 
national legislation  to  formulate  the  rights  of 
nations,  I  believe  to  be  far  the  most  important. 
It  is  a  confession  that  the  whole  structure  of 
international  organization  cannot  be  erected 
until  the  solid  foundations  have  been  laid. 

Another  significant  feature  of  this  proposed 
league  is  its  frank  recognition  of  the  fact  stated 
by  President  Wilson  that:  "Neutrality  is  no 
longer  feasible  or  desirable  where  the  peace  of 
the  world  is  involved  and  the  freedom  of  its 
peoples.  ..."  (Message  of  April  2.)  Further- 
more, this  league  is  a  candid  recognition  of  the 
necessity  of  force  for  the  preservation  of  inter- 
national rights.  It  affords  a  common  platform 
for  extreme  militarists  and  pacifists.  The  name 
of  the  league  permits  the  militarist  to  stress 
the  word  "enforce,"  the  pacifist  the  word 
"peace,"  while  it  also  allows  others  to  stress 
the  word  "league." 

Serious  objections  may  be  made  against  these 
proposals  as  involving  perilous  liabilities  for 
the  United  States  and  an  abandonment  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  It  is  not  to  be  expected  that 
these  recommendations  will  be  adopted  in  toto 


WORLD  PEACE  235 

by  the  great  nations.  They  afford,  however,  an 
excellent  basis  for  discussion,  a  point  de  depart, 
when  the  question  of  future  guarantees  for 
world  peace  shall  be  formally  taken  up. 

"Whether  or  no  the  nations  are  ready  as  yet 
to  enter  into  any  formal  "league,"  any  "part- 
nership" or  "covenant  of  cooperative  peace," 
immense  encouragement  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  the  present  combination  of  fifteen  na- 
tions against  the  Teutonic  bloc  is  virtually  a 
league  of  peace.  Its  object  is  the  preservation 
of  international  order.  This  union  of  interna- 
tional good  citizens  against  an  outlaw  is  a  most 
hopeful  sign  that  the  majority  of  the  nations 
are  in  substantial  agreement  concerning  the 
rights  of  free  democratic  peoples.  It  is  an  en- 
couraging indication  that  with  the  overthrow 
of  Prussian  absolutism  it  would  not  be  impos- 
sible to  secure  a  consensus  of  international  opin- 
ion regarding  the  fundamental  rights  and 
obligations  of  nations.  If  this  fiery  furnace  of 
affliction  should  fuse  the  warring  nations  into 
a  real  "partnership  of  opinion,"  into  one  demo- 
cratic union  of  sympathies  and  ideals,  it  should 
augur  well  for  the  future  peace  of  the  world. 
When  men  understand  each  other  there  may  be 
little  need  of  coercion  or  of  the  formal  organiza- 
tion of  councils,  or  leagues  to  enforce  peace. 


IV 

The  insistent  demand  that  the  respective  bel- 
ligerents should  state  their  definite  terms  of 


236  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

peace  is  hardly  reasonable.  It  would  seem  very 
much  like  cynical  indifference  to  ask  either  the 
outlaw  or  his  victims  to  define  clearly  what  they 
are  fighting  for.  Moreover,  in  any  war  whose 
fortunes  may  fluctuate  from  day  to  day,  where 
deeds  are  done  that  cannot  be  made  right,  where 
situations  are  created  that  render  a  return  to 
the  status  quo  ante  impossible,  neither  of  the 
contending  parties  can  afford  to  lay  all  its 
cards  on  the  table.  There  must  always  be  some- 
thing in  reserve  with  which  to  bargain,  espe- 
cially in  the  interests  of  the  weaker  party. 
Unless  the  belligerents  have  both  become  sin- 
cere converts  to  the  ideal,  the  principle  of  uti 
possidetis  cannot  be  eliminated  from  peace  dis- 
cussions. To  be  definite,  the  question  of  the 
disposition  of  Germany's  conquered  colonies 
depends  very  largely  on  the  question  of  the  dis- 
position of  the  territories  conquered  by  Ger- 
many in  Europe.  The  creation  of  a  Teutonic 
Mitteleuropa  during  this  war  is  a  new  and  por- 
tentous fact  that  must  necessarily  render  diffi- 
cult the  statement  of  war  aims  by  either  of  the 
belligerents  during  the  actual  conduct  of  the 
war. 

All  that  may  fairly  be  demanded  is  that  the 
belligerents  should  formulate  their  general 
aims.  This  has  been  done  with  considerable 
precision  by  the  Entente  Allies  and  the  United 
States.  They  have  demanded  "  restitution, ' ' 
"reparation"  and  "guarantees."  They  have 
insisted  that  the  outlaw  should  restore  his  plun- 
der, should  make  all-too-inadequate  amends  to 


WORLD  PEACE  237 

his  victims,  and  should  be  rendered  impotent 
to  break  again  the  peace  of  the  world. 

The  German  Government,  on  the  other  hand, 
has  spoken  of  a  "German"  peace.  It  has  failed 
to  subscribe  whole-heartedly  to  the  Russian 
formula,  which  has  been  mildly  accepted  by  the 
feeble  Reichstag,  to  the  effect  that  there  shall 
be  no  "annexations  by  conquest"  or  indem- 
nities. The  Kaiser  and  his  Prussian  autocrats, 
the  Austrian  Emperor,  the  Government  of  Hun- 
gary, the  Sultan  of  Turkey, — none  of  them  could 
honestly  subscribe  to  the  condition  emphasized 
by  President  Wilson  "that  governments  derive 
all  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that  no  right  anywhere  exists  to 
hand  people  about  from  sovereignty  to  sov- 
ereignty as  if  they  were  property."  To  sub- 
scribe to  that  principle  would  mean  the  end  of 
their  power,  their  complete  downfall.  In  some 
instances  it  would  mean  the  dissolution  of  their 
nations,  notably,  Austria  and  Hungary.  There 
can  be  no  reconciliation  of  the  war  aims  of  the 
opposing  parties  in  this  struggle.  The  failure 
to  perceive  this  fundamental  fact  is  a  failure 
to  see  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong, 
between  virtue  and  crime,  between  freedom  and 
slavery.  There  can  be  no  honorable  surrender 
by  the  friends  of  international  freedom.  It  is 
an  insult  to  ask  them  repeatedly  what  they  are 
fighting  for. 

But  when  it  concerns  a  question  of  frontiers, 
of  the  disposition  of  the  fates  of  whole  peoples, 
though  the  United  States  may  very  properly 


238  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

decline  to  assume  direct  responsibility  for  all 
future  adjustments  of  this  character,  we  are 
bound  to  insist  on  the  application  of  certain 
sound  principles.  In  our  fight  for  the  over- 
throw of  an  outlaw  and  for  the  safety  of  de- 
mocracy throughout  the  world,  we  are  bound  to 
make  certain  that  no  more  such  criminal  denials 
of  the  rights  of  free  peoples  shall  be  permitted 
as  in  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  Our  concern  is 
primarily  not  about  European  problems  but 
about  problems  which  involve  the  peace  and 
good  order  of  the  whole  world.  We  must  there- 
fore demand  that  this  war  should  result  in  a 
just  recognition  of  all  rights  in  accordance  with 
just  principles.  The  archaic  principle  of  the 
balance  of  power  which  heretofore  has  brought 
such  misery  and  cruel  wrongs  to  Europe  must 
be  forever  repudiated.  The  United  States  has 
not  come  into  this  struggle  to  redress  the  Euro- 
pean " balance  of  power."  We  have  come  into 
the  struggle  primarily  for  the  protection  of  our 
own  rights.  But  we  cannot  shirk  our  responsi- 
bility to  mediate  between  ancient  enmities  and 
bring  to  the  councils  of  Europe  fresh  inspira- 
tion and  counsels  of  justice.  We  cannot  become 
party  to  any  adjustments  based  on  desire  for 
revenge,  aggrandizement  and  power.  We  must 
be  prepared  to  insist  on  the  application  of  sound 
principles  which  shall  ensure  an  enduring  peace. 
Our  own  interests  demand  this,  as  well  as  the 
interests  of  the  nations  most  vitally  concerned. 
The  sacrifices  of  this  hideous  struggle  must  not 
have  been  in  vain. 


WORLD  PEACE  239 

First  of  all,  we  may  properly  insist  on  the 
rights  of  nationalities,  on  the  recognition  of  the 
principle  "that  governments  derive  all  their 
just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed, 
and  that  no  right  anywhere  exists  to  hand  peo- 
ple about  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as 
if  they  were  property."  The  long  fight  of  na- 
tionality and  democracy  must  end  in  the  fullest 
recognition  of  the  right  of  men  to  group  to- 
gether in  accordance  with  their  political,  social, 
religious  and  economic  preferences  and  preju- 
dices. Any  substantial  denial  of  these  rights 
can  only  lead  to  future  wars.  There  can  be  no 
just  "enforcement  of  peace"  where  the  legiti- 
mate claims  of  nationalism  are  not  recognized. 
In  further  territorial  readjustments,  the  wishes 
of  the  people  immediately  concerned  should  be 
ascertained  as  far  as  possible  by  plebiscites. 
But  a  small  minority  should  never  be  permitted, 
in  a  spirit  of  selfish  provincialism,  to  have  the 
final  decision  where  the  larger  interests  of  two 
or  more  nations  are  vitally  involved. 

If  it  should  prove  impossible  in  every  instance 
to  satisfy  fully  the  aspirations  and  claims  of  a 
whole  people  or  of  a  relatively  small  district, 
their  rights  should  be  protected  by  the  establish- 
ment of  complete  local  self-government.  The 
principle  of  autonomy  is  the  logical  corollary 
of  the  principle  of  nationality.  It  may  not  be 
possible  or  desirable  to  guarantee  complete  in- 
dependence to  all  aspirants  for  a  separate  na- 
tional state.  Take  Poland  or  Bohemia  for 
example.    Owing  to  their  peculiar  situation,  and 


240  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

their  relations  to  their  neighbors,  it  would  be 
excessively  difficult  for  them  to  enjoy  absolute 
independence.  But  the  guarantee  of  the  fullest 
degree  of  autonomy  in  affairs  of  a  domestic, 
internal  character  would  be  the  most  essential 
right  of  democratic  free  peoples.  They  may 
not  properly  claim — any  more  than  individuals 
— absolute  freedom  of  action  in  their  external 
relations.  For  the  sake  of  compensating  ad- 
vantages in  protection  and  general  welfare,  they 
may  well  be  content  to  sacrifice  a  certain  amount 
of  freedom.  Any  other  pretensions  might  lead 
to  anarchy  in  international  affairs  as  they  would 
within  the  state. 

A  further  principle  which  would  seem  to  de- 
mand increasing  recognition  is  that  of  interna- 
tional freedom  of  intercourse.  The  nations  of 
the  world  are  growing  more  and  more  depend- 
ent on  each  other,  not  alone  for  physical  neces- 
sities, but  for  intellectual,  artistic  and  moral 
satisfaction  as  well.  The  age  of  Chinese  isola- 
tion is  past.  But  so  also  should  it  be  with 
economic  warfare.  Tariff  frontiers  and  the  ex- 
clusive exploitation  of  colonial  markets  do  not 
conduce  to  world  peace. 

It  is  true,  unfortunately,  that  state  aid  to  in- 
dustries in  various  guises,  or  low  standards  of 
living,  may  enable  the  manufacturers  of  a  given 
country  to  flood  foreign  markets  with  cheaper 
goods.  This  in  turn  naturally  compels  other 
nations  to  raise  protective  dykes.  This  leads 
inevitably  to  friction,  distrust,  hatred  and  war 
itself.    The  end  of  economic  warfare  is  disaster. 


WORLD  PEACE  241 

The  logical  alternative  of  this  lamentable 
state  of  affairs  is  a  frank,  generous,  mutual 
understanding  between  nations  concerning  the 
basic  questions  of  production  and  distribution. 
Whether  one  speaks  of  it  as  reciprocity,  free- 
dom of  trade,  freedom  of  exchange,  or — to  em- 
ploy Mr.  Weyl's  phrase — "the  economic  inte- 
gration of  the  world,"  it  would  seem  clear  that 
the  future  peace  of  the  world  will  depend  in 
very  large  measure  on  the  extent  to  which  na- 
tions are  able  to  reach  generous  agreements  for 
regulated  freedom  of  intercourse  in  all  that 
makes  life  itself,  as  well  as  mere  existence,  worth 
while.  The  whole  question  strikes  at  the  very 
roots  of  human  welfare  and  happiness. 

These  three  basic  principles  of  nationalism, 
autonomy  and  freedom  of  intercourse  amply 
complement  each  other.  They  afford  a  happy 
solution  for  many  trying  European  problems 
such  as  Bohemia,  Poland,  Ireland,  and  Trieste. 
In  the  case  of  Trieste,  for  example,  where  the 
nationalistic  claims  of  Italy  conflict  with  the 
economic  interests  of  the  Austrian  hinter- 
land, the  creation  of  a  "free  port"  with  com- 
plete autonomy  under  Italian  sovereignty,  and 
with  absolute  freedom  of  intercourse  with  Aus- 
tria would  doubtless  prove  an  equitable  ar- 
rangement. 

These  principles  would  seem  to  be  the  sound 
and  just  principles  on  which  the  maintenance 
of  peace  mainly  depends.  The  statesmen  of 
Europe,  for  honest  or  vicious  motives,  have 
heretofore   been   unwilling   to   grant   the   just 


242  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

claims  of  nationalism  and  democracy.  They 
have  been  dazzled  by  the  ignis  fatuus  of  the 
cynical  principle  of  the  "balance  of  power." 
If  this  principle  should  dominate  or  even  exert 
a  minor  influence  on  the  negotiations  for  peace 
which  shall  end  this  war,  it  would  surely  sow 
the  seeds  for  future  wars.  The  United  States 
is  bound  to  see  that  Europe  shall  free  itself 
from  this  baleful  influence  which  is  a  constant 
menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  We  have 
always  stood  for  the  principles  of  nationalism 
and  democracy.  We  abandoned  our  neutrality 
because  "neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or  de- 
sirable where  the  peace  of  the  world  is  involved 
and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples.  ..."  We  are 
bound  to  insist  on  sound  guarantees  for  the 
future  peace  and  freedom  of  the  world.  Such 
guarantees  would  seem  to  lie  mainly  in  respect 
for  the  principles  of  nationalism,  autonomy 
and  regulated  freedom  of  international  inter- 
course. We  may  not  care  to  assume  direct  re- 
sponsibility for  their  application  in  the  Balkans 
and  elsewhere,  but  it  would  seem  to  be  our  duty 
to  insist  on  their  recognition  wherever  the  peace 
of  the  world  may  be  directly  or  indirectly  in- 
volved. We  must  make  certain  that  all  the 
horror  and  the  heroism  of  this  "war  against 
war"  shall  not  have  been  in  vain. 

To  summarize  briefly,  our  consideration  of 
the  objects  of  this  war  from  the  American  point 
of  view  has  led  to  the  following  conclusions : 

1 — The  United  States  is  protecting  its  own 


WORLD  PEACE  243 

vital  interests.  We  were  attacked  by  an  outlaw 
and  could  do  nothing  else  with  self-respect  than 
defend  ourselves.  Not  content  with  inhuman 
attacks  on  our  citizens  and  ships  on  the  high 
seas,  he  conceived  dastardly  plots  in  our  very 
midst.  With  cynical  effrontery  he  dared  at- 
tempt to  incite  Japan  and  Mexico  against  us 
with  promises  of  American  territory.  Negotia- 
tion with  such  a  scoundrel  was  as  shameful  as 
it  was  futile. 

2 — Once  in  the  fight,  we  find  our  task  to  be 
something  more  than  the  satisfaction  of  a  pri- 
vate grievance  and  the  temporary  protection 
of  American  interests.  Our  duty  is  to  make 
certain  that  it  never  can  happen  again.  We  are 
seeking  permanent  guarantees  of  peace.  We 
see  that  the  Prussian  regime  is  a  perpetual 
menace  to  peace.  Its  control  of  the  German 
people,  its  partnership  with  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey  in  a  formidable  Mittel- 
europa,  because  of  its  lust  for  world  power  is 
a  portentous  menace  to  the  free  democracies 
of  the  world.  It  will  not  be  sufficient  merely  to 
thwart  Prussia.  A  free  democracy  in  Germany 
will  be  the  only  genuine  guarantee  of  peace. 
In  this  sense,  therefore,  our  war  against  Ger- 
many, though  primarily  for  the  defence  of  our 
vital  interests,  becomes  a  war  in  behalf  of  inter- 
national freedom.  We  have  resolved  that  "the 
world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy." 

3 — The  war  must  not  be  permitted  to  end  in 
a  compromise  with  an  outlaw.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  must  not  degenerate  into  a  war  for  re- 


244  THE  WORLD  PERIL 

venge,  aggrandizement  and  power.  The  United 
States  is  bound  to  insist  on  reasonable  guaran- 
tees for  enduring  peace.  This  is  indeed  "a  war 
against  war."  We  must  insist  on  the  applica- 
tion of  sound  principles  even  though  we  may 
have  no  immediate  concern  in  the  local  problems 
at  issue.  These  principles  would  seem  to  be  the 
rights  of  nationalities,  of  autonomy,  and  of  reg- 
ulated freedom  of  intercourse.  If  the  belliger- 
ents are  willing  to  negotiate  with  each  other  in 
a  spirit  of  equity,  this  world  catastrophe  will 
have  proved  a  blessing. 

4 — There  remains  the  further  problem  of  in- 
ternational cooperation  for  the  enforcement  of 
rights,  and  the  preservation  of  order  and  peace. 
The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  any  formal  or- 
ganization at  this  stage  of  development  in  the 
community  of  nations  are  many  and  great.  If 
the  law  abiding,  peace  loving  nations,  however, 
are  able  to  crush  this  outlaw,  and  then  lay  the 
foundations  of  peace  in  accordance  with  sound 
principles,  they  may  have  but  little  reason  to 
concern  themselves  about  the  formation  of 
"councils,"  "leagues,"  police,  or  even  of 
courts.  The  application  of  the  Golden  Rule  as 
the  rule  of  enlightened  self-interest  among  na- 
tions will  need  hardly  any  other  sanctions  than 
its  own  sanction.  The  horrors  of  war  must  not 
be  permitted  to  drive  nations  to  adopt  doubtful 
expedients  for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  There 
must  be  no  menace  of  unjust  coercion,  and  no 
denial  of  that  freedom  which  is  even  more  es- 
sential to  nations  than  to  individuals. 


WORLD  PEACE  245 

5 — The  ultimate  problem  of  all  must  always 
remain  that  of  seeking  to  bring  about  better 
understandings  among  nations.  They  must 
learn  to  understand  each  other  first  of  all  in 
order  to  sympathize  with  their  respective  aims. 
They  must  then  learn  to  think  alike  concerning 
the  basic  interests,  the  rights  and  obligations 
of  nations. 

This  is  a  long  process  of  education  requiring 
the  labor  of  generations.  Yet  we  may  confi- 
dently hope  that  this  struggle  will  have  proved 
a  most  powerful  agency  in  making  nations 
understand  each  other.  A  common  task,  a  com- 
mon sacrifice  and  suffering  should  bring  them 
to  a  clear  vision  of  international  justice.  The 
union  of  the  United  States  with  sixteen  other 
nations  in  the  performance  of  the  obligations 
of  good  international  citizenship  cannot  fail  to 
bring  about  a  mutual  understanding  and  re- 
spect that  will  firmly  guarantee  world  peace. 

The  revolution  in  German  thought  that  must 
inevitably  come  about  in  the  near  future  should 
by  the  workings  of  Providence  bring  them  also 
to  a  just  appreciation  of  the  rights  of  other 
nations.  They,  too,  through  sacrifice  and  suf- 
fering will  be  brought  to  a  realization  of  their 
duties  as  good  international  citizens.  The  great 
fight  for  international  freedom  will  have  at- 
tained its  supreme  triumph.  The  United  States 
may  then  thank  God  that  we  were  privileged  to 
have  our  great  share  in  so  sublime  a  cause. 


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